Radical Institutional Innovation: A Multilevel Framework by Basir, Nada
 
 
 
Radical Institutional Innovation: A Multilevel Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
Nada Otman Basir 
 
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies 
 in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Graduate Program in Business Administration,  
Policy and Strategic Management Stream 
Schulich School of Business 
York University 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
 
September 2015 
 
© Nada Basir 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Prior research explores how knowledge brokers can bring about technological innovation 
and the structural and network features of brokers, yet little attention focuses on how these 
micro-level broker relations and processes can have significant macro-level consequences. This 
dissertation begins to fill this gap by examining the role of brokers in creating radical 
institutional innovation. Drawing on research in innovation and institutional field emergence, I 
explore how entrepreneurs create institutional building blocks through brokering and diffusing 
knowledge, resources and capabilities in an emerging field.  
 More specifically, I employ an ethnographic approach that uses semi-structured 
interviews, participant observation, and archival data over a 2-year   period   to   examine  Libya’s  
rapid emergence of civil society after the fall of a dictator regime.  A multi-level process 
framework emerging from the findings highlights the important role institutional brokers, actors 
embedded in both established institutions and in the emerging institutional field, play in bringing 
about radical institutional innovation. These institutional brokers do more than link organizations 
and individuals; they also transform ideas as they are ideally positioned to receive new and 
previously uncombined ideas. The framework developed illustrates the dynamics and 
mechanisms by which these institutional brokers bring about innovation and how their social 
position mediates their relation to the environment in which they are embedded, and drives their 
access to the resources and capabilities that support innovation.  
The findings supplement the rather static portrait of the role of knowledge brokers with a 
more in-depth understanding of the innovation process these individuals and organizations 
participate in as they create radical institutional innovation. The framework also extends current 
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views of institutional field emergence by revealing the important, but often missed dynamics of 
bottom-up strategic action and institutional brokerage as critical drivers of institutional 
emergence. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 This dissertation was motivated by a phenomenon. A phenomenon I saw. One I felt. A 
phenomenon that changed my life and continues to do so. 
February 15, 2011. Fueled by the recent success of Tunisia and Egypt overthrowing their 
own dictators, protests against the Gaddafi regime emerged across Libya. By February 20, 233 
deaths in Benghazi alone were reported by Human Rights Watch and videos had started to 
emerge showing Gaddafi forces and non-Libyan mercenaries using heavy artillery against 
civilians. War had broken out in Libya. By September 21, 2011, after seven months of fighting, 
Tripoli, the final city under regime control, was liberated. But the revolution had a heavy price. 
In the span of eight months over 30,000 Libyans had been killed, 20,000 injured, hundreds raped 
and thousands missing. During the war, over 400,000 civilians became displaced, including 
55,000 left as refugees (UNHCR, 2011). A humanitarian disaster had unfolded. 
Unlike  other  ‘Arab  spring’  countries,  such  as  Tunisia  and  Egypt,  where  even  though  there  
was authoritarian rule, opposition parties, civil society groups, and independent press existed, 
Libya was absent of such freedoms. Under the forty-two year authoritarian rule of Libyan leader 
Muammar Gaddafi, all institutions were government controlled, including all media, and non-
government organizations. Civil society was non-existent. Gaddafi   saw   civil   society   as   “a  
bourgeois culture and an imitation of the West that   has   no   place   here   [in  Libya]”1. But as the 
events of the revolution were unfolding, individuals, inside and outside Libya, were forming 
organizations, media channels, and setting up quasi-governments to deal with the crisis at hand. 
The first impromptu civil organizations had begun to appear, paving the way to the emergence of                                                         
1 Thursday  28,  January  2010,  televised  address  to  the  General  People’s  Congress.   
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civil society.   
The unprecedented events following the start of the Libyan uprising provide a unique 
opportunity for research on organizational and institutional formation. The context represents an 
extreme case of institutional voids and the rapid creation of civil institutions, an extreme case of 
radical institutional innovation.  
 
1.1 Theoretical Lens and Research Gap 
Innovation,  the  “generation,  development,  and  implementation  of  new  ideas  or  behaviors”  
(Damanpour, 1991, p. 556) continues to be an important driver of competitive advantage, 
renewal, and social progress. Innovation ranges from minor changes to what already exists to 
breakthroughs in products, processes, business models, services or organizations, with 
unprecedented features or performance. It is a process for introducing the new, from ideation to 
dissemination. Research in this area continues to build our understanding of the various steps in 
this process. Most of the studies exploring innovation break down the process into two parts, 
generation, and outcomes. Innovation type, speed, radicalness and frequency are among 
dimensions of innovation outcome that are examined by innovation researchers, with type 
receiving the most attention. These include product innovation, service innovation, process 
innovation and business model innovation (Chesbrough, 2010; Daft 2001; Damanpour, 1991; 
Salunke, Weerawardena, McColl-Kennedy, 2013; Van de Ven, 1986). These outcomes are 
usually looked at from an organizational level of analysis with little research exploring macro 
level outcomes.  
Additionally, innovation involves first an actor(s), either an individual, a team, or an 
organization, and second, the broader environment within which the actor(s) is embedded. The 
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actors and the environment they are embedded in, interact and affect one another continuously. 
Yet, innovation researchers tend to focus on one level of analysis, with little understanding of 
how variables at different levels of analysis influence each other (Anderson, Potocnik,  & Zhou, 
2014; Gupta, Tesluk, and Taylor, 2007). Innovation researchers are beginning to extend their 
work in search for a deeper understanding of theses multilevel dynamics of innovation 
(Anderson et al., 2014; Chen, Farh, Campbell-Bush, Wu, & Wu, 2013). Institutions are a nested 
system with various societal, field, organizational, and individual systems (Friedland & Alford, 
1991; Thornton, 2002). Thus, multi-level processes are especially important for understanding 
institutional innovation. Although the outcomes are seen at the field level, the process to get 
there requires work at various levels. It is individuals or groups of individuals that see the need 
for innovation and champion the push to bring about change (Beckert, 1999).  
If institutions are the level of analysis for institutional innovation, then we must have an 
understanding of institutions before we begin to conceptualize institutional innovation. However, 
there has been little connection between the innovation literature and institutional theory 
(Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; Munir & Phillips, 2005; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2015).  
To deepen our understanding of institutional innovation, I bridge the innovation literature 
with the research in institutional theory and field emergence, a body of work that provides a 
more developed macro approach relevant to innovation at the institutional level. 
Institutions emerge and evolve as products of social interaction. At times, they are the 
product of deliberate actions. Other times they arise by accident, as unintended byproducts of 
behaviours and logics that become routinized over time. Although researchers agree that 
institutions matter, there is still disagreement on how institutions are created and who are the 
critical actors involved. Research in the area of institutional field emergence tends to investigate 
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how fields are created, focusing on the role of institutional entrepreneurs in this process (David, 
Sine, & Haveman, 2013; Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004; Powell, White, Koput & Owen-
Smith, 2005). However, much of the focus centers on the legitimization of new organizational 
forms, practices, and the conditions that create institutional entrepreneurs. This research 
primarily focuses on elaborating the characteristics of, and the conditions that, produce these 
actors. It is relatively silent about how they differ in various contexts (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006; Maguire et al., 2004; Pacheco, York, Dean, & Sarsvathy, 2010). Less is known about the 
actions of those actors involved in field emergence (David et al., 2013). Thus, researchers have 
called for more empirical research into the relationship between field position and institutional 
entrepreneurship (Battilana, 2006; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Wright & Zammuto, 2013). In 
addition, little work examines what types of resources are needed for these entrepreneurs to do 
their work, and how they gain access to these resources.  
Also, notwithstanding the important recognition of previous work in this area, the 
literature has yet to give explicit and sufficient consideration to the emergence of institutions, 
especially in the context of institutional voids. More specifically, although a significant, and 
growing, stream of research focuses on how actors create, maintain, and disrupt institutions (e.g., 
DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991, 1992, Dacin, Goodstein & Scott, 2002; Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006; Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008; Wright & Zammuto, 2013), this research 
tends to elucidate micro fields, such as management consulting (Greedwood & Suddaby, 2006) 
and HIV treatment advocacy (Maguire et al., 2004) versus more macro or societal level 
innovation. A review on the work looking at institutional entrepreneurship by Pacheco, York, 
Dean, and Sarasvathy (2010) suggests that there needs to be an expansion of the types of 
institutions that are typically studied and the evolution of these institutions. 
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Finally, organizations typically existed before field emergence, thus much of the focus in 
the field emergence literature is on institutionalization of a field (Philips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 
2000; Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Dorado, 2013), and not particularly in the birth of new 
fields and the process to get to institutionalization. Consequently, significant questions regarding 
the origin and evolution of institutions are left partially unaddressed. 
Furthermore, few empirical studies examine the interplay between more than two levels 
of analysis [see Wright and Zammuto (2013) for a recent exception]. Research looking at 
innovation at the institutional level has typically been seen as a macro process with change being 
initiated at the field-level. There is a neglect of bottom-up change with repeated appeals for 
scholars to give greater attention to the micro-processes of institutionalization (Smets, Morris, & 
Greenwood, 2012). 
Finally, even when research does examine more than one level of analysis, the contexts 
chosen are typically more stable institutional fields (Purdy & Gray, 2009; Tracey, Phillips & 
Jarvis, 2011; Wright & Zammuto, 2013). Institutional innovation is a context dependent social 
process and therefore radical upheaval and transformation differs from changes in more 
developed and established institutional fields. Radical institutional innovation is the development 
of new institutions that transform the institutional field they are embedded in. In some contexts, 
like what was observed in Libya, radical institutional innovation creates a new institutional field. 
To understand how radical institutional innovation emerges, attention must also shift to the 
actors in the process. While some studies emphasize processes, there is little research on the 
detailed activities of institutional entrepreneurs and how these actors perform activities that lead 
to the rise and shift of institutions. Although there have been efforts to incorporate an increasing 
demand for strategic insight in neo-institutional theory (Beckert, 1999; David et al., 2013; 
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Fligstein, 1997), the focus has been mostly on power dynamics, and less so on the strategic 
actions these actors take. What is missing in the dialogue of institutional theory and 
entrepreneurship is the underlying phenomenon of strategic action in field emergence. Little is 
known about how individuals and organizations make strategic choices when confronting major 
institutional upheaval or large-scale institutional transitions. Finally, there is growing recognition 
that spatial systems connecting people and other institutions allow for positive interactions that 
result in successful knowledge transfer, creativity, and ultimately innovation outcomes (Fleming, 
Mingo & Chen, 2007; Hsu & Lim, 2013; Wang, 2014). Although these studies are not at the 
institutional level of analysis, they underscore the imperative role brokerage can play in 
innovation. A brokerage lens can bring valuable insight into the underlying processes of 
emergence in radical institutional innovation. 
The assumption that innovation has many dimensions and cannot be treated equally in 
studies that treat innovation as a dependent variable, has fueled a great deal of research that 
explicitly defines the type of innovation within the innovation literature. However, little work 
has looked at innovation at the institutional level or taken a multi-level approach. Within 
institutional research, attention to institutional fields and their emergence has offered a better 
understanding of how fields evolve and the actors involved. However, a deeper understanding of 
strategic action, and how the processes and actors involve differ in various contexts is still 
required.  
This  dissertation  begins  to  fill  these  gaps  and  heeds  the  call  for  “research  on  the  different  
processes, antecedents, and micro and macro structures that generate collective action through 
which  institutions  are  created  and  the  causal  mechanisms  behind  them”  (Hargrave  &  Van  de  Ven,  
2006, p. 866). More specifically, it seeks to answer the following questions: 
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• Who are the key actors that bring about radical institutional innovation? 
• What characteristics do they hold that enables them to innovate in an institutional void? 
• How do they create radical institutional innovation? 
 
1.2. Overview of the Methodology 
I chose a grounded theory approach as an appropriate methodology for this study. This 
approach involves understanding prior research on the phenomenon under investigation and 
relevant concepts. Themes are abstracted and emerged from the data by making empirical 
observations in the field, and iteratively moving between data generation and data analysis. The  
ultimate goal of this type of approach is to organize and communicate the data through 
categories, typologies, or ultimately, new theory. This is appropriate as it allowed me to take 
note of existent themes and their limitations, to acknowledge recent developments in the field but 
also remain in close contact with the empirical phenomena while being theoretically flexible. 
I employ qualitative research, as it is useful for building process theories because it is 
highly sensitive to the context and sequence of organizational events and actions with the ability 
to offer insight into complex social processes that quantitative data cannot easily reveal. More 
specifically, I use ethnographic methods and approaches to data collection and analysis by 
submerging myself in the field from the beginning of the phenomenon. I collected data using 
semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and archival data over a 2-year period to 
examine   Libya’s   rapid   emergence   of   civil   society   after   the   fall   of   a   dictator   regime.   This  
approach emphasizes the experiential, with an approach to knowledge that is both contextual and 
interpersonal thus allowing for data collection that takes into account the various forces and 
history surrounding the innovation.  
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1.3. Organization of the Dissertation 
 In chapter 2, I present a review of the relevant literature in innovation and institutional 
field emergence. I then present my conceptualization of institutional innovation by bridging 
work on technological innovation with institutional theory. Here I introduce and elaborate on the 
concept of radical institutional innovation. I then present my multi-level framework of radical 
institutional innovation that I developed to guide my research going into the field. Following this, 
chapter 3 details the ethnographic methodology used. I articulate the rationale for the choice of 
methodology and case study site. In Chapter 4, I introduce the resulting framework and explicate 
the antecedents of radical institutional innovation and the characteristics of the actors that were 
found to instigate the process. As a result of my data collection, the focus of this dissertation 
became a specific type of actors, whom I label institutional brokers. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 describe 
the three dynamics uncovered in the process – creative translation, network cultivation and     
collaborative transmission. Next, Chapter 8 integrates these three dynamics in a multilevel 
process framework. Finally, Chapter 9 offers a discussion of the findings and their implication 
for research in the area of innovation and institutional theory, and practice. I conclude with 
limitations and directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL MOTIVATION AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW  
 
 
This dissertation is grounded in two different streams of research; innovation and 
institutional theory. Since this study follows a grounded theory approach, I entered into the field 
with  a  general  research  question  asking,  “How  does  radical  institutional  innovation  emerge?”   
I start my literature review with a brief overview of civil society, how it is defined and its 
relationship to institutional innovation elucidating key elements that make up the civil society 
field. Following this, my literature review reflects my grounded theory approach examining 
institutional theory and innovation broadly first. I then bridge these two streams to develop the 
concept of institutional innovation. My underlying premise is that both the innovation and 
institutional theory literature are speaking past each other, however there is much that can be 
learned by bridging these two areas of work together. Finally, I present the process framework 
going into this research based on the extant research.  
 
2.1. Civil Society  
Civil society can be defined in many ways. I utilize the commonly used and broad 
definition proposed  by  Helmut  Anheier;;  “civil society is the arena outside family, government, 
and  market  where  people   voluntarily  associate   to  advance  common   interests  based  on  civility”  
(Anheier, 2008). This definition encompasses a vast array of organizations, both formal and 
informal, and includes; interest groups, cultural organizations, civic and developmental 
associations, issue-oriented movements, media organizations, and the social relations of mutual 
respect. Sievers (2010) proposes seven core concepts as the constitutive elements of a definition 
of civil society. These concepts frequently appear in the large body of civil society literature, and 
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incorporate the essential institutional and normative factors present that create the social 
framework needed for civil society to flourish (Sievers, 2010).  Philanthropic organizations, legal 
frameworks, nonprofit and voluntary organizations, and a system of free expression reflect 
institutional structures. The other three, commitments to the common good, to individual rights, 
and to tolerance, reflect social norms. The elements that constitute the structure of civil society 
are the primary vehicles outside the state through which citizens interact and collaborate to 
achieve common purposes. The three normative elements are the values animating these 
institutions. Sievers (2010) argues   that   these   elements   are   “constitutive   and   interactive  
components that together create the necessary and sufficient conditions for the successful 
functioning of modern civil society. They are mutually supportive and interdependent”  (Sievers,  
2010; 7). More recently, Anheier (2013) introduced a Civil Society Diamond (CSD) as a basic 
system to present and analyze the major contours of civil society in a systematic way. The 
framework is based on four dimensions, and when relative indicators are generated for each scale 
of the dimensions, a diamond is formed. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the CSD. 
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FIGURE 1: Illustration of Civil Society Diamond 
 
 
The four dimensions include: structure, which describes the make-up of civil society, 
space, which looks at what legal and cultural climate civil society operates in, the values 
dimension refers to what values civil society represents and advocates, and finally, the impact 
dimension looks at what are the contributions of civil society. Table 1 provides an overview of 
these four dimensions incorporating the seven elements put forward by Sievers. This framework 
provides a backbone that facilitates understanding the context of this study and the outcomes of 
institutional innovation in the Libya context. 
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TABLE 1: Civil Society Diamond Overview2 
 
Dimension Key Question Elements Example 
Indicators 
 
Structure 
 
How large is civil society in 
terms of institutions, 
organizations, networks and 
individuals; what are its 
component parts; and what 
resources does it command? 
 
Philanthropic 
organizations, 
nonprofit and 
voluntary 
organizations, and a 
system of free 
expression 
 
 
Number of 
organizations, 
memberships, 
share of 
philanthropic 
giving,  
Space What is the legal and political 
space within the larger 
regulatory environment in 
which civil society operates; 
and what laws and policies 
enable or inhibit its 
development? 
 
Governance and 
regulatory systems, 
legal frameworks 
Degree of 
enablement 
provided by 
regulatory 
environment 
Values What values underlie civil 
society; what values, norms 
and attitudes does it represent 
and propagate; how inclusive 
and exclusive are they; and 
what areas of consensus and 
dissent emerge? 
 
Commitments to the 
common good, to 
individual rights, and 
to tolerance 
Democratic 
inclusion (e.g. 
human rights 
values; democratic 
attitudes 
Impact What is the contribution of 
civil society to specific social, 
economic and political 
problems? 
Development and 
achievements 
Efficiency and 
effectiveness of the 
operations of civil 
society 
organizations, and 
 
 
Although the CSD has its own major conceptual and methodological issues3, it provides a 
core set of characteristics and dimensions to describe the state of civil society in a given context.  
                                                        
2 Adapted from Anheier and Carlson, 2001. 
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Furthermore, these dimensions do not operate in isolation. Although civil society is referred to as 
the third sector, acting autonomously from the state and private businesses, there is an inherent 
tension present between the relationships of civil society and these other sectors. For example, 
even though civil society is considered to be separate from the state, it is regulated by it. The 
state is involved in shaping civil society organizations by means of financial instruments, 
accountability procedures, and performance management. Accordingly, civil society provides an 
enabling framework for democracy and state building. Similarly, the private sector is many times 
financiers of civil society organizations, while at the same time, civil society can shape the 
business landscape. One only needs to look at the sustainability movement and its affect on 
private businesses to see how important this relationship is. Sievers (2010; 2) writes:  
“While   civil   society   provides   an   enabling   framework   for   democracy,   at   the  
same time it contains an intrinsic tension, a fragile balance between private and 
public interests. Maintaining this balance is essential to finding solutions to 
vital challenges in modern democracies that demand public resolution, 
challenges such as environmental degradation, deficient educational systems, 
ethnic and religious strife, and deterioration of public decision-making 
processes”. 
 
This brief overview of civil society provides a context for this study and consequently, a 
springboard for the literature review. The rapid emergence of civil society institutions in Libya is 
a form of radical institutional innovation. In the following sections, I conceptualize institutional 
innovation.  I begin by exploring previous thinking on the concept and then discuss two separate 
areas of very relevant research; innovation and institutional theory that provide the necessary 
basis for an understanding of institutional innovation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
3 Some of these challenges include applicability across countries that may differ in terms of culture, economy, and 
politics. And technical challenges in terms of data coverage, availability and measurement. Thus, the CSD should be 
considered a basic framework that continues to evolve and develop.  However, it serves a vital starting point in 
conceptualizing civil society for research and policy. 
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2.2 Innovation and Institutions 
It is hard to imagine any issue more central to society than innovation (Drucker, 2006; 
Gupta et al., 2007; Schumpeter, 1942; Van de Ven, 1986). It is essential for society as a whole, 
and for all the subsystems that compromise it, including individuals, organizations, industries, 
institutions, and countries. It is the primary determinant of success, consumer welfare, and vital 
for evolutionary and revolutionary adaptation. For the purpose of this dissertation research, I 
view  innovation  consistent  with  Van  de  Ven  (1986:  592)  that  “as  long  as  the  idea  is  perceived as 
new to the people involved, it is an innovation, even though it may appear to others to be an 
imitation  of  something  that  exists  elsewhere”.   
The rapid growth of research in this area has led to an abundance of findings regarding 
the facilitators, inhibitors, and the process of innovation. Despite the magnitude of research in 
this area and the importance of the topic, no dominant theoretical perspective has emerged to 
integrate theses multiple streams of innovation research (Drazin & Schoonhoven, 1996; Greve, 
2003). What can be agreed on is that innovation is a multi-level phenomenon that involves actors 
at the individual, team, and organizational level, and an environment within which the actors are 
embedded in.   
Institutional theory provides an anchoring theory and a useful lens to begin to understand 
and conceptualize how those levels interact and the role of context in the process when outcomes 
are seen at the institutional level. I first present an overview of institutional theory and relevant 
concepts before introducing the current conceptualizations of institutional innovation. Finally, I 
return to the innovation literature to discuss two premises of that work that are important in 
building a better understanding of radical institutional innovation. I then present the framework 
developed before going into the field. 
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2.2.1 Institutional Theory  
There is a vast array of research stemming from institutional theory. These include 
studies on institutional change, institutional entrepreneurship, institutional fields, and 
institutional work amongst others. For the purpose of this dissertation, I present a brief overview 
of institutional theory and its evolution and then focus on institutional fields and institutional 
work. 
Evolution of Institutional Theory 
The literature on institutionalism suggests that the definition of an institution differs 
significantly depending on the author, the area of research, and sometimes even the context. The 
concept lacks coherence due to many approaches to institutionalism  that  are  “united  by  little  but  
a common skepticism toward atomistic accounts of social processes and a convention that 
institutional   arrangements   and   social   processes   matter”   (DiMaggio   & Powell, 1991:3). In this 
thesis  I  follow  North’s  (1990)  description, describing institutions as consisting of both informal 
constraints (e.g. norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct) and formal 
constraints (e.g. rules, laws, constitutions) and their enforcement properties. Based on this 
definition,   institutions  possess  a  number  of  features.  First,  they  are  “constructs  of  human  mind”  
(North,   1994)   and   “products   of   human   interaction”   (Scott,   2001).   Institutions   in   this   view   are  
evolving, stemming from human beings as the agents of a collective and evolutionary dimension 
of action. Second, institutions guide and govern human behavior in decision-making and 
interactions within society (North, 1990). Institutions create expectations that determine 
appropriate behavior (Meyer & Rowan, 1991) by defining what is appropriate and rendering 
other actions unacceptable (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).  
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Scott (2001) formulates three forces that shape these behaviors; regulatory, cognitive and 
normative. Regulatory forces represent the laws and regulations that individuals and 
organizations must comply with. These are the conscious aspect of institutions. Cognitive forces 
stem from individual underlying beliefs, knowledge and skills. Normative forces are based on 
social obligations to comply that are rooted in social, professional and organizational interactions.  
North   (1993)   describes   institutions   as   “rules   of   the   game”   and   organizations   as   “the  
players”.   Organizations   exist   to   secure   and   advance   the   interests   of   their   members   within   the  
existing institutional framework, while constantly seeking to influence that framework so that 
they may achieve greater advantages and benefits (Scott, 2001). Thus, the intimate and dynamic 
relationship and interaction between institutions and organizations determines the terms of 
exchange and access to resources in a market, sector, and society as a whole.  
The interplay of actors, agency, and institutions plays a dominant role in institutional 
research. Studies in this area began with neo-institutional writing focusing on cultural processes 
through which institutions affected organizational practices and structures (Hinings & 
Greenwood, 1988; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), which led to looking at patterns of isomorphism 
within fields of activity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This early work was subsequently 
criticized for the lack of incorporations of agency into institutional theory and how actors can 
pursue their interests in the face of institutions, also referred to as the paradox of embedded 
agency  (Holm,  1995;;  Seo  &  Creed,  2002).  Oliver’s  seminal work (1991) offers an approach to 
this problem by combining strategic approaches with new institutionalism to analyze how actors 
develop specific strategies depending on their institutional environment. Others called for the 
incorporation of agency into institutional theory (Beckert, 1999; Hirsch, 1997; Hirsch & 
Lounsbury, 1997). Subsequent research started to focus on how actors affect institutional 
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arrangements (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005).  This work centers on institutional entrepreneurs, actors who have an interest 
in particular institutional arrangements and who mobilize resources to create new institutions or 
transform existing ones (DiMaggio, 1988; Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Rao, Morrill, 
& Zald, 2000; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). These agents can be either organizations or groups of 
organizations (e.g. Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002) 
or individuals or groups of individuals (e.g. Fligstein, 1997; Maguire et al., 2004) or institutions 
(Zilber, 2007). Much of the focus of these studies is on how these actors legitimate the formation 
of new organizations, industry sectors, and institutional fields (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001).  
Institutional Fields 
Institutional   fields   are   “a   recognized   area   of   institutional   life”   (DiMaggio   &   Powell,  
1983:  148)   in  which   “participants   interact  with  one  another  more   frequently   and   fatefully   than  
with   actors   outside   the   field”   (Scott,   2001:   56).   More   recently,   scholars   have   expanded to a 
broader   definition   of   a   field,   defining   it   as:   “two   constitutive   elements:   a   set   of   institutions,  
including   practices,   understandings,   and   rules;;   and,   a   network   of   organizations”   (Lawrence   & 
Phillips, 2004: 692). They are comprised of three key components: structured positions that are 
occupied by actors that make up the field (Maguire et al., 2004), understandings and meaning 
systems (Scott, 2001), and formal rules such as laws or professional standards that organizations 
must conform to (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  
The conceptualization of civil society embodies these institutional elements and forces.  
There are networks of non-profit and philanthropic organizations and individuals actively 
participating in this sector. There are meaning systems and understandings that encompass 
individual rights, the common good, and tolerance. Finally, there are also regulatory frameworks 
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governing civil society organizations including laws associated with the rules of funding, 
lobbying, and assembly. Therefore, the creation of fields is of particular importance for this 
research.  
Researchers continue to explore how new fields are created. Prior research suggests that 
field emergence occurs through a process of isomorphism that is a result of interconnected and 
interdependent organizations (Dacin, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood & Hinings, 
1988; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  Fields are said to arise from structures of existing fields and are 
legitimized through the actions of actors in the field (Baron, Dobbin & Jennings, 1986; Tolbert 
& zucker, 1983). Fligstein (2001) argued that external environmental shocks give rise to 
significant institutional changes that are the main driver of field creation. Fields develop through 
network relationships (Galaskiewicz & Waserman, 1989, Lawrence & Phillips, 2004), conflict 
(Purdy & Gray, 2009), and the diffusion of shared understandings, beliefs and norms. These 
patterns of social action produce, reproduce, and transform the institutions and networks that 
constitute it (Lawrence & Phillips, 2004; Maguire et al., 2004). This process can be strategic as 
various groups seek to establish new fields (Beckert, 1999; Maguire et al., 2004; Perkmann & 
Spicer, 2007). Social movement theory emphasizes how new fields are created by mobilizing 
resources (e.g. McCarthy & Zald, 1987) and framing issues strategically to motivate and 
legitimate activities (Creed, Scully & Austin, 2002; Lounsbury et al., 2003). However, although 
these studies have provided explanations of how new fields are established, they do not provide a 
complete understanding of how fields actually form (Levy & Scully, 2007; van Bommel & 
Spicer, 2011). 
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2.3. Institutional Innovation 
Where institutional theory explains homogeneity, innovation is a means of introducing 
heterogeneity. Attempts to develop an understanding of institutional innovation are limited. The 
concept has been used in some prior work on institutional change (for example Hargrave & Van 
de Ven, 2006; Rao & Giorgi, 2006), however there has been little connection between the 
innovation literature and institutional theory and scant conceptualization of the term (Hargrave & 
Van de Ven, 2006; Munir & Phillips, 2005). While some studies use the term institutional 
innovation interchangeably with institutional change (for example, Ruttan, 1984), Hargrave and 
Van de Ven (2006) offer a definition that distinguishes institutional innovation from institutional 
change. However, they do not elaborating on the actual dimensions that separate the two 
descriptions, arguing that change versus innovation is based on magnitude of divergence in a 
period of time;  
 
We define institutional change as a difference in form, quality, or state 
over time in an institution. Change in an institutional arrangement can 
be determined by observing the arrangement at two or more points in 
time on a set of dimensions (e.g., frames, norms, or rules) and then 
calculating the differences over time in these dimensions. If there is a 
noticeable difference, we can say that the institution has changed. If 
the change is a novel or unprecedented departure from the past, then it 
represents an institutional innovation (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006: 
866). 
  
Recently, Raffaelli and Glynn (2015) argue that institutional innovation is located at the 
intersection of three dimensions: novelty, usefulness, and legitimacy.  This is similar to other 
types of innovation in that innovation is typically conceptualized as new and useful. However, it 
differs in that they argue that legitimacy is essential to institutional innovation.  They also 
broaden the concept to the field level. More specifically, Raffaelli and Glynn (2015) suggest that 
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institutional innovation is the   “novel,   useful   and   legitimate change that disrupts the cognitive, 
normative  or  regulative  mainstays  of  an  institutional  field” (pp. 408).  
Legitimacy   is   an   important   dimension   in   institutional   innovation   as   “the   creation,  
transformation, and diffusion of institutions require legitimacy, a condition whereby other 
alternatives  are   seen  as   less  appropriate,  desirable,  or  viable”   (Dacin et al., 2002: 47).  This is 
seen   in  Hargadon  and  Douglas’ (2001)   study  of  Edison’s   innovation   factory  where   the  authors  
illustrate  how  Edison’s   innovation of electricity succeeded, in part, because he embedded it in 
familiar and legitimate systems. Other work in the entrepreneurship literature (for example 
Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Navis, & Glynn, 2010) recognizes how the institutional context binds 
entrepreneurial innovations as they cast them as being legitimate. A further contribution of 
Raffaelli   and   Glynn’s   (2015)   work   is   that it bridges institutional and innovation constructs. 
Raffaelli   and   Glynn’s   work   is   useful   for   conceptualizing   institutional innovation.  Yet, how 
institutional innovation emerges and is legitimized has yet to be explored. Furthermore, there is 
the assumption that there are cognitive, normative and regulative forces already present for this 
process to take place. This overlooks contexts where institutional innovation is arising and being 
formed.  There is still much to learn about how institutional innovation happens. Research 
stemming from past innovation research can help inform our understanding of institutional 
innovation. 
 
2.3.1 Innovation – Process and Outcome 
The fundamental outcome of innovation is the creation of something new. However, it is 
also a process. Decades of work have focused on building a better understanding of the process 
and outcomes of innovation. From this research, there are two key insights that are especially 
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relevant in understanding institutional innovation and help shed light on how radical institutional 
innovation emerges and evolves. The first insight comes from understanding the process of 
innovation. Although there is no definitive process of innovation, recombination is typically at 
the heart of innovation. Essentially, innovation is a process of recombining resources, whether 
that is technologies, business units, ideas, or business model with new things emerging by 
recombining what already exists in novel and unique ways.  The second premise is based on the 
outcome of the innovation. Here, two broad forms of innovation, incremental and radical 
innovation, are generally recognized and used in innovation studies with researchers arguing that 
the processes, antecedents, and capabilities required differ depending on the type of innovation 
outcome (Damanpour, 1991; van Dijk, Berends, Jelinek, Romme & Weggeman, 2011). I now 
review these two insights and how they can inform our understanding of institutional innovation. 
Types of Innovation 
Innovation scholars tend to distinguish between incremental and radical innovation 
(Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997). Incremental innovations are typically extensions to 
current product offerings or logical and relatively minor extensions to existing processes (Benner 
and Tushman, 2003; Gatignon, Tushman, Smith, & Anderson 2002; Jansen, Bosch, & Volberda, 
2006).  They have minor impacts on existing products and services in the market. The strategic 
focus in incremental innovation rests on improving and expanding current products and services 
in a market within a short time (Abernathy & Clark, 1993; Ettlie, Bridges, & O'Keefe, 1984; 
Taylor & Greve, 2006). It requires the ability to reinforce and take advantage of existing 
knowledge resources (Danneels, 2002; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). Outputs of incremental 
innovations are slight variations of existing products, services, practices or approaches 
(Damanpour, 1991).  
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Radical innovation is referred   to   as   ‘revolutionary’,   ‘disruptive’,   ‘discontinuous’,   or  
‘break- through’   (Freeman,   1974;;   Garcia   & Calantone, 2002; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Radical innovation differs in that it seeks to meet the needs of emerging customers or markets 
(Benner & Tushman, 2003; Jansen et al., 2006) and involves the development or application of 
significantly new technologies or ideas into new markets or require dramatic behavioral changes 
to existing markets. These technologies then provide the foundation upon which future 
generations of products are manufactured. The magnitude of change for radical innovations is 
larger than incremental innovations and is based more on long-term strategy, where 
organizations attempt to disrupt the prevailing technological trajectory and create new designs, 
technologies, and distribution channels for new markets (Abernathy & Clark, 1993; Ettlie et al., 
1984; Gatignon et al., 2002). Thus, radical innovation builds on knowledge resources that a firm 
does not yet have or that differs from existing resources (Danneels, 2002). It is more strategic in 
nature. In this case, exploratory learning becomes critical in that the firm needs to search a wide 
range of available knowledge to expand existing knowledge domains to novel or unfamiliar areas 
(Kang & Snell, 2009; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). These innovations have the ability to make 
prevailing technologies obsolete by transforming the old knowledge into new knowledge, 
thereby producing fundamental changes in an organization (Damanpour, 1991; Subramamiam & 
Youndt, 2005).  
If we extend the idea of radical innovation to the institutional level, radical institutional 
innovation would involve the creation and design of institutions in a field where little or no 
institutions exist. It most likely occurs when new problems arise and there is no   ‘focal’  
institution readily available for selection or modification (Rittberger, 2012). A profound crisis or 
‘substantial  gap  in  the  institutional  status  quo’  has  likely  occurred.  The  process  is  typically  risky  
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and costly for the actors involved with the implications of the process often unclear. From a 
normative perspective, actors involved in radical institutional innovation tend to engage in 
deliberative and argumentative processes over the right and legitimate institutional order to 
govern a problem or solve a particular crisis (Blyth, 2002). Thus this process is highly creative.  
If we extend this dichotomy of types of innovation and   the   use   of   ‘radical’   and  
‘incremental’   to   the   institutional   level, we can define incremental institutional innovation as 
occurring when and where there are existing institutions that do not satisfactorily address 
problems at hand due to them being ineffective or inappropriate in carrying out the designated 
actions. This process is situated in a more stable normative environment where standards of 
legitimacy already exist (Rittberger, 2012). In contrast, radical institutional innovation is defined 
as the development of new institutions that transform the institutional field they are embedded in 
or create new institutional fields.  
Innovation as Recombination 
Research on innovation has long sought to determine the sources of innovative 
breakthroughs.     This  concept  dates  back  to  Schumpeter’s  (1942)  perspective  on   innovation  and  
creativity and was further emphasized by evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and 
the knowledge-based view of the firm (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). In much of this 
work the process of recombination is a primary driver of innovation (Henderson & Clark, 1990; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Schumpeter, 1934). As Nelson and Winter 
(1982:  130)  state:  “the  creation  of  any  sort  of  novelty  in art, science, or practical life-consists to a 
substantial extent of a recombination of conceptual and physical materials that were previously 
in existence”.  
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Research examining various new innovations, such as the making of the PCR technology 
(Rabinow,   1996),   Henry   Ford’s   production   line   (Hounshell,   1984),   much   of   Edison’s   work  
(Hargadon, 2003), and the success of the product design company IDEO (Hargadon & Sutton, 
1997) demonstrate that the processes of recombining existing elements are fundamental to 
explaining many successful innovative outcomes (Senyard et al., 2014). Much of this research 
draws   from   a   ‘tension’   view   of   the   relationship   between   knowledge   and creativity (Weisberg, 
1999). Here, deep knowledge in one domain is said to dampen creativity by entrenching 
individuals into one way of thinking. Recombination of different kinds of knowledge breaks 
these bonds to produce novel solutions (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). On the other hand, a less 
tested  theory  of  creativity  comes  from  the  ‘foundational  view’  (Weisberg,  1999;;  Taylor  & Greve, 
2006). This view suggests that in order to break out of existing constraints and advance a field 
beyond its current state, one needs to have a deep understanding of a particular area first. 
Therefore, recombination can be detrimental as the recombiner is combining elements without 
full understanding of what is being recombined (Kaplan & Vakili, 2014).  
Regardless, recombination is inarguably at the heart of creativity, organizational success 
and economic growth (Hargadon, 2003;;  Hargadon  &  Sutton,  1997;;  Murray  &  O’Mahony,  2007).  
Although the importance of cumulative innovation is clear, we still do not fully understand the 
conditions  that  shape  an  innovator’s  ability  to  build  on  the  work  of  others.  Furthermore,  attempts  
to understand the sources of innovation have been frustrated by a lack of understanding of the 
process by which inventors create new innovations (Fleming, 2001, Kaplan & Vakili, 2014). 
The process of radical institutional innovation versus incremental institutional innovation 
highlights different implications for the normative component of institutions. In radical 
institutional innovation, actors tend to engage in deliberative and argumentative processes over 
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the   ‘right’   and   ‘legitimate’   institutional   order   to   govern   a   problem   or   solve   a   particular   crisis  
(Blyth, 2002)4. Therefore this process is more creative and deliberate as actors attempt to define 
what constitutes as legitimate solutions to the problem(s) at hand. This requires a great deal of 
resources and creativity in recombination as actors struggle to make dramatic changes to 
institutional logics.  Institutional logics are the organizing templates that govern institutional 
fields, defining appropriate means and ends, providing motivation and identity to individuals 
(Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2002). This radical 
innovation process likely requires various actors from proximate fields to help bridge the gap in 
knowledge and to recombine this knowledge creatively to address the void that is present. 
This section integrates and bridges literature on institutions and innovation to develop the 
concept of institutional innovation, both radical and incremental. In the next section, based on 
this foundation, a framework delineating the dynamics of radical institutional innovation is 
offered.  
 
2.4. The Dynamics of Radical Institutional Innovation  
 
The conceptual framework presented in Figure 2 delineates the dynamics of radical 
institutional innovation developed based on the literature review before entering the field and 
collecting data. This framework weaves together the foundation established earlier in this chapter 
and provided a conceptual backdrop and springboard for the dissertation research.   
 
 
                                                        
4 Blyth uses the term institutional creation.  
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Figure 2: Radical Institutional Innovation: A Multi-level Process Framework 
 
 
2.4.1. Triggers of Radical Institutional Innovation 
 
What leads to radical institutional innovation? Why does it happen? Simply stated, this 
dissertation proposes that radical institutional innovation occurs in response to a major 
environmental change or exogenous shock (Fligstein, 1997; Hoffman, 1999), and can be 
exaggerated in the presence of institutional voids.  
I propose that field level conditions initiate the institutional innovation process. Field 
level conditions include jolts and crises that occur from social upheaval, technological disruption, 
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competitive discontinuity and regulatory changes that disrupt current logics in the field and 
introduce new ideas (Child & Tsai, 2005; Fligstein, 1997, 2001; Greenwood et al., 2002; Holm, 
1995). When actors decide to engage in radical institutional innovation it often reflects a 
profound crisis or substantial gap in the institutional status quo, where any existing or relevant 
institutions are not adequate to deal with the crisis event at hand.  
 One possible field-level condition that enables radical innovation as shown in Figure 2 is 
the presence of institutional voids, a term originally coined by Khanna and Palepu (1997) to 
account for the macro-level   “absence   of   specialized   intermediaries,   regulatory   systems,   and  
contract-enforcing mechanisms”   (Palepu,   Khanna   &   Sinha,   2005:   63).   The term institutional 
void is used by scholars from different streams of research, particularly in the political sciences 
and sociology literature, which focus on how institutional voids hamper market development 
(Polanyi, 1944; Woodruff, 1999), in economics where researchers elaborate on how institutional 
voids prevent the efficient functioning of markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2000), and in 
entrepreneurship where researchers explore how actors maneuver around voids to develop their 
ventures (Luo & Chung, 2013; Marti & Mair, 2009). Marti and Mair (2009) examine the role of 
institutional entrepreneurs in the context of institutional voids and described institutional voids as 
“situations   where   institutional   arrangements   that   support   markets   are   absent,   weak,   or   fail   to  
accomplish the role expected by them (Mair & Marti, 2009: 419).  The presence of voids can 
exaggerate shocks in the institutional environment as the lack of institutions to deal with 
problems and situations that come about due to these shocks creates a sudden demand for 
institutional innovation. 
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2.4.2. Institutional Entrepreneurs and their Social Position 
Institutional innovation can be seen as a collective action process (Hargrave & Van de 
Ven, 2006). In this vein, the actors involved can include individuals or groups of individuals 
(Fligstein, 1997; Maguire et al., 2004), organizations or groups of organizations (Garud et al., 
2002; Greenwood et al., 2002), or other institutions (Zilber, 2002). Their social position mediates 
their relation to the environment in which they are embedded (Emirbayer, 1997; Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998) as it affects the perception of a field (Bourdieu, 1977) and their access to the 
resources needed to engage in institutional innovation (Battilana et al., 2009). Literature 
exploring the role of social positions in changing institutional arrangements finds conflicting 
results, where some studies suggest that organizations and individuals located in the periphery of 
a field, as shown in Figure 2, are more likely to act as institutional entrepreneurs (e.g. Garud et 
al., 2002; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay & King, 1991; Wright & Zammuto, 
2013), other studies find that those in the center of a field are more likely to act as institutional 
entrepreneurs (e.g. Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2002). Battilana, Leca, and 
Boxenbaum (2009) argue that the observed variance seen may be due to differences in field 
characteristics such as the level of heterogeneity and institutionalization or due to differences in 
the type of change.    
Building   on   this,   I   argue   that   an   institutional   entrepreneur’s   position,   or   the   type   of  
institutional entrepreneur involved in the innovation process, also depends on whether it is 
incremental or radical institutional innovation that is taking place. More specifically, radical 
institutional innovation requires actors within the institutional field and those outside the 
institutional field.  This allows for more unique combinations of resources that can be used to 
build the institutional field. 
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Research also indicates that the ability of institutional entrepreneurs to act is dependent 
on their willingness to act and their access to enough resources to do so. According to Bourdieu 
(1990), the social position of an actor determines their perception of the field, their views about 
the field, and the stand they take to maintain the status quo of the field. Therefore, the 
willingness of an agent to transform a field is dependent on their social position within that field. 
Recent work has explored how an individuals’   or   organizations’   social   position   affects   the  
likelihood for them to act as institutional entrepreneurs. For example, Dorado (2005) argues that 
the likelihood of an actor to behave as an institutional entrepreneur is dependent on the actors 
perception of the field, which is affected by the their social position in their social network. 
Similarly,  Maguire,  Hardy   and   Lawrence’s   (2004)   study   on  HIV/AIDS   treatment   advocacy   in  
Canada suggests that the formal position of actors provides them with legitimacy in the eyes of 
stakeholders, and enables them to access various resources. Wright and Zammuto (2013) look at 
how actors situated in mature fields use their field positions to create opportunities for 
institutional entrepreneurship. They find that these actors leverage the resources (knowledge 
corridors, formal authority, social ties, and discursive resources) that accompany their position, 
and tactics to deploy these resources. These tactics include agenda setting, construction of 
narratives, empirical verification and entrepreneurial bricolage.  
Just as technological innovation requires the recombining of previous innovations, 
institutional innovation can be seen as a combination of prior, or already present, institutions and 
institutional elements (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Rojas, 2010). 
In a context of institutional voids these elements of recombining need to come from outside that 
field. To do this, institutional entrepreneurs located outside the field periphery must be involved. 
However, these actors lack legitimacy in the field. Thus, actors already in the field play a 
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bridging role to work with external actors to introduce innovation (Westley & Vredenburg, 1991). 
Both these groups are connected to already existing institutions and institutional frameworks that 
interact with both individuals and organizations (North, 1990; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 
2001). Actors involved in any institutional innovation process are inherently affected by the 
formal and informal constraints of institutional frameworks they already belong to (North, 1990; 
Oliver, 1991; Peng & Heath, 1996). Organization members become institutional carriers by 
constructing social structures, enacting routines, and interpreting norms (Zilber, 2002). Due to 
the presence of institutional voids, these structures, routines, and norms are some of the possible 
elements actors may bring in to the emerging field.  
2.4.3. Recombination Institutional Work 
Institutional  work  describes  “the  purposive  action  of  individuals and organizations aimed 
at   creating,   maintaining   and   disrupting   institutions”   (Lawrence   &   Suddaby,   2006:   215).  
Institutional work shifts the focus to understanding how action affects institutions and connects, 
bridges, and extends work on institutional entrepreneurship, institutional change and innovation 
(Lawrence et al., 2009). I incorporate institutional work into my framework because it highlights 
the  more   intentional   and   strategic   actions   taken  by   actors   and   thus   avoids   “depicting   actors   as  
‘cultural   dopes’   trapped   by   institutional   arrangements,   or   as   hyper-muscular institutional 
entrepreneurs”   (Lawrence   et   al.,   2009:   1).   It provides a bottom-up approach to the creation of 
institutions (Zilber, 2013). Based on a comprehensive review of the literature, Lawrence and 
Suddaby (2006) present a description of nine forms of institutional work, they include; advocacy, 
defining, vesting, constructing identities, changing normative associations, constructing 
normative networks, mimicry, theorizing, and educating. Since then, a number of studies have 
produced other types of institutional work. For example, standardization work (Slager, Gond, & 
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Moon, 2012), political work (Perkmann & Spicer, 2008), practice and boundary work (Zietsma 
& Lawrence, 2010) and rhetorical work (Symon, Buehring, Johnson & Cassell, 2008). Tracey, 
Phillips and Jarvis (2011) present a multi-level approach to institutional work by looking at the 
formation of a new organizational form in the social enterprise space. They find that for 
institutional entrepreneurs to create a new organizational form, they require institutional work to 
be done at the multiple levels. This includes micro-institutional work (opportunity recognition), 
meso-institutional work (design of the new organizational forms), and finally macro-institutional 
work (legitimization of the new organizational forms). Similarly, in radical institutional 
innovation, recombination institutional work happens at multiple levels, and the outcomes of this 
work can be seen at the individual, meso, and field level as shown in Figure 2. Mechanisms of 
recombination work are described below. 
Bricolage. Although the notion of bricolage is more familiar to social movement theorists 
than to organization theorists, a stream of research has emerged in the management literature that 
explores bricolage as an important component of institutional work and entrepreneurship in 
resource-constrained environments (Baker, 2007; Baker, Miner, & Eesley, 2003; Baker & 
Nelson, 2005; Boxenbaum & Rouleau, 2011; Di Domenico, Haugh, & Tracey, 2010; Mair & 
Marti, 2009; Perkman & Spicer, 2014). The French anthropologist Levi-Strauss (1967) first 
coined the term, however offered no specific definition of bricolage. It has been used to describe 
a range  of  phenomena  based  on  the  notion  that  it  is  ‘making do by applying combinations of the 
resources  at  hand  to  new  problems  and  opportunities’  (Baker  &  Nelson,  2005).  Douglas  (1986)  
conceptualizes ‘intellectual   bricolage’   by extending the concept of bricolage to institutional 
thinking. He argues that the construction of institutions and decisions to act are rarely made on 
the basis of individual rational choice. Instead institutions are constructed through a process of 
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bricolage by gathering and applying analogies and styles of thought that are present in existing 
institutions.  
This capability is also used to build networks as individuals rely on their networks to 
gather financial and symbolic resources needed to create the rules and organizations that will 
govern a new field (Rojas, 2010). This method of recombining is critical in this context as 
institutional voids present new challenges, as resources for organization and capability building 
are scarce. Just as innovation requires the recombining of previous innovations, institutional 
innovation can be seen as a combination of prior, or already present, institutions and institutional 
elements (Desa, 2012; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Rojas, 2010). 
Institutional innovation requires concessions to rival logics and interests as actors try to 
incorporate competing belief systems that shape their behaviors and practices. Thus, recombinant 
institutions result as actors combine these rival logics and external actors intervene in response 
and embed their practices and beliefs (Rojas, 2010). A good example of this form of work is 
described  in  Lawrence,  Hardy  and  Phillips’  (2002)  study  of  how  a  ‘proto-institution’  emerged  in  
the field of child nutrition in Palestine, though a network that included an NGO, the University 
of Oslo, the Australian embassy, a government agency, and others. The institution emerged 
though  each  actor’s  pre-existing institutionalized practices for addressing issues of malnutrition 
even though these actors all had different motivations and interests going into the field. Desa 
(2012) looked at institutional bricolage as a form of resource mobilization in the absence of 
supportive institutional environments, and found that the survival of ventures depends, to a large 
extent, on bricolage. Thus, bricolage is a critical form of recombination institutional work 
through which institutional entrepreneurs create radical institutional innovation. 
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Mobilization through collective institutional entrepreneurship. Institutional scholars have 
leveraged social movement theory (SMT) to explain institutional processes of change. SMT 
provides insight to institutional innovation in terms of a collective model of institutional 
entrepreneurship (Hargrave & Van de Ven 2006). This approach stresses the need for 
institutional entrepreneurs to gain support from a wide array of actors so that they may achieve 
their goals. One way this is done is through the idea of collective institutional entrepreneurship 
(Mollering,   2007;;  Wijen  &  Ansari,   2007),   “the   process   of   overcoming   collective   inaction   and  
achieving sustained collaboration among numerous dispersed actors to create new institutions or 
transform  existing  ones”  (Wijen  &  Ansari,  2007:  1079).  
Radical institutional innovation is a social process too complex for individual 
institutional entrepreneurs to spearhead change unilaterally. It requires institutional work from a 
broad spectrum of actors including institutional entrepreneurs and the mobilization of the various 
actors and stakeholders across the field. Radical institutional innovation requires support, and 
therefore actors must mobilize allies (Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood et al., 2002) and build 
alliances and encourage cooperation within their network (Fligstein, 2001; Lawrence et al., 
2002). Building a sustainable coalition to accomplish innovation requires strategic skills so that 
actors can mobilize political and regulatory support, which is crucial for the process. This also 
helps actors acquire resources. An important strategy used by actors involves educating other 
actors in skills and knowledge necessary to support new institutions. This type of capability is 
illustrated   in   Lounsbury’s   (2001)   study   that   investigated the institutionalization of recycling 
programs in American universities. This required new skill sets to be developed by a large 
population. Consequently, the SEAC (Student Environmental Action Coalition) became a key 
player in the change by acting as an educator. A key strategy the SEAC used to educate a large 
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population was to sponsor annual student conferences, maintain an elaborate network of 
experienced student organizers who travel to campuses and hold workshops and provide training, 
and to create templates that provide other actors with an outline for action (Lounsbury, 2001). 
Educating is a critical capability as radical institutional innovation involves the development of 
novel practices, organizational forms, and mechanisms of doing day-to-day work.  Therefore, as 
presented in Figure 2, mobilization of collective institutional entrepreneurship is another means 
through which institutional entrepreneurs create radical institutional innovation. 
2.4.4. Outcomes 
Radical institutional innovation ultimately leads to the creation of new institutional fields, 
however, innovation happens at the individual, organization and the institutional field level as 
Figure 2 displays. It is the micro level changes that ultimately lead to macro level changes, and 
macro level outcomes continue to influence micro level elements. Fields are eventually created 
via isomorphism from the interconnections shared by organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1988; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), as a function of network relationships 
(Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989), and shared understandings, beliefs and norms (Scott, 2001). 
It is these elements that create normative, cognitive and regulative orders in the field. These new 
orders have far reaching consequences as they can impact surrounding fields and organizations 
in adjacent institutional fields. Existing logics are also questioned, morphed, and new logics 
emerge as a result of the innovation. Finally, these changes eventually become legitimized and 
accepted as the new status quo. 
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2.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I reviewed the institutional field emergence literature highlighting that we 
still know little about how the processes, actors, and outcomes of the creation of new fields differ 
in various contexts. As such, I draw on the innovation literature to build our understanding of 
institutional innovation. I argue for the need to differentiate between radical and incremental 
institutional innovation and develop definitions for both types of institutional innovation. I also 
advocate examining the process of recombining more closely. Both the distinction between 
radical and incremental innovation and the role of recombination are drawn from the innovation 
literature and then extended to build the conceptualization of radical institutional innovation. 
From there, I present the conceptual framework I developed before beginning my field research 
that specifically focuses on the dynamics of radical institutional innovation.  These dynamics 
involve processes at multiple levels of analysis including field level conditions, institutional 
actors and their social position, recombination institutional work, bricolage, and mobilization. 
The next chapter outlines the methodology used to study radical institutional innovation. 
I first describe the context used for this study, and the methodological paradigms adopted. I then 
provide details about the data sources used and methods for data analysis, before presenting the 
findings in the succeeding chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I presented and discussed the theoretical framework that informs 
my research. This chapter describes and justifies, the context used for this study. It also 
highlights the methodological paradigms that I adopted for data collection, analysis and 
interpretation that culminated in the findings that are outlined in the next chapters of this 
dissertation. I will first provide an overview of the context of this study as it sets the stage for 
why I chose this case study and why it is an exemplary case of institutional innovation.  
 
3.1. Empirical Setting 
 
 
 “It  is  impossible  to  understand  an  institution  adequately  without  an  understanding  of  the  
historical  process  in  which  it  was  produced”  (Berger  &  Luckmann,  1967:  54-44) 
 
3.1.1. Historical Background: The Gaddafi Era 
For over four decades, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi ruled Libya with an iron fist. 
Gaddafi came to power on September 1, 1969 after leading a group of Libyan military officers 
against   King   Idris   in   a   coup   d’état.      The   Libyan   Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), 
headed by Gaddafi, abolished the monarchy and the constitution and claimed Libya to be a new 
Libyan Arab Republic with the motto “freedom,  socialism,  and  unity” (Vandewalle, 2006). Soon 
after coming to power, the RCC abolished parliamentary institutions, as they took control of all 
legislative functions. They also prohibited the formation of any political parties.  
The press was officially conscripted in 1972 as part of the Gaddafi. Italians and Jewish 
communities were expelled from the country and their property confiscated in October 1970. For 
years   Gaddafi   continued   to   change   Libya’s   political   and   administrative   structure.   In   1977  
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“revolutionary   committees”  were   created and assigned the task of supervising and raising the 
general   population’s   devotion   to   revolutionary   ideals.  By   the   early   1980s,   the   functions   of   the  
RCC expanded to officially include the right to “propagate, guide, and control the revolution”, 
all  under  Gaddafi’s  orders.  Their   task  was  to  defend  the  revolution at all costs, which included 
the  power  to  pursue,  hunt  down,  and  physically  liquidate  ‘enemies  of  the  revolution’ abroad and 
at home (Vandewalle, 2006).  
This led to a number of assassinations both within Libya and abroad. The RCC also 
infiltrated  the  country’s  legal  system,  where they created revolutionary courts based  on  the  “law  
of  the  revolution”.  Surveillance took place in the government, in businesses, and in the education 
sector. The government often executed dissidents through public hangings and mutilations on 
university campuses and soccer stadiums and rebroadcast them on state television channels, a 
scare tactic used to show the population the consequences of dissent. As late as 2004, Gaddafi 
still provided bounties on his critics, including $1 million for one Libyan journalist in the United 
Kingdom (Freedom of the Press, 2009). He also made it against the law to talk with foreigners 
about politics, with a three-year prison term as punishment (St. John, 2008). Gaddafi banned 
elections, political parties and all forms of autonomous organized activity including non-state 
owned media and not-for-profit organizations by introducing Law 71. The law imposes the death 
penalty on anyone who forms, supports or participates in an opposing political party. Gaddafi 
saw  civil  society  as  “a  bourgeois  culture  and  an  imitation  of  the  West  that  has  no  place  here  [in  
Libya]”  (Thursday  28,  January  2010,  televised  address  to  the  General  People’s  Congress).   
The  RCC,  under  Gaddafi’s  orders also infiltrated the private sector. In 1978, the Gaddafi 
regime started to build a so-called socialist country by taking over businesses one by one. The 
country’s   small   business  were quickly dissolved. By the end of 1980, larger industries became 
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controlled by Basic Production Committees, a selected group of workers within each business or 
enterprise. Mangers of these large corporations were thrown in jail for months while the 
committees took over. The role of traders was also abolished, and only the banking system and 
oil-related industries were saved from this takeover (Vandewalle, 2006). Land was also 
confiscated and turned to public property. In a speech on September 1, 1980, Gaddafi 
emphasized  that  the  country’s  entrepreneurs  were  nothing  but  parasites because their economic 
activities did not contribute to productive activity within Libya (Vandewalle, 2006). Private 
businesses   closed   throughout   the   country,   often   with   “the   assistance”   of   the   revolutionary  
committees. Their function was taken over by a number of state supermarkets.  
In 1992, sanctions were put on Libya for its involvement in the Lockerbie bombing that 
killed  over  270  people,  including  all  passengers  and  crewmembers  on  the  flight.  Libya’s  already  
suffering economy took a spiral for the worse as sanctions were put on travel, oil trade, and 
investments. As part of a reconciliation process, the Libyan government agreed to compensate 
the families of the bombing ($10 million dollars each) and disarm its nuclear weapons program. 
Although an attempt for some reform took place within the country, such as lifting the ban 
against retail trade, little else would change. According to the 2009 Freedom of the Press Index, 
Libya is the most-censored state in the Middle East and North Africa (Freedom of the Press, 
2009). 
3.1.2. February Uprising 
 The protests in Benghazi on February 15, 2011 quickly led to clashes with security forces 
that fired on the crowd. After only a few days, what initially started as peaceful demonstrations, 
turned into violent protests, and escalated into a rebellion that spread across the country. By 
February 28, 2011, Libya had ignited into a full-fledged, and soon to be very bloody, civil war 
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between those opposing Gaddafi and those forces loyal to him. Footage and photographs of the 
atrocities the regime were committing on innocent civilians quickly spread across the world 
through media networks and various social networks such as Facebook and Twitter. Shelling of 
civilian homes, ruthless killings of dissidents, and even footage of gang rapes by Gaddafi 
loyalists were making their way to the homes of anyone across the world who had internet or a 
TV. Pressure for UN intervention quickly mounted as a growing consensus between country 
leaders and the global population in general that something needed to be done. On March 17, UN 
resolution 1973 was approved and the war in Libya became an international affair. On August 21, 
2011, the final city under regime control was liberated. After months of bloody fighting, NATO 
led offenses, tens of thousands of deaths, thousands missing, and hundreds raped, the war was 
over.  
Around the world, organizations were quickly formed to help deal with the humanitarian 
and political crisis, including the Canadian Libyan Council, Libyan Emergency Task Force, and 
Libya Outreach in North America. Until February there had been few, if any, formal 
organizations created under a Libyan heading, even outside of Libya, in fear of the consequences 
if any actions were to be viewed unfavorably by the regime back in Libya. But the mobilization 
and creation of civil organizations was not isolated to those living outside of Libya who likely 
had some experience with not-for-profit organizations and civil work. Inside Libya, literally 
overnight, civil society was being born in the wake of the revolution including groups such as the 
Free Generation Movement, located in Tripoli, Voice of Libyan Women, and media stations such 
as Libya AlHurra (Libya the Free), TributeFM, and TripoliRadio. Furthermore, political parties 
started to form as early as three months into the revolution. In a matter of months, Libya had 
gone from a country void of civil institutions to hundreds of socially focused organizations, 
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politically parties, advocacy groups, and non-state controlled media channels. Rather than 
starting  from  scratch,  ‘Free  Libya’  was  leveraging on a foundation of qualified professionals and 
scholars from various institutionalized fields even before the regime toppled. Libyans were 
already practicing democracy and participating in a sector that had never existed before.  
3.1.3. Post Revolution Libya: A Case of Extreme Institutional Innovation 
Prior to the February revolution in Libya, there were 22 registered civil organizations in 
Libya, many, if not all, were under government control (Mercy Corps, 2011). By May 2011, only 
a few months into the revolution, 250 civil organizations were registered in Benghazi alone. It is 
estimated that there are over 1800 registered civil organizations in Libya right now (UNDP Civil 
Society Organizations Survey Report, 2015). Additionally, there is now a Ministry of Civil 
Society, and in just a little over a year after the end of the Gadaffi regime, Libyan citizens have 
voted for the first time in over sixty-two years.  The election by-laws now include a mandatory 
quota to include women members in the various cabinets and ministries.  
The phenomenon I examine is radical given the need to form civil organizations and 
institutions quickly to tackle the crisis the revolution produced in an environment characterized 
by an institutional void. It required bridging and combining together various elements outside of 
civil society given the extreme void present. Thus, the context of the rise of civil society in Libya 
presents an exemplar case of radical institutional innovation. 
 
3.2. Approach for this Study 
To develop a relevant research paradigm and methodology for data collection, I was 
guided by my research objectives and questions, and my relationship to the context being studied. 
This dissertation is part of a three-year study, begun in March 2011, exploring the emergence of 
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an institutional field. In particular, this dissertation focuses on the actions of entrepreneurs 
engaged in building an institutional field and how their actions and positions allowed for 
institutional innovation. I adopted an iterative inductive approach, intended to build upon and 
extend recent work in innovation and institutional theory (discussed in Chapter Two), to 
understand the underlying processes of emergence of a new institutional field. More specifically, 
I employed ethnographic methods and approaches to data collection and analysis. This approach, 
which included submerging myself in the field, continuing to elaborate and refine my emerging 
data-driven themes, and connecting it to existing literature, helps build confidence in my findings.  
3.2.1. Grounded Theory 
The methodological approach taken in this study is that of grounded theory, which is 
suitable for studying emergent phenomena not fully explained in the existing literature (Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008). Glaser and Strauss (1967) developed grounded theory as an inductive method 
to understand patterns of behavior and activity in order to arrive at new theory. They (1967:3) 
describe grounded theory as an approach that will: 
“Fit  the  situation  being  researched,  and  work  when  put  into  use.    By  “fit”  
we mean that the categories must be readily (not forcibly) applicable to and 
indicated  by  the  data  under  study;;  by  “work”  we  mean  that  they  must  be  
meaningfully relevant to  and  be  able  to  explain  the  behavior  under  study.”   
 
There are three important elements in conducting grounded theory; theoretical sampling, 
constant comparison, and iteratively moving between data collection and data analysis (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). Unlike random sampling, in theoretical sampling the researcher is not concerned 
with identifying a representative sample, instead the researcher is more interested in identifying 
patterns and relationships in the data which best illustrate the phenomena under investigation.  
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The second important element is constant comparison. Here the researcher is continually 
identifying concepts that emerge from the data and comparing them to other samples and 
concepts. The researcher is able to uncover (and confirm) the presence of patterns and concepts 
in the data by iteratively moving between data collection and data analysis. This process is 
completed when the researcher feels they have reached theoretical saturation, or when the same 
types of patterns and concepts emerge in new samples or cases.  
The final element, data analysis, has been a point of concession as Glaser and Strauss had 
different views on how a researcher enters a field. Whereas Glaser (1978, 1992) argued that the 
researcher should not enter the field with preconceived categories and a flexible methodology, 
Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) supported entry into the field with more specified categories 
and a more systematic and methodological approach to data analysis. Despite this divide between 
the original founders of grounded theory, most grounded theory studies in the management 
field’s  top  journals  adopt  an  analytical  strategy  advocated  by  Miles  and  Huberman  (1994).  Table  
3.1 summarizes some of this work. This approach involves three main stages; 1) data reduction, 
which involves identifying and extracting key themes contained in a single case, 2) data display, 
a cross-case analysis that compares themes across multiple data points, and finally 3) conclusion 
drawing, by examining the data in its aggregate form. 
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Table 2: Recent Grounded Theory Articles in Management Journals 
 
AUTHOR & YEAR 
 
PUBLICATION 
 
PHENOMENON UNDER 
INVESTIGATION 
 
 
Shubha, Gioia, & 
Hamilton (2015) 
 
Academy of 
Management Journal 
 
Identity crisis in an emerging 
field. 
 
Powell & Baker 
(2014) 
 
Academy of 
Management Journal 
 
How founder identity affects 
strategic responses. 
 
Perkmann & Spicer 
(2014) 
 
Organization Science 
 
Organizational bricolage for 
organization formation. 
 
Beck & Plowman 
(2014) 
 
Organization Science 
 
Factors that affect inter-
organizational collaboration 
 
Austin, Lee & 
Sullivan (2012) 
 
Organization Science 
 
Factors that support 
accidental innovation 
 
Gemmell, Boland, & 
Kolb (2012) 
 
Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice 
 
Use of social behaviours, 
techniques, and cognitive 
processes to generate ideas 
 
Dijk, Berends, 
Jelinek, Romme & 
Weggeman (2011) 
 
Organization Studies 
 
The legitimization of radical 
innovation through 
institutional work 
 
Clark, Gioia, Ketchen 
& Thomas (2010) 
 
Administrative Science 
Quarterly 
 
Changes in organizational 
identity during a merger. 
 
Margolis & Molinsky 
(2008) 
 
Academy of 
Management Journal 
 
People’s  response  to  
performing  ‘necessary  evils’ 
 
Shah (2006) 
 
Management Science 
 
Understanding participation 
in open source software 
projects 
Michel (2007) Administrative Science 
Quarterly 
Cognitive change processes 
in junior bankers 
Baker & Nelson 
(2005) 
 
Administrative Science 
Quarterly 
 
Resource recombination 
among bricoleurs 
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3.2.2. Qualitative Research Design  
Qualitative research is useful for building process theories because it is highly sensitive 
to the context and sequence of organizational events and actions (Gephart, 2004; Pettigrew, 
1990) and   “has   the   ability   to  offer   insight   into   complex   social   processes that quantitative data 
cannot  easily  reveal”  (Eisenhardt  &  Graebner, 2007: 26). Furthermore, qualitative methods allow 
for  examination  of  actors’  interpretations  and  their  enactment  of  strategies  while  paying  attention  
to the analysis of meanings and social interactions (Gephart, 2004), thus providing meaning to 
the how and why (Pratt, 2008; Yin, 1994). I employ a qualitative research design based on an 
embedded single case study design. Although the research question focused on the institutional 
level of analysis, the case study approach allowed a close examination of the interrelationships 
among the actors and organizations in the field and the relationships and dynamics of these 
actors and organizations within their institutional context. 
One of the major applications of case studies is to explain the causal links in real-life 
interventions that are too complex for surveys or experimental methods.  Case studies allow the 
researcher   to   retain   the   “holistic   and   meaningful   characteristics   of   real-life events – such as 
individual   life  cycles,  and  organizational  managerial  processes”  (Yin,  1994:  14).  Although case 
studies may pose difficulties in generalizability, they are ideal for revelatory cases where an 
observer may have access to a phenomenon that was previously inaccessible. Pettigrew (1990) 
encouraged researchers to seek extreme situations and to choose cases where the change 
occurring is transparently observable. Given the lack of civil institutions in Libya prior to the 
revolution, any innovation taking place in this sector is highly observable and therefore can be 
easily followed.  In this sense, a case study allowed for greater depth in understanding 
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(Eisenhardt, 1989). It also contributes to a thick description of events within their natural context 
that aims at creating understanding of a phenomenon (Gephart, 2004; Pratt, 2008). 
 
 
3.3. Data Collection 
3.3.1. Ethnographic Approach 
I used ethnographic methods and approaches to data collection and analysis by 
submerging myself in the field from the beginning of the phenomenon. As Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996: 1046) suggest, analyzing the evolution of a given organizational field requires 
“immersion”  within  it.  An  ethnographic  approach  (Watson,  2011)  was  adopted  for  this  study  as  it  
emphasizes the experiential, with an approach to knowledge that is both contextual and 
interpersonal.   I   first   entered   the   field   with   the   research   question,   “How   does   institutional  
innovation   emerge   and   evolve?”   and   the   desire   to   look   at   the   relationship   between   grass-root 
organizations and international organizations as a locus for knowledge creation and innovation. 
My intention was to conduct this research with special attention to the role of networks as I felt 
there was a lack of direct observation of entrepreneurs and organizations and how they used their 
networks to bring about radical innovation.  
My data collection can be divided into 4 techniques; 1) Open-ended interviews, 2) 
participant/field observations, 3) archival data analysis, and 4) social media analysis. The various 
data collection techniques facilitated data triangulation, which helped in building confidence in 
my conclusions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 1990). 
Data collection took place in three subsequent phases. In the first stage (from March 2011 
to June 2012), I began the study with a rather open aim to study how civil society was emerging 
in Libya and to understand how organizations emerge and lead to institutional change – at this 
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stage I was trying to grasp the focus of this study. Data collection at this stage mostly consisted 
of archival data as I did extensive studies of documents that helped build my understanding of 
the historical context.  
However, I also interviewed participants to develop a better comprehension of the 
landscape prior to the war, and even prior to the 1969 coup by Gaddafi. During this stage, I also 
became involved in Libya focused organizations. All of these organizations were created during 
the revolution. This included participation in Canadian-Libyan based organizations sending aid 
to Libya and spearheading lobbying efforts in Canada, partnering with newly formed 
organizations in Libya, following and participating in over 36 Libyan based Facebook groups 
and following Twitter feeds.   
Another vital form of data collection at this stage was participant observation. Participant 
observation is an important aspect of ethnographic research. In this research practice, the 
investigator joins the group, community, or organization being studied, as either a full or partial 
member, and both participates in and observes activities, asks questions, takes part in 
conversations, and reads relevant documents (Watson, 2011; p. 206). For this to be significant to 
the research, the observation has to occur over a period of time that is sufficient for the 
researcher to appreciate the range of norms, practices, and values that characterize the research 
setting (Watson, 2011). During the war, I participated in conference call meetings with 5 
organizations, and ad-hoc groups dealing with the crisis in Libya. These meetings were either via 
Skype, conference calls, or in person. Three of the organizations were located in North America, 
2 in the UK, and 1 in Tunisia. I also attended day conferences in North America. I became 
heavily involved in two organizations, the Canadian Libyan Council (CLC) and Libya Outreach. 
This involved over 3 hours every day participating in meetings and program and organizational 
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development. The CLC was a newly established organization created in light of the war and 
focused on lobbying and media efforts in Canada and humanitarian projects at the Tunisian-
Libyan border to deal with the refugee crisis. After the war was over, the CLC spearheaded a 
program to develop communication between elementary schools in Libya and Canada, and an 
election focused program to encourage voting during the first elections. Libya Outreach was an 
international organization headquartered in the United States and was also established in wake of 
the revolution. This organization spearheaded a number of humanitarian and lobbying efforts 
during the war, including Situation Reports that were used by a number of government agencies 
and NATO forces. Libya  Outreach’s  main  activities   included  a  secret  online  group  that  brought  
together over 2000 activists across the world during the crisis. This online group acted as a key 
platform to connect other activists, disseminate information during the revolution, and as a 
means to organize various humanitarian, political and media efforts.  
In the second stage (July 2012-August 2013). I visited Libya three times over a period of 
one year for data collection through interviews, observations and retrieving additional documents.  
I spent 65 days all together in Libya. The timing of my trips was deliberate. The first trip 
coincided with the first national election to ever take place in the country in over 50 year.  The 
second trip allowed me to attend a 4 day conference that brought together the leading women 
focused organizations in the country. The final trip was a year after my first trip to allow for 
observation on how the field has evolved in the past year and follow up with key informants. 
During these trips, I attended workshops, conferences, focus groups, election stations, round 
table meetings, and social gatherings. Observations that were recorded included assessments of 
the organization, characteristics of the individual, historical information, processes taking place, 
activities, general impressions of what was happening, relationships and network dynamics.  
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Interview participants were initially selected through theoretical sampling and then 
snowballing (Eisenhardt, 1989); therefore, those that had the greatest potential to illustrate how 
the institutional field was created were selected. These participants were either individuals 
involved in highly visible civil organizations, or they themselves were highly visible and active 
in the emerging field. I also interviewed members of more grassroots organizations and spoke to 
citizens who were not involved in civil society to understand their perceptions on what was 
happening.  Since I was interested in the civil society field, I tried to interview individuals that 
are participants in this field.  As a researcher, I was the primary instrument of data collection, 
personally conducting and recording each interview. I employed the ethnographic interviewing 
processes and techniques  outlined  by  Spradley  (1979),  a  process  he  describes  as  involving  “two  
distinct  but  complementary  processes:  developing  rapport  and  eliciting  information”  (p.78).   
Because of my Libyan nationality and involvement in civil society, I was in a position to 
build on the rapport that already existed between myself and many of the participants, which 
allowed for cooperation, engagement and interaction. I was also able to quickly gain the trust of 
participants  as   I  was  seen  as   “one  of   them”  with  vested   interest in using this work to help the 
country. My familiarity with the language, history, and culture also eliminated the barriers of 
language and culture that could otherwise have limited the success of this approach to data 
collection. All of these factors combined to make the conversational interviewing techniques I 
used more natural and more productive with this group of research participants than formal 
interviews with more structured questions would have been.  
After framing the problem being examined in the study, each participant was allowed to 
tell his or her story with myself asking questions only for clarification or for added detail. 
Through interaction stemming from descriptive and open-ended questions, the flow of each 
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interview was very conversational. A list of questions used is included in Appendix A-D, 
although these only served as guiding questions. Audio-recording, notes, and subsequent 
transcription of interviews were conducted for most of the interviews. Detailed field notes were 
taken during all interviews where permission for recording was not granted.  
Over 42 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 57 informants. Of these, 31 
were recorded and transcribed in full. For those interviews not recorded, I took extensive notes 
during and immediately following. Interview lengths ranged from 10 minutes to 170 minutes. 
Given how nascent the field was, organizational documents were difficult to collect. Nonetheless, 
I gathered all news articles, reports, documentaries, online videos, proposals, bylaws (drafts and 
actual), promotional material by organizations, meeting minutes (when available) and petitions. 
Websites for the various organizations and government bodies were also used. In the final phase, 
I followed up with key informants to check on progress, new updates regarding their 
organization and the field in general. I also used this opportunity to check with those I 
considered experts in the field on my constructs and the emerging framework and to follow up 
with questions that had emerged as I was working through the analysis. 
Social Media Analysis. Social media was a critical tool used during and post the 
revolution. In all three phases of data collection, I followed various Facebook and Twitter groups 
pertaining to Libya. This included discussion groups, pages associated with the various civil 
organizations, and government agencies. At times I would start certain discussion topics on 
Facebook and observe the resulting conversations. 
Table 3 provides an overview of the data collection phases and the data gathered. 
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Table 3: Data Collection Phases and Subsequent Data 
DATA 
TYPE PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 
TOTAL # 
OF PAGES 
Interviews 
 
12 (54 pages) 
•  3  exiled  citizens 
•  4  elder  members  
of the community 
•  5  activists 
 
31 (491 pages) 
•14  founders 
•  6  organizational  
members 
•  8  international org 
employees 
•  3  government  
official 
•  2  media  workers 
•  4  activists/regular  
citizens 
•  1  lawyer/activist 
 
9 (108 pages) 
•5  founders 
•  2  international  
org employee 
•1  government  
official 
•1  media  worker 
•1  
lawyer/activist 
•2  
organizational 
members 
653 
Field 
Observations 
 
81 pages of notes 
 
390 pages of notes 
23 pages of 
notes 494 
Archival 
Data 
657 Pages (Books, 
laws, 1951 
constitution, 
websites, New 
Reports, Situation 
Reports)  
489 Pages (Bylaws, 
draft laws, proposals, 
petitions, 
government 
websites, 
organizational 
websites, news 
reports, official 
reports, blogs) 
116 Pages 
(Bylaws, draft 
laws, proposals, 
petitions, 
government 
websites, 
organizational 
websites, news 
reports, official 
reports, blogs) 
1,062 
Social Media 
Constant following 
of Facebook pages 
Twitter accounts 
Constant following 
of Facebook pages 
Twitter accounts 
Constant 
following of 
Facebook pages 
Twitter accounts 
N/A 
Total # of 
Pages 
792+ 1,370+ 247+ 2,409+ 
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3.3. 2. Ethics and Confidentiality 
This research project received ethical approval from the Faculty of Graduate Studies at York 
University. Interview participants were assured anonymity. Where interviews were done in 
person, each participant read and signed a copy of the consent form. Where interviews were done 
by phone, the consent form was read to participants and/or sent over via web. Participants were 
informed that they could discontinue the interview at any time or could decline to answer any 
specific questions. They were also assured of anonymity, and names were not used in the final 
report. Given the unique Libyan dialect, any transcription would have to be done by someone 
familiar with the dialect, meaning a Libyan citizen or someone who has lived in the country for a 
very long time. Given the sensitive nature of the current situation in Libya and safety risks 
involved with disclosure of names of organizations, participants and government officials, I 
personally transcribed all interviews. 
 
3.4. Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis and interpretation were closely linked to the process of data collection in 
that I frequently engaged with the gathered data by transcribing it myself, studying my notes, and 
developing new memos on impressions, ideas and perceptions that came to mind from the data. 
Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006) argue that: 
“…analysis   and   interpretation   are   not   two   distinct   phases   in   the   process   of  
qualitative  research  process…  the  researcher  often  engages  simultaneously  in  
the process of data collection, data analysis and interpretation of the research 
findings”  (p.  355). 
 
Following the procedures recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994) a three stage 
inductive and iterative process was used to analyse the data. In the first stage, I coded the data to 
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identify emergent themes and constructs. A set of a priori codes was first developed from the 
review of the literature. I focused on the type of actors involved in the field, their actions, 
outcomes of their actions, and their perceptions of the events that were happening. Iterating back 
and forth between the data and the literature informed the coding of the data to create the first 
order codes. This process kept theory building grounded in the available empirical data. I 
primarily focused on coding the interviews and observations, but I utilized documents and the 
social media data for support and for extra details. Although I was using my a priori codes to 
analyse the data, I was also cognizant of conceptually powerful codes that were emerging. For 
example, the role of networks quickly became apparent once I had started coding, as respondents 
were referring to leveraging their contacts to gain access to resources. I was also paying attention 
to text that were not directly related to civil society, however were of importance to the 
development  and  outcomes  of  civil   society.  I  kept   in  mind  that  “equating  civil   society  with  the  
non-profit sector excludes important instrumental and normative dimensions that are of 
fundamental  importance  to  understanding  civil  society’s  central  role  in  political  and  social  life”   
(Siever, 2010:6). 
 In the second stage, I integrated the first order codes by extrapolating the common 
elements from the first stage. This second stage of data analysis coincided with the second phase 
of data collection when I realized that individuals based outside of Libya and also had a 
connection to Libya, kept coming up as key actors in the field. Based on this emergent theme, I 
narrowed my focus during this coding stage and subsequently refocused the rest of my data 
collection to understand the process, actions, and relationships surrounding these actors and their 
organizations. At this point of data analysis I also sectioned the data based on phases of data 
collection. My field notes pointed to a process that was emerging and I therefore wanted to 
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organize my data in a way where I could identify emergent themes that had a temporal aspect to 
them. For example, during my third phase of data collection, I noticed that there was much more 
collaboration happening in the field. Respondents were also discussing collaborative efforts with 
me. I did not note this in my prior data collection trips. This alluded to the possibility that there 
was a processual framework in the emergence of radical institutional innovation that I wanted to 
capture. 
Finally, in the third stage of analysis, I revisited all the codes created and searched for 
how they are linked. At this point I was focusing on specific dynamics that were emerging as 
aggregates of the data, but I was also paying attention to whether these aggregate dimensions 
were happening across the three data collection visits or if there were certain dynamics that were 
more present at certain phases of data collection. At this stage analysis, I grouped the emergent 
constructs into what I considered were the 5 key elements of the process framework, antecedents, 
actors, triggers, actions, and finally outcomes. I then went back to the 1st order categories 
developed in stage 1 of analysis to help inform me of the connections between these 5 elements. 
Figure 3 shows the final data structure, moving from first-order categories to second-order 
themes to aggregate dimensions. 
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Figure 3: Data Structure 
 
 
 
3.5. Quality Criteria 
While validity and reliability measure research rigor in quantitative studies, qualitative 
researchers differ a great deal in the language used to describe the process of assessing the 
internal validity, external validity, and reliability of a qualitative study. Moreover, these terms 
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are typically not used when referring to qualitative research. Four criteria which are typically 
used to measure data trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) are: 
a. Credibility (in preference to internal validity)  
b. Transferability (in preference to external validity or generalisability)  
c. Dependability (in preference to reliability) 
d. Confirmability (in preference to objectivity)  
 
To achieve data trustworthiness in my study, I employed several techniques that cover these 
criteria. 
 Credibility. Lincoln and Guba (1985) describe credibility as the extent to which results of 
a study are truthful or realistic. They argue that ensuring credibility is one of the most important 
factors in establishing trustworthiness. To achieve credibility, I used multiple data sources as a 
triangulation measure, so as to cross-check the accuracy and consistency of the information I 
gathered. I also interviewed a wide range of informants, so that individual viewpoints and 
experiences could be validated against others and construct a rich picture of what was happening. 
Patton  (1990)  advocates  the  use  of  triangulation  as  it  “strengthens  a  study  by  combining  methods.  
This  can  mean  using  several  kinds  of  methods  or  data”  (p.  247).  I  also  checked  my  constructs,  
interpretations and findings with participants and those I considered experts in the field. Finally, 
my prolonged time in the field and engagement with the participants and the context allowed me 
to develop trusting relationships and therefore a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon 
under study. 
Transferability. Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose that it is up to the reader, not the 
original investigator to determine the transferability, or the applicability of the findings to 
another setting. As a researcher, I tried to provide a rich and thick description of the context and I 
used  multiple  informants  and  data  sources  to  strengthen  the  study’s  usefulness  for  other  settings.  
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By providing a thick description of the phenomenon under investigation a reader is hopefully 
able to understand it. 
Dependability. Dependability is   the   researcher’s   account  of   the  changes   inherent   in  any  
setting as well as changes to the research design as learning unfolded (Marshall & Rossman, 
1995). Acknowledging that reality is socially constructed and continually changing, 
dependability is problematic (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). Lincoln and Guba (1985) stress the 
close ties between credibility and dependability, arguing that in practice, demonstrating the 
former helps ensure the latter. To address the dependability more directly, again, I took extra 
care in documenting the process and reporting it in detail. 
Confirmability. Confirmability deals with whether the findings could be confirmed by 
another researcher, thus removing some of the researchers objectivity (Marshall & Rossman, 
1995). This criterion is about research objectivity, where the gathered data and findings should 
truly   represent   the   participants’   views   and   perspective   or   meanings   rather   than   that   of   the  
researcher  (Lincoln  &  Guba,  1985).  This  being  said,  a  researcher’s  subjectivity   is a strength of 
qualitative research and allows the researcher to build rapport with participants. Although a 
researcher’s  insights  increases  the  likelihood  that  they  will  be  able  to  describe  the  complex  social  
system being studied, controls for bias in interpretation still need to be considered. Again, by 
triangulating my data, the effect of any bias is reduced. I also checked and rechecked the data, 
and I paid extra attention to contradictory information. 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS - INSTITUTIONAL FIELD AND BROKERS 
 
 
 
"If we have learned anything in these many months, it is this—do not underestimate the 
aspirations and will of the Libyan people." - President Obama 
 
 
In chapter two, I presented the conceptual framework I utilized going into the field. This 
framework was based on a review of relevant literature in innovation and in institutional theory. 
The grounded theory approach used for this dissertation described in Chapter 3 allowed for the 
continuous back and forth iterative process between the field and the literature.  
After my first trip into the field, I realized the critical role that institutional brokers play 
in radical institutional innovation. I modified my research questions to center specifically on the 
pivotal role institutional brokers play in radical institutional innovation. 
More specifically, I set out to understand: 
x Who are the key actors that bring about radical institutional innovation? 
x What characteristics do they hold that enables them to innovate in an institutional 
void? 
x How do they create radical institutional innovation?  
In this chapter I discuss the antecedents of radical institutional innovation and the 
characteristics of the actors that were found to instigate the process. More specifically, I build an 
argument   for  why   Libya’s   civil   society   can   be   considered   an   extreme   institutional   void, what 
triggered the instigation of civil society, and then I present my findings in terms of who were the 
actors seen in this context. This sets the stage for the following chapters, Chapter 5, 6, and 7, 
where I delineate how a specific type of actors, whom I label institutional brokers, create a new 
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field through three different, but connected dynamics. In chapter 8, I integrate the three dynamics 
and discuss their relationship to each other. 
 
4.1. Institutional Field Characteristics 
Three fields, an emergent institutional field, adjacent institutional fields, and non-
adjacent institutional fields, were identified in this study. The field where institutional innovation 
is taking place is referred to as the emergent field. These are social spaces where rules, practices, 
and networks of organizations did not yet exist (Fligstein & McAdams, 2011). The emergent 
institutional field may be surrounded by, connected to, or have overlapping fields. I refer to these 
as adjacent fields. The organizations, meaning systems, and practices may come into contact 
frequently with actors in the emerging field as the process progresses. These fields included 
religious institutions, the private sector, and the government. Finally, non-adjacent fields were 
also identified as playing a role in the radical institutional innovation process. These are fields 
that have little, if any, ties to the emerging field and little capacity to influence it on their own. 
For example, institutional fields embedded in foreign countries, such as Canada, the United 
States, and Tunisia, would be considered non-adjacent fields.  
 
4.1.1. Civil Society as an Institutional Void  
The complex assembly of formal rules and informal norms generates institutions that 
organize  and  configure  the  “terms  of  action”  (Fligstein,  2001).  Whether  formal  or   informal,  the  
features of well-functioning institutions are manifested in meaningful, taken-for-granted 
understanding of actions and decisions within a field. These actions are consistent and repetitive, 
thus bringing about some level of social order (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Greenwood et al. 
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2008).  When   these  “rules  of   the game”   (North,  1990),  whether   they  are formal rules or shared 
unsaid beliefs, are not present or weak, scholars have pointed to the presence of institutional 
voids (Khanna & Palepu, 1997).  
Based   on   Scott’s   (2001) classifications of institutions into three pillars; regulative, 
normative, and cultural-cognitive,   Libya’s   civil   society,   or   lack   of,   can   be   characterized   as   an  
example  of  an  institutional  void.  The  regulative  pillar  of  Scott’s  system  consists  of  enforcement  
mechanisms by the state and formal rule systems such as laws, policies and regulations that 
direct and constrain actions (North, 1990; Scott, 2001). The normative pillar refers to the 
expected norms of behaviour concerning what is right or wrong, and may include professional 
societies that define the roles and expectations of the members within the field. Finally, the 
cultural-cognitive pillar encompasses the take-for-granted beliefs and values shared among 
individuals that guide their action. My findings point to a void in all three of these pillars and 
transcends three levels of analysis. Figure 4 provides a layered model of institutions with the 
various institutional elements adapted from Scott and Meyer (1994: 57). The arrows in the figure 
represent how these institutional elements effect one another.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  60 
Figure 4: Layered Model of Institutions from Scott and Meyer (1994: 57) 
 
Prior to the revolution, it was clear that elements of this model were absent. During my first visit 
to Libya, I asked members of civil society organizations hereafter referred to as CSO’s  whether 
civil society existed before the war. Sarah5 shared:  
 
“Nope   (civil   society   didn't   exist   before).   I   didn’t   know   about   it   before   the  
revolution. Maybe before, I didn’t know I imagine line-ups. Like a line up of 
people getting food”  (CSO Interview).  
 
 
                                                         
5 Given the volatile and dangerous security situation in Libya, all respondent names have been changed to 
protect their identity. In situations where I feel the respondent’s identity can be linked to the  CSO’s  name, 
the CSO name will not be shared as well. 
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Mohammed, one of the members of the CSO 1Libya told me; 
“Yeah   we’re   kids,   but   when   I   sit   with   the   adults   we   explain   exactly   what   we  
were doing. And given the situation in Libya, whether you were young or old, 
you had no experience  doing  this  so  it  didn’t  matter  who  was  putting  together  the  
program or the charity, you were an expert because no one else had experience. 
Everyone  was  at  the  same  level” (CSO Interview). 
 
Even the regulative body responsible for civil society was clearly weak from the lack of 
experience, resources, and at times understanding, of the current landscape in the country. The 
newly formed Ministry of Cultural Affairs and Civil Society was created to manage all the CSOs 
that were established during the revolution. A number of the founders of various CSOs in Libya 
voiced their frustration with the Ministry. Eyad from the an organization named “February17” 
shared: 
 
“There  is  no  organizing  at  the  government  level.  There  are  lots  of  organizations,  
but no plan or control on what they are doing and how they will use the money. 
We  don’t  even  know   if   there   is  any  money  at   that  Ministry  [of  Cultural  Affairs  
and Civil Society]. No one knows how to get funding or endorsement”   (CSO  
Interview). 
 
May, an investment banker from the United Kingdom who left her job during the revolution and 
started  a  women’s  empowerment  center  in  Libya  shared: 
 
“They  [Ministry]  are  useless.  We  couldn’t  even  get  our  organization  registered.  
We had a friend who worked for them and even through   him  we   couldn’t   get  
registered.  It’s  a  joke” (CSO Interview). 
 
In fields characterized by voids, uncertainty and controversy are present. At the 
organizational level, there is confusion about what an organization looks like, what 
elements it should contain, what practices are needed and how to achieve common goals. 
A number of informants voiced the frustration with the complete lack of understanding of 
what organizations do. May also shared: 
 
 
 
  62 
“I  helped  as  much  as  I  can  and  tried  to  give  them  advice  on  what  to  do,  like  get  
business cards, and like seriously some did not know even what that is. It was a 
bit ridiculous. I also had to teach them how to have a meeting. So when you have 
a meeting you have to close the door.  Someone leads the meeting etc. And 
they’re  like  ‘but  she’ll  get  upset’.  And  I’m  like  it  doesn’t  work  like  that.  They’re  
so  funny,  but  it’s  this  basic  stuff  that  they  don’t  know”  (CSO Interview). 
 
These examples illustrate the Libyan landscape and dramatic challenges institutional actors faced. 
Table 4 gives an overview of my findings describing Libya’s  civil  society as an institutional void. 
It illustrates the absence of the institutional elements from the institutional layer model illustrated 
in Figure 4.  
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Table  4:  Examples  of  Institutional  Layers  Missing  in  Libya’s  Civil  Society 
Missing 
Layer 
Institutional 
Element Illustrative Examples 
Meaning 
Systems & 
Behaviour 
Patterns 
Normative 
Rules 
x Question at a workshop: “But  what  if  a  law  comes  
out preventing us from working on this strategy (for 
women  inclusion  in  the  constitution  committee)?”  – 
International  NGO  leader  responds,  “Wait  a  minute.  
What is the role of civil society? Is it to sit down if a 
law comes out? No! Your role is to scream and make 
noise,  and  make  sure  the  law  is  changed.” 
Regulatory 
Process 
x No governmental body responsible for CSOs 
x Registration and funding mechanisms completely 
missing 
x Civil Society law absent 
Governance 
Structure 
Organizational 
Field 
x “There  was  nothing  in  Libya  before.  Like  I  was  there  
right from the beginning. There was just protests. 
Then we formed teams, and then we realized we 
needed organizations and Libya became all these 
organizations.  Wherever  you  go,  there’s  an  
organization. And everyone is doing something. Like 
some people created an organization for the purpose 
of  cooking  food  for  people.” 
Organizations x Only a few CSOs registered prior to the revolution. 
Media stations all state owned. 
Actors 
Capabilities 
x “They  have  no concept of how to get money. You 
know, their idea of getting the money is going 
through  the  government.” 
x “I  had  to  teach  them  how  to  have  a  meeting.” 
Understanding x “I  told  Safia  that  we  were  going  to  become  an  organization so we can do things. And she said 
“what’s  an  organization?”  And  I  explained.” 
Logics 
x “Civil  society  was  a  fund  where  people  made  
monthly contributions and then when you needed 
some  money  you  could  go  into  the  fund.  It’s  called  a  
jemeeya.  That’s  all  there  was.  That  was  our  civil  
society”. 
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Thus,  by  applying  Scott  and  Meyer’s  classification  of  institutions,  the  data  reveals that Libya is 
missing many institutional layers and can be conceptualized as an institutional void and thus 
setting the stage for radical institutional innovation.  The next section presents how institutional 
innovation was initiated and the actors initiating the change in the field. 
 
4.2. Triggers of Institutional Innovation  
By definition, institutions are stable and enduring. Although minor adaptations occur 
with most institutions frequently, radical upheavals that occur in an institutional field happen less 
often. Radical institutional innovation in Libya was triggered by the humanitarian crisis brought 
on by the war. The outcome of this led to a void in institutions that could deal with the crisis, and 
the dismantlement of the government, which meant that civil society activities were now allowed.  
At the start of the revolution, grassroots organizations were developing in Libya. These 
organizations were not much more than a group of individuals with shared interests for some 
cause, working under a name and logo. Three main types of organizations were starting to 
emerge at this time. The first were charity groups that collected donations to be distributed to 
families in need, organized food preparations for the rebel fighters, and took over government 
controlled activities that had been abandoned since the fighting started (e.g. garbage collection, 
teaching, and even traffic control). Young Libyan men and women typically led these groups. 
“In  the  first  weeks  of  the  revolution  it  was  all  charity  and  humanitarian  work.  We  
had lots of refugees to deal with. We had many injured. It was a 
nightmare…When  the  war  continued  we  had  other  issues  to  deal  with...  there  was  
no government in Benghazi at the time. No one paying salaries, no one taking care 
of the everyday tasks to run a city. So these organizations turned into labour based 
organizations.  Someone  had   to  patrol   the   streets,  pick  up  the  garbage”   (Ahmed – 
CSO Interview). 
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The second group of organizations was media and outreach related. During the Gadaffi 
regime, all media outlets were state controlled and Libyan press and media were considered 
“among  the  most  tightly  controlled  in  the  world”  (Freedom  of  the  Press,  2011:  para.1).  When  the  
revolution broke out, all news officially coming out of Libya was very one sided. Some of the 
news outlets were claiming that there were no protests happening, and terrorist groups were 
leading all fighting against the regime. This was contradictory to the videos being leaked by 
individuals from Benghazi showing protests of thousands of people, and shots being fired from 
the government army at unarmed protestors.  
Once the government was no longer able to deny the protests and fighting that was 
happening, state news started reporting that those leading the fighting were high on drugs that 
had been put in their Nescafe coffee drinks. During the first few days of the revolution videos 
were being shared on popular media sights such as Facebook and YouTube showing the brutality 
of the Gadaffi regime. One video, shot by a women on her balcony, showed mercenaries 
(individuals who were believed to not be of Libyan origin and hired by the Gadaffi regime) 
running  after  protests  with  machetes.  The  women  could  be  heard  in  the  background  yelling  “they  
are  setting  us  on  fire.  They  are  setting  us  on  fire”.  This video, and many similar ones, were being 
used to get the attention of the international community. The sharing of this real-time footage 
and information about the situation were critical in gaining international support for the NATO 
mission in Libya 6 . Without them no one knew what was exactly happening in Benghazi. 
Technically savvy individuals were able to hack some of the systems put in place by the regime 
to prevent Internet access and use v-sat devices to communicate with those outside of Libya. 
These small media groups such as Libya AlHurra, AlManar, and ShababLibya were set up to                                                         
6 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 is a measure that was adopted on March 17, 2011. It 
formed the legal basis for military intervention in Libya by a NATO led coalition. 
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provide real-time footage and accounts of the events unfolding to those outside of Libya. Many 
would evolve to be the first post-revolution, non-government controlled media stations in Libya. 
These graphic videos and personal accounts became critical in gaining international support for 
the NATO mission in Libya. 
While these organizations were developing inside of Libya. Groups of people were also 
coming together to form organizations outside of Libya. The Libyan diaspora, once fragmented 
and quiet, had started to form organizations to deal with the crisis at hand. Outside of Libya, the 
organizations forming were focused on sending humanitarian aid into Libya, and pushing for 
international support for involvement in Libya. 
 When the war ended, people started to return to their homes. Services such as garbage 
collection and education resumed, and the injured were being sent to developed countries for the 
long recovery process. Life started to resume to somewhat of a normal state in Libya. However, 
the countries institutions needed reform, a constitution was to be rewritten and democratic 
elections, the first in over 50 years, were scheduled to take place within the next six months after 
liberation. NGOs created for charity and humanitarian purposes during the war now had a new 
role in ensuring a democratic process, that women had a role in the new Libya, and previously 
neglected groups, such the mentally and/or physically disabled, widows, rape survivors, had a 
voice. For example, Malik, from the organization 17th of February (named after the first day of 
the revolution) shared how his group was in charge of protests during the early days of the 
revolution. They would organize protests taking place in Benghazi, make signage, and videotape 
the events and post them on social media stations for sharing. Once the NATO mission had 
started in Libya, there was little to protest. Malik and many of his co-organizers joined 
humanitarian efforts to collect money and items for those displaced at Tunisian refugee camps 
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due to fighting in their city.  
“Then,  when  things  started  to  settle  [in  Benghazi]  and  we  had  a  [temporary]  
government; some of us joined the fighting, and some focused on civil society 
based issues. This is how  it  happened”  (CSO Interview). 
 
Libya’s  civil   society  was  slowly  emerging.  Figure  5   illustrates  some  of  the  headlines  of  
major international news outlets and reports celebrating the emergence of civil society in Libya. 
These headlines point to the novelty of the situation, and also suggest how apparent and visible 
this process was. 
 
Figure 5: Representative Headlines Focused on Emergence of Civil Society in Libya 
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However, it was not just necessity that triggered the institutional innovation seen in Libya, 
it was also the dismantling of the government that now allowed for civil organizations to exist, as 
previously, civil society was considered an illegal sector in Libya. 
During the Gaddafi era only two civil organizations were present, Watasemu and the 
Gaddafi Foundation. Both organizations were affiliated with the government. A few other 
organizations   existed   but   were   considered   “youth   activity”   and   therefore   not   under   the   civil  
society umbrella. These were the Libyan Scouts, and Global Change Makers, an initiative started 
by the British Embassy in Libya that organized youth targeted, and run, charity projects. All 
other organizations that touched upon areas of civil society including politics, human rights, 
activism, and unions were banned. The consequences of starting or belonging to collective 
groups in this third sector were serious. In the early eighties, the Gadaffi regime created a fear 
campaign where anyone known to be participating in political dissent was publicly executed, 
sending a clear message to Libyans that the government was serious about those going against 
their rule. Ibrahim, a Libyan-Canadian, shared his account of what it was like growing up in 
Libya: 
 
“I   remember  arriving  on  campus   (in  1982)  and  seeing  something  hanging   from  
one of the trees outside of the engineering faculty. I thought it was a bag of 
garbage or something. When I got closer, I realized it was a man. He was in my 
class.   I   ran   home   shaking.   I   will   never   get   that   image   out   of   my   head”  
(Historical-context interview). 
 
Videos can be seen of some of these public executions. One of the more famous ones was 
that of Sadiq Shwehdi, a 30 year old Libyan man accused of plotting to assassinate Gadaffi. A 
video of him from 1984 emerged during the revolution7. It shows him sitting in the centre of a                                                         
7 Video available on http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/18/gaddafi-brutal-regime-exposed-lost-
archive 
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stadium, crying as he is sentenced to death. Moments later he is hung from the basketball nets of 
the stadium. 
Even outside of Libya, the fear was present. The Canadian Libyan Council (CLC) was 
created in wake of the February 17 revolution. At a roundtable discussion with founding 
members and the advisory board, I asked why such an organization was not started before? 
Clearly, with the growing population of Libyan-Canadians, there was a need to create some sort 
of organization that met their needs. Hani, a board member of the CLC shared: 
 
“Well   we   had   social   committees.   Nothing   formal,   but   it   was   a   mailing   group  
where we organized Eid parties, and some picnics. Even those events were 
controversial [laughing]. We talked, moved, did things, very carefully, weighting 
everything,  and  making  sure  we  weren’t  breaking  any  rules.  Anyone  could  have  
been  a  spy  for  Gadaffi.  We’re here, but I have family back in Libya, we have to 
make   sure   we   don’t   break   the   rules.   Even   in   Canada”   (Historical-context 
interview). 
 
Civil society did not exist in Libya because it was not legal, and the consequences of any sort of 
civil action outside of the regime has serious, many times deadly, consequences. 
 
4.3. Radical Institutional Innovation Actors 
Who are the actors that bring about institutional innovation? Two key groups were 
clearly visible in the emerging institutional field in Libya; International Non-Government 
Organizations (INGOs)  that  had  a  mandate  to   fund  and  help  develop  Libya’s  civil   society,  and  
grassroots organizations that were founded by Libyan individuals who mostly associated 
themselves with Libya only. International organizations came into Libya even before the war 
ended. They had lots of resources, experiences and funding, however, they suffered from a 
“liability of foreignness” (Zaheer, 1995). International organizations can face a liability of 
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foreignness due to a lack of embeddedness in a country. This creates additional 
structural/relational and institutional costs or social costs of access and acceptance (Zaheer, 
1995). Eden and Miller (2004) found that institutional distance is the key driver behind each of 
these costs. INGOs were disadvantaged for two reasons; unfamiliarity with the local 
environment, and distrust.  
INGOs did not completely understand the unique culture, tribal characteristics and social 
fabrics of Libya. Zeineb, a Libyan-Tunisian who grew up in Libya, worked for one of the INGOs. 
She provided some interesting insight on the challenges INGOs were facing.  
“It’s  like  you  must  speak  their  language.  Not  literally  just  their  language,  but  you  
have to, you have to understand the cultural fabric, the social fabric. The 
international  NGOs  don’t.  A  lot  of  times  they  think  they  can  bring  in  a  template  
from  whatever   country   they  were   in   before   and  use   that,   but  we’re   different   in  
Libya”  (INGO interview). 
 
They also have a limited understanding of the history, culture and norms within the field. 
This especially became apparent when I explored the rape crisis in Libya as many civil 
organizations stemmed from this crisis. The INGOs did not clearly understand the stigma behind 
rape in Libya. Thus, they had a lot of difficulty accessing rape survivors, hospitals and clinics. 
Lisa, from a European NGO shared: 
“Early   on  we   realized  we  were   not  going   to   be   able   get   to   the   survivors   at   the  
camp.  We’ve  had  experience  with  war  crimes  and  rape  victims, like in Kosovo, 
where   we   brought   with   us   Kosovo   nationals,   women,   but   here   they   wouldn’t  
even talk to us if we were around, even if we had Libyan women on our team. It 
was  hard”  (INGO interview).  
 
 This   quote   from   Lisa   further   supports   Zeineb’s   statement regarding the use of 
templates from other contexts by the INGOs for the situation in Libya. It also illustrates 
how this did not work, at least for the rape crisis. Finally, Lisa did not realize, until much 
later on, that women in Libya do not even talk to Libyan women about rape. There is 
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incredible stigma surrounding rape in Libya.  
Abeer, a young stay at home mom, who I interviewed, shared with me the 
following anecdote: 
 
“Remember  the  ‘ghara’  (1986  air  strikes  on  Libya  by  the  U.S)8? You know what 
my mom told me about that night? That’s? when they fled their house, because it 
was right beside the airport and they were afraid it would get hit. You know what 
they took with them? Knives. Large kitchen knives. You know why? Because they 
wanted to use them on themselves if the American soldiers came down. They 
would rather kill themselves than  be  victims  of  rape”  (Non-civil society interview). 
 
Liability of foreignness also creates distrust as the international CSOs share little 
in terms of cultural and institutional systems (Zucker, 1986; Mollering, 2006) with the 
people they are trying to serve. And because they are not part of the environment, their 
intentions for being in the field are questioned. Many times people referred to them as 
having  “an  agenda”  and  “untrustworthy”. 
“Our  biggest  challenge?  First  it  was  building  trust.  This  was  the  biggest  challenge  
because for months I thought I was, I felt I was perceived as a spy, or I did 
something wrong. But   it’s   a   learning   process,   we   dealt   with   their   issues, with 
opening bank accounts, and withdrawing money at the beginning. I mean, we did 
everything that you can imagine in order for us to build trust with the 
organizations” 
 
Another INGO manager shared: 
“They   wanted   to   see   that we were registered. Every single one of our 
organizations  took  the  grant  agreement  to  a  legal  adviser.  That’s  never  happened  
in  my  life…  It’s  like,  we’re  giving  them  money,  so  they’re  thinking  ‘what  are  they  
planning  for  us?’”  (Pierre  – INGO Interview). 
 
                                                         
8 On April 15, 1986, President Ronald Reagan ordered air strikes against Libya in response to the Berlin 
discotheque bombing that killed three people and injured 230. The bombing was said to be targeting 
American soliders as the La Belle discotheque was popular entertainment venue for United States 
soldiers. 
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Also present in the emerging field are grassroots organizations. These organizations were 
founded by individuals, and groups of individuals with low levels of embeddedness in a few or 
no relevant fields. Many of them were homemakers, teachers, retail associates, and civil workers. 
Grassroots organizations were trusted as their purpose was clear given their ties to the country. 
They also had a strong understanding of the Libyan socio, cultural, and religious landscape.  
However, they suffered from a liability of institutional newness, a term I developed based 
on my research in Libya. This is a problem associated with organizations with little experience in 
relevant fields. The founders of these organizations have little or no entrepreneurial and 
organizational experience. They lack an understanding of the logics of the developing field. In 
Libya, these organizations had limited experience in building civil organizations, the role of civil 
society or its meaning. They are also are confined to the institution they are already embedded in 
and therefore bound by existing norms, logics, and values of a field established without civil 
society based institutions. I saw many grassroots organizations that did not exist upon my return 
in  my   second   trip   because   they   couldn’t   get   funding.  Many  grassroots organizations that were 
part of international civil society incubators on my second trip were no longer part of the 
incubators by the time I made my third visit. Many of these organizations were not meeting 
milestones, and not keeping up to date with what many would consider lenient and very basic, 
reporting mechanisms put in place by the international funding bodies. When asking a local 
organization focused on the handicapped, that I had met with on my first trip, why they were no 
longer active, one of the members, Aya, told me: 
“The   president   started   acting   like   a   dictator.   If   we   wanted   dictators   then   we  
would have been happy with Gadaffi. You know, people like power, and I’m 
sick  of  this.  Everyone  is  sick  of  this”   (CSO Interview). 
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The 50 – Key Institutional Entrepreneurs  
Who was bringing about the radical innovation seen   in  Libya’s  emerging  civil   society?  
Initially,  this  study  was  looking  at  the  various  types  of  institutional  entrepreneurs  in  Libya’s  civil  
society. This included the grassroots organizations, the INGOs, the local businesses, and all other 
players   that  were   helping   to   shape  Libya’s   fast   emerging   third   sector.  However,   early   into   the  
research, it became clear that there was a consensus among Libyans that civil society in Libya 
was  being  built  by  a  third  group  of  organizations  and  individuals.  These  were  referred  to  as  ‘the  
50’.  A  small  group  of  individuals  were  the  founders  of  what  were  considered  the  successful  civil  
organizations in Libya. The following comment by Sura one of the founders of a youth based 
organization in Libya, Libya Today, sums up a theme that repeatedly came up during the 
interviews: 
 
“There  is  a  group  now  that  is  civil  society.  Because  right  now,  wherever  you  go,  
a  workshop,  an  event,  whatever,  it’s  the  same  people.  It’s  maybe  50  people.  Even  
in  Benghazi  and  here,   it’s   the  same  people  you  see  all   the  time.  This   is  Libya’s  
civil society”  (CSO Interview). 
 
Zeyad, from the T.V station, Libya Al-Hurra, shared: 
 
“Yeah  (civil  society  is  50  people),  they’re  the  50  that  speak  English.  They  are  better  at  
networking and therefore getting exposed. When the foreign organizations come to talk, 
this person is easy to communicate with, have a proven track record. They can market 
themselves.  They  know  the  strategy”  (Media Interview). 
 
I   identified   16   organizations   with   members   belonging   to   “The   50”.   Table   5      provides   an  
overview of these organizations and their brokerage characteristics based on collected data about 
their founders. 
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Table  5:  Overview  of  “the  50” 
Description Chracteristics of Founders 
Civil society 
capacity 
building and 
funding. 
x Co-Founder 1 
o Libyan-American 
o United Nations Youth Delegate for Libya – spent 4 years in Libya 
while working with the UN – co-founded a coaching service after her 
time in Libya 
x Co-Founder 2: 
o Libyan-American 
o VP of an American Biotechnology company she co-founded. 
Women 
Empowerment 
x Founder: Libyan-Canadian medical student 
x Rest of founding team also medical students 
Women 
Empowerment 
x Founding team includes: - Libyan American – Master’s  and  PhD  graduates  from  
Egyptian and American Universities  
Transistional 
justice and 
human rights 
x Lawyers graduating from University of Oxford, London School of Economics, 
Berkely, Cairo University, and Stanford.  
Women 
Empowerment 
x Investment banker from the UK 
x Pharmacist with an international mother 
Women 
Empowerment 
x Engineers grauated from Libya 
o Worked for international companies in Libya 
x Fathers are Libyan-Canadian business men who grew up in Canada but moved 
back to Libya 
Children’s  
Wellbeing 
x Spent summers in Egypt 
x Spoke fluent English 
o Learned English through courses in Libya and television 
Dental Health x Dentist from the UK but located in Libya during the war 
Victims of War 
Displacement 
x Global change maker leader – associated with British Embassy prior to the 
revolution  
o Spent some time in England with the group 
Women 
Empowerment 
x UK born medical school student 
Political 
Lobbying 
x Global change maker participant 
x Engineers working for international oil companies in Libya 
Youth 
Development 
x Sisters raised in Italy 
x Daughters of Libyan entrepreneur based in Italy 
Media Station x Libyan-British technician 
Social Media 
Activism 
x Libyans from across the world – various professional backgrounds 
Libyan 
Canadian 
Organization 
x Lawyers, doctors, professors, and engineers  
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Table 5 Continued 
Description Characteristics of  Founders 
Libyan 
Canadian 
Organization 
x Engineers, civl employees, students 
Activism x Muslim Brotherhood based organization 
American 
Libyan 
Organization 
x Founder is an entrepreneur in the tech sector  
x Civl employees, students, professionals from various sectors 
Think Tank x American, British, and Canadian Libyan backrounds 
x Founder worked for CSO in Morocco 
x Political science and finance backgrounds from international universities 
Online Network 
of Activists 
x Founder is a women retail entrepreneur 
x Co-Founder worked for the WorldBank and the White House 
x Rest of the members are from all over the world 
Youth 
Empowerment 
x Founder is a Libyan-Canadian serial entrepreneur based in Canada 
Women 
Empowerment 
x Founder is a teacher in Libya, but spent 10 years in Texas where she managed the 
Muslim community center 
Political 
Lobbying 
x Corporate lawyer based in Libya 
x Most of her clients are international companies operating in Libya 
 
Closer examination of who was in this group indicated three key characteristics; these 
individuals were of Libyan background, typically had some professional experience in large 
organizations, and they had spent a considerable time in countries with established civil societies. 
Research in neo-institutionalism and social movement theory suggests that institutional 
innovation   is   a   “political   process   in   which   social   movements   play   a   double   edged   role:   they  
deinstitutionalize existing beliefs, norms, and values embodied in extant social structures and 
establish  new  structures  that  instantiate  new  beliefs,  norms,  and  values”  (Rao  &  Giorgi,  2006:  pg.  
271). Institutional entrepreneurs are crucial in this process as they are able to identify 
opportunities, frame issues and problems and mobilize others. In Libya, there was a special 
group of institutional entrepreneurs responsible for rapid, starting from scratch, institutional 
innovation.  
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4.4. The  “50”  as  Institutional Brokers 
The  unique  position  of  “The  50”  allowed them to successfully maneuver through the void 
and spearhead the attempt to infuse new values, beliefs, and norms into the emerging field. These 
individuals, or the organizations they had founded, acted as institutional brokers connecting 
otherwise unconnected institutions. More specifically, these entrepreneurs are partially 
embedded in developed institutional environments of civil society, or non-adjacent institutional 
fields   in  Figure  3,  but  are  also  partially   embedded   in  Libya’s   society  void  of   civil institutions. 
They are able to facilitate the diffusion of knowledge in a social system from outside that system 
by moving across institutional fields. This partial embeddedness in very different fields, links 
these actors to different sets of actors and therefore providing them with distinct opportunities 
and competitive capabilities (Zaheer & McEvily, 1999). 
A large body of research has looked at the roles of brokers in the assembly of new 
combinations as they are ideally positioned to receive new and previously uncombined ideas 
(Brass, 1995; Burt, 1992, 2004; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997). Brokerage relies on leveraging the 
knowledge and efficiencies that reside in elements of existing technologies. It is based on a 
strategy that lends itself to innovation by combining existing technologies in new ways that 
result in dramatic synergy (Hargadon, 1998).  The concept is rooted in the theory of structural 
holes, which explains how certain organizations can play a key role in bridging knowledge gaps 
in a market (Burt, 1992). Although most research has centered on technology brokering, it is a 
concept that can be applied to the combining of not only technology, but the development of 
other innovations such as theories, policies, processes, and in this case, institutional elements. 
Thus, brokerage can be considered to happen at various levels. 
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 Interest in the role of brokers spans a number of different research fields at various levels 
of analysis in the last 20 years. This work has typically focused on technology transfer and 
diffusion, innovation management, and service organizations (Howell, 2006). However, little 
work has looked at brokerage at the institutional level.  
At an organizational level of analysis, Hargadon and Sutton (1997) describe the 
advantages of brokering within a firm that operated between different industries. They studied a 
design firm that routinely took technologies and ideas from one industry and applied them to 
another and found that the firm exploited its network position to access the knowledge of 
existing technologies in various industries which allowed them to generate new solutions for 
other industries. Hargadon and Sutton (1997) argue that knowledge brokers use their industry 
position to facilitate the acquisition, retention, and retrieval of information. Thus, they have the 
ability to effectively recombine knowledge given their access to previous ideas. Their study 
focused on how brokers, as agents, facilitate the process of knowledge and technology transfer 
across people, organizations and industries. They stress that brokering is more than just a linking 
role, but also helps transform the ideas and knowledge being transferred as they are a repository 
of knowledge that can provide solutions that are new combinations of existing ideas to their 
clients (Howell, 2006).  
Literature looking at the role of social positions in changing institutional arrangements 
has found conflicting results, where some studies have suggested that organizations and 
individuals located in the periphery of a field are more likely to act as institutional entrepreneurs 
(e.g. Garud et al., 2002; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Leblebici et al., 1991), other studies have found 
that those in the centre of a field are more likely to act as institutional entrepreneurs (e.g. 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2002). The variance in these findings may be 
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due to differences in field characteristics such as the level of heterogeneity and 
institutionalization (Battilana et al., 2009) or due to differences in the type of change (Battilana, 
2007).  The related concept of boundary spanners in the institutional transformation literature 
(Helfen, 2015; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010) overlaps with the concept of brokerage, however 
spanners redirect information that is confined by boundaries, whereas brokers connect otherwise 
unconnected  entities.  Thus  “brokers  can  span  boundaries  but  not  all  boundary  spanners  broker”  
(Fleming & Waguespack, 2007; 166). 
Building   on   this,   I   argue   that   an   institutional   entrepreneur’s   position,   or   the   type   of  
institutional entrepreneur involved in the innovation process, also depends on whether it is 
incremental or radical institutional innovation that is taking place. Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis 
(2011) discuss institutional brokerage as one of the strategies available to entrepreneurs in 
emerging markets. They argue that “the greater the institutional uncertainty in an emerging 
market, the greater the opportunity for entrepreneurs to act as institutional brokers by creating 
ventures that reduce the risk for other actors”  (Tracey  et  al.,  2011;;  31).  
In this study, institutional brokers are defined as organizations or individuals who 
facilitate the diffusion of knowledge in a social system from outside that system by moving 
across institutional fields. They help build organizations and ultimately new institutional fields 
by bringing in elements, such as practices, logics, and organizational templates, from other 
institutions they are embedded in. In extreme cases of institutional voids, institutional brokers are 
an important type of institutional entrepreneurs.   
Giddens’   (1984)   structuration   theory   provides   a   useful   perspective   for   integrating   the  
concept of brokerage and exploring institutional embeddedness and how actors can be reflexive 
and constrained. He argues that structure is not detached from action as social structures are 
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made up of human action, and are also mediums for this interaction. Thus, structuration refers to 
the process by which actors reproduce and transform social practices across time and space and 
can either enable or constrain action. Actors are seen as embedded in a social context, including 
the history of their previous interactions. They are engaged with various structures that they also 
reproduce or transform.  
  Research has previously looked at how the embeddedness of individuals in social 
networks determines the success of knowledge transfer within that network (Burt, 1992). It is 
believed that ties to a cohesive group boost the motivation to share knowledge (Reagans & 
McEvily, 2003), and stronger ties reflect greater trust that helps enhance the articulation of 
knowledge (Levin & Cross, 2004). Thus, brokers can use their connections to access knowledge 
valuable to the institutional field and to realize opportunities for knowledge sharing. These ties 
help offset institutional and cultural barriers to transferring knowledge across the institutional 
borders. Because they are connected to multiple institutional fields, institutional brokers are able 
to see multiple frames, and not attach themselves to a single frame. This allows them to step 
outside of conventional wisdom and think more creatively. They have connective awareness, the 
ability to hold different ideas and experiences loosely, and connective legitimacy, legitimacy 
through their connection with the field. 
Whereas research has focused on institutional entrepreneurs already taking action (Smets 
et al, 2012) and the position of brokers in a social network, there is little insight about how their 
position allows them the ability to act as brokers, and what it is exactly that they do.  
Bourdieu (1985) argues that field characteristics are likely to influence whether actors 
become institutional entrepreneurs and that actors view various aspects of a field differently 
depending on where they are located or positioned within that field. This research found that 
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institutional brokers are able to bring about innovation to the field as an outcome of two 
dimensions of their positions; a spatial dimension and a temporal dimension.  
The spatial dimension stems from the network position of a broker. Social network theory 
describes the relationship between individuals and organizations within a network. Actors in a 
network form  subgroups  that  “know  one  another,  are  aware  of   the  same  kinds  of  opportunities,  
have  access  to  the  same  resources,  and  share  the  same  kinds  of  perceptions”  (Burt,  1983:  180).  
This conceptualization can be moved up to the institutional level by looking at institutional fields 
as the subgroup of actors. Institutional brokers occupy the space between institutional fields that 
would otherwise not be connected. Thus, if we explicate the difference between an institutional 
entrepreneur and an institutional broker, institutional entrepreneurs occupy a position within one 
relevant subgroup, however brokers occupy spaces within both relevant subgroups spanning the 
distance between subgroups therefore creating bridging ties. This spatial aspect of institutional 
brokers allows connections to be made between the fields therefore creating a flow of existing 
solutions from one field where they are ample to an emergent field void of these institutional and 
organizational solutions.  
 The cognitive dimension  stems  from  the  memory  that  allows  brokers  to  “acquire,  retain,  
and   retrieve   new  combinations   of   information   obtained   through   such   a   position”   (Hargadon  &  
Sutton, 1997; 717). Being positioned in both fields allows for a bridge between the two fields 
that creates a channel for knowledge and resource flow, and the ability to connect other actors 
from one field to another. However, being present in a field also creates unique, field specific 
events and experiences that are retained in the broker’s  past.  Thus,  this  dimension   is  dependent  
on the history of the broker, where successful institutional brokers spent a considerable amount 
of time taking part in activities that are relevant to the work that is needed to be done to help 
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create radical institutional innovation. Many times this history was based on time spent in a 
professional organization, for-profit entrepreneurial ventures, courses taken in English, or 
occupations these brokers held. For example, a mid-age women named Amina was on the 
founding team of LSO, one of the larger organizations in Libya. She also served as a liaison for a 
number of international organizations trying to reach Libyan women entrepreneurs.  Amina also 
free-lanced for some of the new media outlets for reports on civil society events and women in 
business related events and stories. Amina had hardly ever left Libya except for the occasional 
trip to Europe and Syria. Amina was however a successful pharmacist who had opened her own 
pharmacy before the war. Her ability to network with the foreign organizations and local 
organizations was incredible. When I asked her how she made time to go to all these events, she 
told me;  
“It’s   like  marketing  your  business.  There’s  pharmacies  all  over  Tripoli,  the  only  
way to get people   in  yours  is   to  go  to  them.  It’s  the  same  here.  Im  not  going  to  
get  anything  done  by  waiting  for  someone  to  come  to  me”  (CSO Interview).  
 
Amina’s  past  experience  in  the  pharmaceutical  field  as  an  entrepreneur  in  the  field  led  to  
experiences that shaped her ability to act in the emerging field.  
Thus, the brokers in this study had one foot in the emergent field and one foot in an 
established field giving them connective awareness and connective legitimacy. This unique 
position allows them to successfully maneuver through the void, build new organizations 
successfully and infuse new beliefs, norms and values into the emerging field vis-a-vis their 
relationship and knowledge from the more established institutions they are a part of, and the 
experiences they had within the more established fields.  
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Sahar from an INGO described the successful organizations she had come across. 
 
“Some people, some organizations, will be by people who were working in 
organizations already and have some knowledge, some functions. Not civil 
society, but I mean expertise in management, in managing an organization, 
planning. You would find those kinds of people having some kind of 
exposure to the business, and also to, they have functions, like function in 
management, human resources. They typically are from companies before 
the war. Of course you will not find them knowing fund raising, or advocacy, 
because   this   type   of   activities   or   functions   is   new   to   Libya”   (INGO 
Interview). 
 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In summary, as shown in Figure 3, three types of fields are present in the institutional 
innovation process; non-adjacent fields, adjacent fields, and the emerging field. Institutional 
innovation in Libya was triggered by the humanitarian crisis brought on by the war, and the 
dismantlement of the government that created an opportunity for actors to bring forward 
innovations that ultimately can be legitimized. Findings from my first data collection phase in 
Libya led me to exploring those individuals who were embedded in Libya, but also belonged to 
other institutional fields that provide relevant institutional building blocks for the development of 
Libya’s   nascent   civil   society.  The   founders   of   these   organizations typically spent considerable 
time abroad in fields with established civil society and/or belonged to professional organizations. 
I label these agents of radical institutional innovation as institutional brokers as they straddle 
both the emerging field and non-adjacent fields, and thus connect these otherwise unconnected 
social arenas. 
Actors situated in institutional voids must develop unique strategies to overcome the 
challenges present. The lack of resources, institutional pillars, networks, and legitimacy pose 
significant hurdles for institutional entrepreneurs. Normative, regulative forces are especially 
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weak here. Cognitive forces from the previous status quo are powerful, and institutional brokers 
must surmount these. This is further exasperated by the relative speed societal gaps created by 
institutional voids need to be addressed in times of crisis. However, institutional voids also 
provide an opportunity for entrepreneurs to creatively construct a field from scratch. 
In the next chapters, I present how these institutional brokers go about creating the new 
field, and the micro and macro dynamics that play out between these individuals, their networks, 
the organizations they belong to or started, and the fields they are embedded in. I also discuss the 
outcomes of these processes along the various phases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  84 
CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS - CREATIVE TRANSLATION 
 
How are institutional elements introduced in environments characterized by institutional 
voids?  At the individual and organizational level of analysis, radical institutional innovation 
begins with creative translation, the transformation of ideational and material objects within and 
during the process of adoption, diffusion, and and/or institutionalization (Czarniawska & Joerges, 
1996; Czarniawska & Sevon, 2005; Zilber, 2006). This process relies heavily on chance, 
necessity, and sometimes naiveté, versus the more linear process of discovery and exploitation 
that is often described in the innovation literature (Hughes, 2011; Powell & Sandholtz, 2012).  
Creative translation is  based  on  the  notion  that  “ideas  do  not  diffuse  in  a  vacuum  but  are  
actively transferred and translated in a context of other ideas, actors, traditions and institutions 
(Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008: 219). Translation can synthesize institutional elements such as practices, 
structures, ideas, models, and laws, which change as they flow through institutional borders 
(Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). They get modified and reshaped and can take on new meanings 
eventually. In the technology transfer literature, existing technologies are often adapted and 
transformed  before  they  become  usable  in  a  new  field.  This  notion  is  also  present  in  DiMaggio’s  
(1992) description of how Professor Paul Sachs used his strong connections to museums, 
universities, and financial institutions to   help   create   New   York’s   Museum   of   Modern   Art.  
Institutional brokers are positioned to put together different practices and templates to create new 
institutional fields from other fields they are embedded in (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997).  
Figure 6 illustrates the creative translation dynamic and the resulting outcomes that 
emerged based on my data collection in Libya.  
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Figure 6: Creative Translation Dynamic 
 
 
Given the presence of institutional voids, the creative translation process involves an 
overlying strategy of bricolage (Levi-Strauss, 1966). Here institutional brokers play the part of 
bricoleurs, patching together, somewhat unconsciously, the elements of various institutions they 
are embedded in and reworking the institutional materials they had at hand given the resource 
constraints they face, and the lack of institutional elements that would normally be present to 
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support organizations and institutional entrepreneurs. Figure 6 illustrates the creative translation 
dynamics. In this chapter, I will describe and explain this process and resulting outcomes. In 
particular, two micro-dynamics are present here. The first is entrepreneurial bricolage, which is 
how recombination, transposing and recasting takes place. The second is constructive negotiation. 
The actors involved in these processes are considered institutional brokers, unless otherwise 
stated. Where relevant, I describe some background information about the individual or their 
organization to further illustrate the characteristics of these brokers. 
 
5.1. Entrepreneurial Bricolage 
Bricolage is a dominant force in the dynamics of radical institutional innovation in Libya.  
As show in Figure 6, it is comprised of recombining, transposing, and recasting.  This section 
begins by describing bricolage more generally then moves to further elaboration on these three 
processes encompassing bricolage observed in the field. 
Although institutional brokers may have experience in established organizations, many 
were never entrepreneurial before the war. They had little or no experience in the activities 
needed to build organizations and develop institutional fields with very few resources, or 
cognitive, social, and material support to work with.  
As a result, these institutional brokers relied on bricolage during the initial phase of 
innovation. Bricolage refers to the process of theoretical tinkering by which individuals and 
cultures use objects around them to assimilate ideas. It is a response to resource scarcity. Levi-
Strauss (1966) first developed the concept while studying primitive societies constructing their 
religions. The ethnographer noticed that these people take what they have at hand – an animal, a 
tree, a natural setting – and recombine these objects, places or persons. The result is the creation 
of a religion that includes these objects that now have a new sense of purpose (Levi-Strauss, 
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1966). This process of innovation differs from the traditional view of the innovation process 
where entrepreneurs approach a problem by hypothesizing a solution and then finding resources 
that fit the criteria. Institutional brokers on the other hand, start with the resources at hand and 
then work their way towards an innovative solution. Although bricolage is a concept more 
familiar to social movement theorists than to organization theorists, a stream of research has 
started to emerge in the management literature that has explored bricolage as an important 
component of institutional work and entrepreneurship in resource-constrained environments 
(Baker, 2007; Baker, Miner, & Eesley, 2003; Baker & Nelson, 2005; Di Domenico, Haugh, & 
Tracey, 2010; Mair & Marti, 2009; Stinchfield, Nelson & Wood, 2013).  
Institutions are constructed through a process of bricolage by using elements that are part 
of existing institutions. This capability is also used to build networks as individuals rely on their 
networks to gather financial and symbolic resources needed to create the rules and organizations 
that   will   govern   a   new   field   (Rojas,   2010).   This   is   similar   to   Douglas’s   (1986)   work   that  
elaborates Levi-Strauss’s  (1967)  concept  of  ‘intellectual  bricolage’  and  extends  it to institutional 
thinking to illustrate how the construction of institutions and decisions to act are rarely made on 
the basis of individual rational choice.  
As the revolution started to unfold, groups operating under a logo and name, but no 
organizational structure, were becoming key players. Established organizations interested in 
Libya, such as INGOs and media channels were looking for people to work and communicate 
with. Masoud, a member of the Red Cross, one of the first organizations to enter Libya during 
the revolution, said: 
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“We  came   in  and  asked  where  are  the  NGOs,  and  we  honestly  couldn’t   find  any.  
We   come   into   these   crisis   situations   and   find   local   groups   to   work   with…   we  
recognize   that   we   can’t   do   this   on   our   own,   but   I   remember   the   first   days in 
Benghazhi, it was a bunch of people cooking and selling revolution flags. We ended 
up stretching ourselves and finding groups that in any other situation we wouldn't 
see  as  a  good  fit,  but  we  were  desperate.”   
 
This comment further emphasizes the void present  in  Libya’s  civil  society  at  the  time  of  
the  revolution,  and  illustrates  the  “making  do  with  whatever  is  at  hand”  concept  of  bricolage.  It  
was not only institutional brokers that acted as bricoleurs, but given the extreme institutional 
void, INGOs also had to rely on bricolage to reach their goal. 
To acquire resources, institutional brokers used both symbolic and material artifacts 
readily available. Things made of simple materials were sold by connecting them with symbols 
that reflected the euphoria felt over the revolution. I asked May how did they collect money? 
“We  made  stuff”  she  answered.  “Like  simple  stuff.  Like  we  found  rocks  and  we’d  draw  on  the  
rocks, the revolutionary flag or a picture of Omar Mukhtar9 and   sell   it”.  Majid,   from   a   local  
media station that started in Benghazi, shared how he and his friends sold flags. 
 
“My  grandmother  sewed  the  flags.  We  sold  so  many.  Everyone  wanted  one.  Even  
when it was dangerous to have one, we were still able to sell them, and for good 
money”  (Media interview). 
 
With little experience in humanitarian work and working in civil society organizations, 
many organization founders resorted to leveraging skills they had developed in other areas. Leila 
was a woman in her late thirties that I met at one of the civil society workshops. She was a 
pharmacist by training, but became involved with various civil society organizations during the 
                                                        
9 Omar Mukhtar  (August 20 1858) was the leader of the Libyan resistance to Italian colonization that 
took place  in  1912.  For  nearly  twenty  years  he  organized  a  movement  against  Mussolini’s  forces.  In  1931  
he  was  captured  by  the  Italian  armed  forces  and  hanged.  He’s  considered  one  of  the  greatest  Arab  heroes 
of the past century. The movie Lion of the Desert from 1981 starring Anthony Quinn centered onhis story. 
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revolution. She was present at most of the civil society related events I attended. Although Leila 
had spent most of her life in Libya, I noticed she spoke fluent English. When I asked her about 
this, she told me she spent time in various European countries, as her dad was a diplomat. I later 
learned  that  her  mother  was  not  Libyan  and  she  visited  her  mother’s  home  country  often during 
the  summer.  Leila  also  had  completed  a  Master’s  degree  in  England.  During  our  first  encounters  
I shared with her that I was looking at how civil society all got started in Libya, and who the 
people leading this change are. She shared: 
 
“These individuals (ones starting the organization) have inner leadership skills. 
Some  talent,  there’s  something  there.  It’s  about  doing  what  you  can  with  what  you  
have. Then they become more and more sophisticated. For example, remember that 
workshop we went  to?  Zeineb,  she’s  a  nurse.  She  has  a  skill  that  stems  from  being  a  
nurse  that  is  not  directly  related  to  nursing,  but  helps  her  in  this”.   
 
With time, these groups started to progress into organizations. The presence of the 
INGOs helped push the need to formalize the organizations. In Benghazi, a quasi-government 
was starting to form and the sudden surge of civil society organizations required them to set up 
the first Ministry of Civil Society and Cultural Affairs. They started to register organizations, but 
required that they include some information including the organizational bylaws. Many of the 
brokers I talked to, especially those in Libya, had little or no experiences with developing 
organizational bylaws. Many said they didn't even know what they were. They shared a variety 
of  ways  on  how  they  came  up  with  bylaws  to  cater  to  the  Ministry’s  request.  One  man  said  he  
Googled how to build an organization and found a bylaw template online and just used that. 
Another even relied on a documentary her illiterate grandmother watched about a scandal 
involving an NGO: 
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“Well   initially  we   didn’t   (know   how   to   put   together   an   organization)   either  
but we were actually told most of this, even before I Googled, because we 
didn’t  have   internet  at  the  time,  so  before I even Googled I was told most of 
this   by   my   grandmother.   Yeah,   she   doesn’t   know   shit   about   anything,   and  
she’s   like,  she  knows.  Well   turns  out  she  knows  a  lot.  I   just  didn’t  know  she  
knew. I love my grandma, amazing cook, awesome women. Anyways, she 
knows a lot about grandmotherly things, but not about organizations. She 
knew   this   stuff   because  of   some   foundation  she  had   seen  on  TV.  And   she’s  
telling me how this foundation has a branch, and a headquarter, and an 
educational arm, and an operational arm, and  this  and  that.  And  I’m  like  what  
the   hell?  And   'no',   she’s   not   educated   at   all.  But   she’s   seen   it  on  TV.  Some  
documentary  about  an  organization  under  investigation,  and  she’s  like  telling  
me  to  write  this  stuff”  (CSO Interview).  
 
Bricolage continued to play an important role as the field developed. I saw this happening 
throughout the dynamics I discuss in the preceding sections, however it was most prominent in 
the first phase of the process. The next section describes three mechanisms of bricolage I 
observed being used by the institutional brokers; recombining, transposing, and recasting.  
 
5.1.1. Mechanisms of Bricolage 
How does bricolage happen? What are the mechanisms involved? Delving into this, I 
discovered that brokers recombine, transpose, and recast elements from the non-adjacent 
institutions they are embedded in, so that they may be used in the emerging field. Figure 7 
illustrates the differences between the three mechanisms of bricolage. 
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Figure 7: Differences in Bricolage Mechanisms 
 
 
 
Recombining. Resources for organization and capability building are especially constrained in 
emerging fields. Just as technological innovation requires the recombining of previous 
innovations, institutional innovation can be seen as a combination of already present, institutions 
and institutional elements (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Rojas, 
2010).  
The drafting of a new constitution was a highly anticipated event post revolution. 
Although the constitution governs the actors inside of civil society, it is not directly associated 
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with the civil society field. However, the constitution embodies the norms and values of civil 
society such as equality, tolerance, and common good. Furthermore, civil society provides an 
enabling framework for democracy and state building (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Putnam, 
Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993) and therefore the drafting of the constitution was an important part of 
the development of this field.  
The first Libyan constitution was introduced in 1951 under the monarchy rule of King 
Idriss. This constitution was relatively short with only 35 articles, but it was the first introduction 
of some codification of rights for Libyans. After the monarchy was overthrown in 1969, Gadaffi 
introduced  “The  Green  Book”  in  1975.  This  consisted  of  37  articles  written  by  Gadaffi  himself,  
and included controversial, and what some may consider ridiculous  articles,  such  as:  “There  is  no  
freedom   for   a  man  who   lives   in   another’s   house,  whether   he   pays   rent  or   not”   (Part   II of The 
Green Book, Qadaffi, M. 1975). This resulted in renters taking over the homes they lived in, and 
thousands of families losing their properties to their tenants. Therefore, a new constitution was a 
priority for the transitional government that took over during the revolution, and the public in 
general. Before a constitution committee was even elected, Azza Maghur, a prominent lawyer in 
Libya, was taking the lead to prepare potential committee candidates, government officials, and 
even the public, on constitutional law. Ms. Maghur was fluent in Arabic, English, and French. 
She spent some time studying in France, and also called Canada home as a Canadian citizen. Ms. 
Maghur was especially known for her role in the defense team for the famous Lockerbie case10.  
I attended a number of her presentations. Her strategy in assisting with constitution development 
was   to  not  “build   it   from   scratch”   but   to  “start  with   the  original  1951  constitution   and   look  at                                                          
10 The Lockerbie bombing refers to the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21 1988. 243 
passengers and 16 crewmembers died when the plane crashed onto residential areas of Lockerbie, 
Scotland, killing 11 more people on the ground. Two Libyan nationals were arrested and one was found 
guilty. In 2003, Gaddafi accepted responsibility for the bombing and paid compensation to the families of 
the victims. 
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similar   countries,   with   strong   constitutions,   and   what   they   have   done,   and   use   them”  
(Presentation by Azza Maghur at the 2nd Annual One Voice Conference). According to Azza, 
“the   Tunisian   and   Egyptian   constitutions   have   been   strong   examples   for   the   shaping   of   the  
Libyan  draft”.   
The  Women’s   Platform   for   Peace   (LWPP)   developed   a   “Charter   of   Libyan   Women’s  
Constitutional  Rights”  based  on  a   series  of  workshops and consultations with both Libyan and 
International academics, lawyers, judges, religious leaders, and civil society activists. A 
promotional video created by LWPP (www.youtube.com/watch?v=glauhZOqpMA) shows clips 
from the meeting, where members of the committee are sharing their thoughts on other 
constitutions.   At   the   beginning   of   the   video   a   man   is   heard   saying   “We   review   different  
constitutions of different countries, and constitutions of countries that went through difficult 
experiences”.  Another  man   then   shares  with   the  group   in   the   room;;   “We   suggest   a  mixture   of  
part  of   the  Moroccan  constitution  and   the  part  of   the   Italian  constitution  article  51”.  A  woman  
then takes the microphone  and  shares  with  the  group;;  “My colleagues with me thought that there 
are   many   points   about   children   in   the   South   African   constitution   that   we   should   look   at”.    
Another   women   is   then   heard   saying   “In these rights we prefer the text in the Ecuadorian 
constitution”.  I  asked  Rania,  a  prominent  Libyan  activist  and  member of the committee, how the 
meeting took place and whether the video really represented the discussion that happened. 
 
“We  consulted  our   local  experts,   so  people   like  Azza  Maghur  and  Salah  Marghani,  
and some of the international organizations that were supporting the constitution 
drafting  procedure…  We  needed  to  bring   in  a  diverse  group  of  people  with  various  
expertise, and representing the various groups in Libya. Our focus was on women 
and   children’s   rights   though.   And   we   asked   all   participants   to   go   over the 
constitution of what our experts and partners thought would be relevant constitutions. 
So   one’s   like   Morocco,   Tunisia,   Egypt,   Jordan,   South   Africa,   and   Bosnia”   (CSO 
Interview). 
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One of the founders of LWPP shared:  
 
“The  roundtable  discussion  was  critical.  We’re  dealing  with  a  unique  situation  here.  
You have a population where a large majority of them were born at a time when we 
had no constitution. Many have no idea what a constitution is or what purpose it 
serves.  There’s  a  need  to  reconcile  Sharia  Law and international conventions, and we 
are in dire need of some sort of transitional justice and reconciliation due to the 
revolution. And, this needs to be done in a time of increasing militarization of the 
country…  We’re  doing  our  best  with  what  we  have…  (the  word)  “Challenge”   is  an  
understatement”  (CSO Interview). 
 
The individuals sitting around the table given the task to come up with key points for the 
new constitution had a tremendous responsibility. They were taking the lead in shaping the 
constitutional rights of all Libyan women, their children, and the generations to come. Many 
participants in that room had little legal experience, and only a 60-year-old constitution that had 
been abandoned for decades to work with. More importantly, they realized how incredible the 
situation was. That, unlike many countries with constitutions set in stone, that were hundreds of 
years old, this was an opportunity to start from scratch and literally use years and years of history, 
templates from the best and worst constitutions ever written, to write something new.  
The process was one of cutting and pasting from the old Libyan constitution, 
neighbouring and far reaching countries, and modifying them until a draft charter was put 
together. The charter was then shared on various social media sites and workshops to gather 
feedback before presenting it to the elected constitution drafting committee. This process 
illustrates  the  recombinative  nature  behind  the  new  constitution  in  terms  of  women’s  rights,  and  
the underlying processes of bricolage that were critical in the radical institutional innovation that 
was creating civil society in Libya. 
 
Transposing. Unlike recombining, which involves piecing together various elements to come up 
with something new, transposing is a mechanism through which attributes and elements are 
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introduced into foreign domains with little change (Powell & Sandholtz, 2012). Transposing is 
accomplished through translation via mimicry, leveraging existing sets of taken-for-granted 
practices, technologies and rules for the purpose of associating the new with the old (Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006). In this study, I found that transposing relies heavily on sense-giving (Thomas, 
Clark, & Gioia, 1993) as well.  
Institutional brokers in Libya mimicked institutional elements from a number of sources. 
Most notably were institutions from other countries with stronger civil societies, and from more 
established institutions within Libya, such as religious institutions, and professional institutions 
such as medicine and law.  
An important part of everyday life in Libya is that of religious institutions. Elements of 
this institution were integral in the emerging of new logics in Libya’s  building  of  civil society. 
Institutional brokers leveraged teachings and principles of religious aspects and used them to 
connect  to  the  logics  of  civil  society  such  as  those  surrounding  human  rights  and  women’s  rights,  
concepts that received little discussion prior to the revolution. At the second annual Voice of 
Libyan Women conference in Libya, the pamphlets had various quotes from the teachings of 
Islam regarding respecting women. One of the sessions was completely devoted to what Islam 
says about respecting women. These beliefs stemming from religious viewpoints were 
continuously used to help shape logics of civil society that were compatible with those of 
religious institutions in Libya. For example, one of the quotes on the pamphlet was from a 
famous saying of the Prophet Muhammad, who Muslims consider the most perfect of man, and 
devoutly practice his teachings. The quote read: 
“The  best  among  you  is  he  whose  treatment  towards  his  wife  is  the  best”  – (Back of 
VLW 2nd Annual Conference Pamphlet). 
 
 During the fighting that took place between March 2011 and August 2011, it was 
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reported that rape was used as a weapon of war in some of the cities in Libya11. In the city of 
Misrata, where the most violence was seen, cell-phone footage of the rapes were confiscated and 
shared on social media sites. The social stigma attached to rape and sexual violence in Libya 
created a number of obstacles for CSOs as they tried to help the survivors of these war crimes. 
The survivors would not come forward to get the help they needed, and sadly, there were reports 
of  families  committing  ‘honour  killings’  of  their  own  daughters  and  sisters12. Libya Outreach, a 
U.S. registered CSO, and online network of over 1500 Libyans from within Libya, the Libyan 
diaspora, and non-Libyans from all over the world, put together a small coalition of their 
members to tackle this issue. They brought in sexual violence experts, Libyan female doctors, 
and connected with organizations in the refugee camps in Tunis that was housing some of the 
survivors. They came up with Public Service Announcements (PSA) to be shared on social 
media and radio and news stations across the country. They even approached Imams (religious 
leaders) that gave sermons in the local mosques in Libya.  
“We  need  to  make  this  about  religion.  That  this  (honour  killings)  are  against  Islam.  
Can we get some religious leaders to come out and say something? 
 
“No,  it’s  too  dangerous.  No  one  will  talk.” 
 
“What  about  Gheryani?  He’s  already  declared  himself  with  the  opposition.  He’s  in  
hiding,  and  everyone  listens  to  him”   
                              (Skype Conference Call with Libya Outreach Rape Crisis Team). 
 
The institutional logics surrounding rape and sexual violence are highly embedded in the 
Islamic  logics  of  virginity,  purity,  and  a  woman’s  sexual  monogamy.  To  target  the  stigma  of  rape,                                                          
11 Libya:  ‘Forced to Rape  in  Misrata’.  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13502715 
  Libyan Forces Use Rape as Weapon of War, Experts Say:       
  http://www.usip.org/publications/libyan-forces-use-rape-weapon-war-experts-say 
12 Government of United Kingdom Country Information and Guidance Document October 2014. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/362008/CIG_-_Libya_-
_Women_-__October_8_2014.pdf 
Libya  rape  victims  ‘face  honour  killings’.  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13760895 
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institutional brokers focused on the underlying logic from Islamic teachings to disentangle and 
separate the two logics. By using religious scholars to distinguish rape as a crime, from the 
sexual behaviour between a man and a woman, brokers were hoping to shift the logics so deeply 
rooted in the vast population. 
Many organizational building blocks were also transposed from adjacent organizational 
fields, and from non-adjacent domains including civil society institutions and experiences not 
close to Libya. Professional institutions such as law and medicine played an important role from 
an organizational perspective. Professionals from these areas used their learning from being a 
part of various associations connected to their profession to transport organizational structures 
and practices over to their newly formed CSOs. One informant was part of her medical school 
student association. She mentioned how she knew the importance of creating a mission and 
vision for an organization from her experience with the university association. Another 
informant, a graduate student from the United States, shared: 
 
“You  know  why   it’s   only   the  English-speaking people who have funding from 
these guys [INGOs], because they know how to market themselves and ask for 
money.   I’ve  written   tons  of   proposals.  Heck   that’s   sometimes   all   I   did   back   in  
Washington. I know how to ask for money and build my case. But these poor 
folks  have  no  clue.  It’s  unfair…  So  now,  the  biggest  complaint  we  hear  is  lack  of  
funding, and our workshop focuses really have been towards writing proposals 
and  grants”  (May – CSO Interview). 
 
Organizational templates and structures were borrowed from the private sector as Libyan 
business men and women became important mentors, advisors, and even partners to many of the 
emerging NGOs. Sarah, from a small organization in Tripoli, talked about how much of the 
learning she received was from the owner of the business they were renting from. In one 
example Sarah is explaining to me how they needed funding for a concert they were organizing 
for the children that had been out of school for so long due to the fighting; 
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“How  did  we  get  sponsors?  So  this  businessman  suggested  that  we  write  down  our  
goals with this project, our needs, and what exactly they can help us with. And we 
gave them options such as one, donate x dollars or two, give us one of these items 
that we are in need of, or three, recommend something else. And because we 
wanted school supplies, we visited the supply stores and got an idea of the costs to 
take care of one child. So one of the options we gave them was the cost per child, 
and how many children they wanted to help. Our office was in a company so we 
were able to use this businessman who was in the company and he would look over 
our letters and tell us what to do and change. Even the idea of getting a cost per 
person,  that  was  his  idea”  (CSO Interview). 
 
Securing funding is a critical capability for organizations to survive, and most capacity 
building workshops given by INGOs focused on this topic. However, before these workshops 
even started to take shape, institutional brokers were transposing some of these elements into the 
field through the relationships they shared. 
 
“How  did  we  come  up  with  a  bylaw?  My  uncle  is  a  lawyer,  he  shared  one  of  the  
bylaws of his client with  me  and  just  blacked  out  the  name  [laughing]”  (Ekram – 
CSO Interview).  
 
Outside of Libya, the Libyan diaspora was facing similar problems to those inside of 
Libya. No registered NGOs were present and therefore individuals were facing push back when 
collecting money as donators were looking for legitimate organizations that had some history, 
and could issue tax receipts. When it came to political lobbying, protests were being held across 
the world begging for international intervention in the crisis, however approaching government 
leaders was becoming a challenge. As one of the founders of the Canadian Libyan Council 
shared: 
 
 “I  was  able   to   secure  a  meeting  with  my   local  MP.   I  was   thinking   this   is  great.  
But then on the morning of my meeting I realized I had little leverage. It was just 
me delivering a letter I wrote asking for something to be done. So I quickly made 
up a name and a logo and added it to the letter and signed it as the president of the 
organization”  (Safia  – Canadian CSO interview).  
 
Safia had volunteered for various NGOs before, however she was never part of any 
lobbying efforts or entrepreneurial ventures. She did however have a legal background. Safia 
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was aware that to look legitimate and be taken seriously she needed to be associated with an 
organization. How is that done? By mimicking the methods of association from her professional 
life, the use of an organizational email, letterhead, and signature, she was able to paint the picture 
to her local MP that she represented a legitimate and established organization. 
Institutional brokers also facilitate the dissemination of ideas and models as they are able 
to introduce these elements selectively based on the environment they are in. They are able to 
engage  in  “sensegiving”  by  addressing  ambiguity  experienced  by  others  by  providing  meaning  to  
the radical changes taking place in the field (Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993). By providing 
meaning, institutional brokers are able to help others in the field navigate perceived tensions 
between logics and address gaps in the field. Framing change to align with stakeholder values 
(Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007) allows for progress as it helps create a cognitive shift (Foldy, 
Goldman & Ospina, 2008) that can then lead to action. Thus, little or no change are made to 
what is being transposed, however, new meaning or clarity is provided by the brokers so that 
those in the field, and in the adjacent fields, can be more accepting. Women based CSOs face an 
especially challenging environment in Libya given the very conservative culture in the country. 
Institutional brokers understand the importance of including women in decision-making 
processes and the workforce for a country to prosper. However, given their position in the field, 
they also understand the gender dynamics in the country, that getting people, especially men, to 
pay  attention  to  women’s  rights  in  a  society  where  the  primary  role  of  a  women  was  to  stay  home  
and take care of the family is incredibly difficult.  
To overcome this hurdle many women empowerment focused CSOs invested a great deal 
of   time   and   energy   trying   to   bring   some   understanding   to   the   general   public   about   women’s  
rights. They used any opportunity they could to discuss the topic, get them involved in the 
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discussion and share with them their experiences living in an environment where women were 
active members of various aspects of society. A few days after the election results came out, May, 
one of the first informants I had interviewed in Libya, called me. She asked me if I could pay a 
visit  to  her  Women’s  Center  and  talk  to  the  ladies  there  about  the  election  results  (17%  of  elected  
officials  being  female),  what  it  means  for  women’s  rights.  She  described    the Women’s  center to 
me during our interview as a place where underprivileged women would come in and get 
vocational training in hair-dressing, make-up application, and learn English and how to use the 
internet. I told May that I really was not qualified to give such a talk but I would come in to share 
my thoughts. I later asked May why she came to me. 
“You’re   from  abroad,  they’ll  pay  attention  to  you,  and  they’re  tired  of  hearing  me  
blab  on…  I  keep  hammering  them  with  women’s  rights.  The  elections  can  actually  
help them understand this stuff”  (CSO  – informal discussion -  notes taken). 
 
The   election   results   were   leveraged   to   bring   more   energy   to   the   women’s   rights  
discussion, an example for May to build on to illustrate the consequences of pushing for women 
inclusion. May told the audience that 17%, although not a lot,  still meant that there were women 
on board that could fight for issues pertaining to women. May was attempting to transpose logics 
surrounding  women’s  rights  by  making  sense  of  a  current  event  in  relation  to  women’s  rights. 
Thus, transposing whether it was to connect religious logics to civil society or to help 
legitimate   funding   activities   or   to   help   educate   about   women’s   rights   provided   an   important  
mechanism of bricolage that helped build and shape radical institutional innovation in Libya. 
 
Recasting. Whereas transposing involves imitating institutional elements, recasting is the 
deconstructing of elements and subsequent remolding to fit the environment. It is about 
rearranging, remodeling, and creating a new form of the shared practices or presenting them in a 
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new way. This comes from the art of metal recasting where different forms of objects are made 
by melting them down and reshaping them. The fundamental components and materials are the 
same, however they are given new purpose to fit more with the current environment.  
As   an   INGO  worker,   Laila,   shared,   “You   need   to   learn   to   speak   their   language”.   For  
example, one CSO had a creative way of framing their questions so they could understand what 
critical obstacles were in the way of women joining the workforce in Libya: 
 
“For   the   women   groups,   we   asked   “What   would   make   you go to work? You 
want to do this. What would make you feel  comfortable?”  But  for  the  men  it  was  
“what  would  make  you  allow your  wife?”  That  way  they  were  open  to  this.  And  
for   that   reason   they   were   OK.   They   would   be   “I   would   allow   my   wife   if   the  
following…  “  If  we  had  said  “What  would  make   it  OK?  Or  Would  you  be  OK  
for  your  wife  to  work  if…”  then  I  don’t  think  they  would  have been as open to it. 
We  kinda  made  them  feel   like  they  were   in  charge”  [emphasis  added]   – (Alia – 
CSO Interview). 
 
Another strategy used by another organizations was to resort to relabeling workshops as 
something else to get women to participate. May, who I referred to before, shared the following: 
 
“We   built   the   workshops   and   called   them   ‘women   cultural   centers’.   And   we  
advertised  them  as  cultural  centers.  Why  did  we  do  this?  Because  they’ve  never  
heard of workshops, but they know what cultural centers are”(CSO Interview). 
 
 
Workshops are an important part of civil society as they provide capacity building 
education, and are used as a means of developing concepts crucial to civil society, such as 
human rights, lobbying and advocacy. The workshop concept was introduced by the INGOs and 
they were able to bring in many of the newly founded CSOs that had a strong presence of 
institutional brokers. However, organizations looking at providing workshops towards a crowd 
not familiar with the concept had to be much more creative in how they described workshops 
and their purpose. Many were not familiar with the term workshop, but more importantly, civil 
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society workshops were associated with a political movement,  
and  lectures  on  women’s  rights,  autonomy,  and  the  importance of being a part of society. In the 
very conservative Libya, husbands and fathers were not comfortable of this as they saw this as a 
movement   being   led   by   “Westerners”.   In  one   cartoon  being   circulated  on  Facebook,   a  women  
covered in the Islamic veil and  a  long  dress  is  seen  entering  a  building  labeled  ‘Workshop’.  The  
next frame shows her leaving the workshop in tight jeans, a cropped blouse, and her hair flowing.  
 Thus, recombining, transposing and recasting are three mechanisms described above that 
illustrate the micro-dynamics of the entrepreneurial bricolage process of creative translations and 
how institutional entrepreneurs infused new elements into the emerging institutional field.   
 
 
5.2. Constructive Negotiation  
 
Another mechanism beyond bricolage that emerged to facilitate creative translation was 
constructive negotiation.  Negotiation   is   ‘the   deliberate   interaction   of   two   or   more   complex  
social units which are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their interdependence’  
(Walton & McKersie,   1991;;   3).   In   the   institutional   entrepreneurship   literature   ‘rhetoric’   and  
‘discursive   strategies’   with   their   opponents   are   some   of   the   mechanisms   used   by   institutional  
entrepreneurs to evoke change. This persuasion through language is a form of negotiation, 
however the means by which innovation can come about via this process has been largely 
neglected.  
In Libya, I found that negotiation between parties with conflicting ideologies was also 
sometimes a means of constructing new solutions to problems which are then embedded in the 
field. When elements from outside fields could not provide a solution that satisfied all parties 
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involved, even after various translation processes, it was sometimes through a process of 
negotiating that novel solutions to problems were constructed. These conflicts between opposing 
forces synthesize new outcomes. I call this form of creative translation constructive negotiation. 
The parties that enter the negotiation usually have competing institutional logics 
(Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Brokers bring to the table the ability to reconcile competing 
logics as they often share logics with the field surrounding the one newly forming and also bring 
with them foreign logics from non-adjacent fields. Their ability to sit on both sides of the fence 
provides them with a unique opportunity to see the various sides of an argument and many times 
come up with creative solutions as a result of this.  
 The introduction of the zipper ballot is an example of the use of constructive negotiation. 
The electoral law initially did not include a quota for women representation in the General 
National Congress (GNC) elections that took place on July 7, 2012. Women rights groups lashed 
out. They could not foresee a fair representation of women if a quota did not exist. Discussions 
soon initiated into what the quota should be. Members of the National Transitional Council, the 
transitional government overseeing Libya until elections could take place, put forward a 10% 
quota. A version of the electoral law, including the quota was shared online, and the NTC asked 
for feedback. Women empowerment focused CSOs were not happy with the 10% quota for the 
most part, however they could not reach a consensus on what the right quota should be. Some 
looked at recent examples of similar countries, such as a 25% quota in Iraq, and 30% quota for 
Tunisia.  Some,  including  women’s  groups,  felt  these  were  too  high  given  the  lack  of  experienced  
women in the political sphere in Libya. Others did not believe any affirmative action should be 
taken. The following post shown in Figure 8 between some of the well-known  women’s  rights  
CSOs in Libya illustrates the discussions surrounding the electoral law. 
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FIGURE 8: Facebook Post Discussion  on  Women’s  Rights CSOs 
 
 
 
The   Libyan   Women’s   Platform   for   Peace   (LWPP)   led   a   coalition   to   bring   the   various  
stakeholders including women focused CSOs, members of the International Organization for 
Migration (a branch of the United Nations), and NTC, and lobby for a more inclusive electoral 
law for women for the elections. Leila from LWPP shared: 
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“It  was  a  back  and  forth  process  that  lasted  weeks.  We  came  in  with  a  number,  
they (NTC) pushed back. We got feedback, and would go back with a counter 
offer. It was negotiating back and forth and we realized no one was going to 
be happy. In the end we asked ourselves, what do we want from this? And it 
really was at this point to make sure women had a fair chance of winning 
seats.  That’s  when  someone  at  the  meeting,  I  forget who,  said,  ‘OK,  let’s  put  
their   names   on   a   separate   list’.   That   of   course   made   no   sense,   so   then   we  
came  up  with  the  zipper  ballot”  (Leila – CSO Interview). 
 
The zipper ballot was an innovative solution as a result of the back and forth negotiations 
between the various parties. It was compromised of the alteration between male and female 
candidates vertically and horizontally on the ballot lists of all political parties. This way, all 
women candidates were clearly visible on each ballot, therefore bringing more attention to them, 
versus having their name lost in the list of hundreds of men. Women won 17.5% of the vote in 
the first elections ever in 52 years. 
 
 
5.3. Outcomes of Creative Translation 
The creative translation dynamic results in two key outcomes; institutional building 
blocks to develop the field, and legitimacy by assimilation.  
5.3.1. Legitimacy by Assimilation 
Legitimacy  is  the  “generalized  perception  or  assumption  that  the  actions  of  an  entity  are  
desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs  and  definitions”  (Suchman,  1995:  574).  It  involves  the  understanding  and  acceptance  of  
change (Glynn & Abzug, 2000) and an audience that endorses or can authorize the change. 
  To secure legitimacy for a new innovation, organizations seek to conform to prevailing 
institutionalized norms, cognition or practices (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Lounsbury & Glynn, 
2001; Navis & Glynn, 2010; 2011; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2015). In the context of institutional voids, 
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where the field is still nascent, connecting new innovations of the field to adjacent and familiar 
fields can help legitimate any new field innovations. The use of already existing and familiar 
logics, practices, and normative, cognitive and regulative elements of adjacent institutional fields, 
helps build familiarity and understanding and therefore make innovations more acceptable. 
Institutional brokers, through the process of bricolage can therefore help legitimate new practices,  
rules, and technology. Hargadon and Douglas (2001) offer a vivid description of  Edison’s  efforts  
to institutionalize a radical innovation, the electric light bulb. They argue that Edison drew on the 
public’s   pre-existing understandings of the technology, its value, and its uses to design the 
incandescent light around many of the already familiar features of the gas system. Although the 
new electric light offered many advantages from a practical and technological standpoint, 
“Edison   deliberately   designed   his electric lighting to be all but indistinguishable from the 
existing system, lessening rather than emphasizing the gaps between the old institutions and his 
new  innovation”  (Hargadon  &  Douglas,  2001:  489).  This  strategy  can  make  new  structures  and  
institutional innovations, especially those that are a radical departure from what was previously 
available, more understandable and accessible, leading to legitimacy by assimilation.  
 
5.3.2. Institutional Building Blocks  
Institutional building blocks consist of components that can lead to the development and 
institutionalization of the field. These elements may include regulative structures such as laws 
and ministries, normative aspects such as shared norms and values, and cultural-cognitive 
aspects such as beliefs and logics amongst those within the field. They can also be more 
structural aspects such as the organizations that make up a field, and the networks that help 
diffuse the elements across the field.  
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The creative translation dynamic creates a number of building blocks that are 
summarized in Table 6. These building blocks are infused in various levels of the process and are 
used as resources for the subsequent phases. These institutional building blocks can be begin to 
be institutionalized due to the legitimacy by assimilation that occurs due to entrepreneurial 
bricolage.  
 
 
Table 6: Overview of Institutional Building Blocks as Outcomes of Creative Translation 
  
Institutional 
Building Block Description Example and/or Illustrative Quotes 
 
Technical 
knowledge and 
competencies 
 
Form crucial 
resources for 
operational purposes 
in the field. 
 
 
“They  (grassroots)  think  the  government  is  the  
only source of money. Then they see these other 
organizations  with  funding  and  realize  there’s  
other ways to get the money”. 
Regulatory 
processes and 
enforcement 
mechanisms 
Externally imposed 
by policymakers 
and governmental 
agencies. 
 
x Zipper ballot bylaw for elections 
x Ministry of Civil Society and Cultural Affairs  
Organizations Organized body of 
individuals with a 
common purpose. 
“[They  trusted  us]  because  we  had  a  logo  and  an  
office”. 
“Phoenix  organization  have  volunteers.  They  
have turned a villa into an office. They now have 
a  proper  office  space.  They’re  an  organization.  
This  is  needed  to  succeed”. 
 
Networks  “But,  the  funding  opportunities,  these  English  
speaking people have access, they know people in 
embassies, they know people within government, 
they know how to access and reach out. They 
know  about  the  EU,  they  know  about  the  USA” 
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5.4. Conclusion  In summary, creative translation involves a process of entrepreneurial bricolage 
and constructive negotiation. Entrepreneurial bricolage occurred through three mechanisms; 
recombination, transposition, and recasting. Institutional brokers were able to introduce various 
elements from fields they are situated in outside of Libya into the emerging civil society field 
through these mechanisms. These mechanisms transform these outside elements into 
recognizable institutional building blocks that are considered legitimate by those entering the 
field due to their familiarity. Another way institutional building blocks enter the field is though 
constructive negotiation. Here institutional building blocks negotiate with other actors inside and 
outside the field for creative solutions. This negotiation process leads to innovations that help 
propel radical institutional innovation and the emergence of a new institutional field.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  109 
CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS - NETWORK CULTIVATION 
 
 
“I  think  there’s  an  elite  group,  who  have  the  advantage  of  having  a  lot  contacts,  
and   knowing  who   to   contact,   and   a   network   base,   and   they’re   the   ones  who  
host these elaborate and extravagant workshops and you get all the guest 
speakers from government coming to them, which obviously attracts a lot of 
new  participants  and  stuff.  They’re  probably  a  step  ahead  of  the  grassroots  civil  
society  organizations”  (Linda – INGO Interview). 
 
Institutional brokers need to spread and disseminate their work. To do this they must 
grow the network they work in and create new ones.  This is done through a process of network 
cultivation that involves network enhancing activities and network collaborations. Figure 8 
illustrates the process and outcomes of this process. The network cultivation dynamic leads to 
two types of outcomes. At the network level, the network size and strength are enhanced. At the 
individual and organizational level, network cultivation creates legitimacy by affiliation, 
competitive capabilities for the brokers, and new institutional entrepreneurs. There is also a 
network selection effect, where individuals and organizations that do not become associated with 
the networks that are developing tend to be selected out. 
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FIGURE 8: Network Cultivation Dynamic 
 
 
As the fighting settled and the focus turned to rebuilding the country and institution 
building, institutional brokers started to bridge ties with other brokers and organizations in the 
developing field and establish their position within the expanding network. This network 
cultivation process was strategic in that most of the time the connections and collaborations that 
were made were planned, intentional, and had a purpose. Network cultivation was achieved by 
creating network enhancing activities and by building collaborations within and outside the 
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network.  These  actions   lead  to  two  useful  outcomes  of  a  network;;  an   increase   in  the  network’s  
size, and strengthening of the position of the brokers within the network and the ties they had 
with others. This also resulted in four outcomes at the organizational level; legitimacy by 
affiliation, competitive capabilities for the individuals and organizations within the network, new 
institutional entrepreneurs, and a selection effect where organizations that did not link to the 
networks created were selected out. I elaborate the process and its outcomes below. 
 
6.1. Network Enhancing Activities 
Institutional brokers created network enhancing activities, events that bring positive 
attention to the existing network. These activities tend to provoke the attention of important 
stakeholders.  
At the start of the revolution, lobbying efforts by organizations outside of Libya primarily 
involved protests and media interviews. Initially, the protests and interviews were led by 
individuals or groups of individuals. Information regarding protests were emailed to friends and 
shared by word of mouth. At the protests, media outlets would find random individuals to talk to. 
This   scenario   quickly   changed.   In  Canada,   protests   started   to   be   “organized”   by   certain   newly  
formed organizations. Official announcements about upcoming protests were sent out to mailing 
lists that had been formed. Logos were attached to these emails, and signage seen at the protests. 
Press releases were being made with the name of an organizational media contact at the bottom. 
In one email thread that included over 200 members of the Libyan diaspora in Canada, an 
argument broke out between two organizations, the Canadian Libyan Council and the Libyan 
Canadian Association, about who was responsible for an upcoming protest. When I probed some 
of the individuals involved in the heated discussion about why did it matter who was organizing 
it, a member from one of the organizations shared: 
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“We  are  the  Canada  organization.  The  other   (organization)  only   has  members   from  
Ottawa.  They’re  not  the  contact  people  for  the  government  or  the  media.  That’s  us”  
(Ali – Canadian based Libyan Organization). 
 
Protests and interviews with the media served a critical role in gaining international 
attention to the events in Libya and pushing for international intervention. However, for 
organizations, they also served as a channel to important actors such as government officials, 
funding organizations, and media stations. Seeham from the United Kingdom organized a large 
fundraising dinner that included a number of British MPs and an invite to some cabinet members. 
She mentioned: 
“We  want  them  to  be  in  the  room  with  us  to  see what we are doing, what we have 
accomplished. This event is one of the only ways we can get them in the same room 
as  us”.(Seeham – UK based Libyan Organization Interview).  
 
 The events in Libya during the first few months of the revolution were fluid, dynamic, 
and complex. Libya Outreach developed what they called Situation Reports, a daily account of 
the events of the previous day. The report covered the three aspects of the conflict; military, 
humanitarian, and political changes or events. A small group of about ten members of Libya 
Outreach’s  online  group  would  create  the  reports  and  send  them  out  to  a  targeted  mailing  list  that  
had been developed. The mailing list included subscribers to the website, government officials, 
such as senators, congressmen, Ministers of Parliament, and media contacts. The Situation 
Reports provided a daily snapshot of the conflict for those interested. However, even more 
importantly to Libya Outreach, it was a daily connection to important stakeholders.  
 I joined the Situation Report committee and quickly saw how media stations and 
government officials who were looking for someone to connect to leveraged the reports by 
replying back to the email the reports were sent from. The Situation Reports were sent out to 
NATO emails Libya Outreach had obtained. A tweet from the official NATO twitter account 
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directed at Libya Outreach referencing the Situation Report led Libya Outreach to start sharing 
coordinates they had obtained of where Gadaffi forces were hiding weapons in the reports. It is 
believed that these coordinates were actually used by NATO to target weapon depots.13 
In Libya, once the fighting had slowed down in the major cities, a small women focused 
organization, Voice of Libyan Women (VLW), organized its first conference. VLW was shaping 
into one of the most popular, and the most funded organization, to come out of the revolution. Its 
founder, Alaa Murabit, is a Saskatchewan born Libyan-Canadian who was in Libya studying 
medicine at a local University at the time of the revolution.  
The conference was to bring together media, embassies, INGOs and other organizations. 
The British Embassy, European Union, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and two of the 
largest business groups in Libya, The Husni Bey Group, and Al Hawari Import and Export were 
the main financial supporters. The conference was open to individual guests, and included 
prominent speakers such as Her Excellency Lady Catherin Ashton, Vice President of the 
European Commission, and the current and past Prime Ministers of Libya. One of the members 
of the organizing team shared:  
“No,   they   (international  NGOs)   found   us.  We   didn’t   find   anyone.  What   happened  
was we did the conference in November. Following that we had a lot of organizations 
working  with  us  on  a  lot  of  issues  that  we  need”  (Alia  - VLW Representative). 
 
INGOs were looking for organizations to partner with in Libya. They were especially 
keen on working with organizations with visibility. VLW had already started to build a strong 
reputation in Libya prior to the One Voice conference by connecting to various embassies, and 
the transitional Libyan government early on. Murabit wrote articles for Canadian newspapers 
while   still   in   Libya   bringing   attention   to   her   cause.   They   soon   became   the   ‘go-to’   women’s                                                          
13  Nato, Twitter and air strikes in Libya; 
http://www.theguardian.com/help/insideguardian/2011/jun/15/nato-twitter-libya 
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focused organization in Libya. In October 2011, VLW was one of a few organizations that met 
with then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton.14 Even before the One Voice conference, VLW was 
being funded by various groups and had built a strong name for itself. INGOs were eager to 
partner up with VLW. As one informant shared: 
“They  (INGOs)  want  to  be  associated  with  successful  organizations,  and  successful  
events that are going to get them some marketing. So in the end they can go back to 
their  funders  and  say  ‘look,  look  what  we’re  doing’”  (Donia – CSO Interview). 
 
In established fields, entrepreneurs typically attend networking events to build ties to 
various actors in their field that may provide them with the necessary resources to build their 
enterprise and achieve their goal. In a nascent field, institutional entrepreneurs create events to 
attract important actors that can help increase the size of their network and ultimately the field.  
The  first  VLW  conference  was  a  critical  event  in  the  field’s  development.  Not  only  did  it  
help VLW founders bring further attention to their organization and therefore expand their 
network, but it also instigated a new interest in activism, a shift from the previous focus on 
humanitarian aid. As one of the founders of VLW shared: 
 
“And,  the  idea  was,  we  would  try  to  shift  the  focus  from humanitarian to actual civil 
society work. It (the conference) would kind of kick-start  women  initiatives”. 
 
And   it  did  do  just  that.  The  conference  represented  what  some  referred  to  as  a  “glitzy”,  
“professional”,   and   “extravagant”   event.  At   a   time  when   those   fighting   had   come   home   to   no  
jobs, and those working on humanitarian projects were not needed anymore, the conference gave 
many attendants an opportunity to get involved in what appeared to be an attractive arena in the 
‘new’  Libya.  Representatives  of  some  of  the  largest  NGOs  in  the  world  and  many  key  political  
                                                        
14 Clinton  and  Libyan  Youth  Share  Views  on  Libya’s  “New  Era”  - 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2011/10/20111019134455nehpets0.4402887.html#axzz3nAhjFb4U 
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actors from inside and outside of Libya were present in one of the most expensive hotels in 
Libya. The presence of the head of the NTC and the Prime Minister could not be ignored. As one 
of the conference attendees shared: 
 
“Like  Jibreel  and  Jalil  (NTC  heads,  considered  celebrities  of  the  revolution)  were  in  
the same room for four hours. It was pretty awesome. Well a lot of the women said, 
‘we  need  to  start  working  hard  and  doing  things”.  So  it  did  actually  really  kickstart  a 
lot  of  women’s  organizations”  (Elham - CSO Interview). 
 
 
Secondly, although this conference brought various actors from within the field and from 
adjacent and non-adjacent fields together, many voiced their anger at being excluded and labeled 
it   as   an   “elitist”   event   used   to   “promote  VLW”   versus   kick   start   the  women  movement   in   the  
“new  Libya”.  A  group  of  women  were  so  angry   they  were  excluded   from   the  conference,   that  
they organized a protest outside the conference venue. One woman I interviewed shared the 
following description of the event: 
“So  you  know  the  first  conference  that  happened,  back  in  November,  the  Voice  of  
Libyan  Women   conference?   I  went   to   this   conference.   There’s   a   demonstration  
outside,   basically  women’s   groups   that  wanted   to   come   and   they were like, you 
weren’t   invited   so   you   can’t   come.   So   one   of   these   women   was   like   ‘Ok,   you  
don’t  want  to  invite  me,  well  don’t  call  yourself  the  “Libyan  women  conference’.  
So this whole hoopla happened. Cameras were there. One of my colleagues flew 
in to this conference and she got so emotional And she saw these women and she 
started   crying.   There   was   screaming,   crying,   cameras,   it   was   crazy.”   (Donia   – 
CSO Interview) 
 
  
 Thus, while network enhancing activities within and across institutional fields was 
another key mechanism of radical institutional innovation, navigating the political terrain was 
complex and sometimes created unintended consequences.  
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6.2. Network Bridging 
The turn of events at the conference led to some animosity towards VLW and further 
marginalization of grassroots organizations. VLW, although continued to be a well-funded 
organization, lost the support of other actors in the field. The following year, as a means of 
reconciling  this,  VLW  held  it’s  2nd annual One Voice Conference. This time it partnered with a 
number of grassroots organizations to develop the conference, opened registration for anyone 
affiliated with an organization that was doing relevant work, and used various activists from 
different organizations across Libya as speakers. This collaboration between organizations was 
not seen in my prior visits. The 2nd VLW conference seemed to pave the way for collaboration, 
as it was the largest event that brought together the various CSOs across Libya. The sponsors 
funded the travel for two representatives from each organization. The conference had a large 
focus on collaboration and working together. There were a number of breakout sessions where 
representatives from the different organizations would join together to discuss various topics and 
plans. VLW had become not only an institutional broker, but also an organizational broker as it 
now connected otherwise unconnected organizations within the field.  
VLW was not the only organization that was able to connect organizations within the 
network that was being formed. Other institutional brokers were well positioned to bridge 
various actors in the field. More specifically, institutional brokers became the bridge between 
INGOs and grassroots organizations.  
 Institutional brokers were able to access the INGOs through their already existing 
networks. They were also well received by INGOs as they shared similar attributes such as 
language spoken, and an understanding of the role of civil society, and key capabilities such as 
financial planning, and marketing. Institutional brokers were already on social media sites such 
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as Facebook and Twitter before these sites became popular in Libya, and they had developed ties 
with media outlets early on. These proved very important as they were channels to find the 
INGOs that were providing funding.  
 This was not the case for many of the grassroots organizations in rural areas, and even in 
the major cities. I found that the INGOs started to use institutional brokers as a way to connect 
and find the grassroots organizations that otherwise would have been impossible to find. As one 
manager from a U.S based INGO shared: 
“A   lot  of   them  have   the  network  and,   rather  than   reinvent   the  wheel,  we  do  things  
through  workshops,  and  we’ll   announce  a  workshop  and  ask  some  of  organizations  
we know to go out and find others that may be interested. Sometimes I even make a 
rule that they need to bring with them one new organization that has not been to our 
workshop  yet.  And  they  do  that.    We  can’t!  So  when  we  have  them together, and they 
sit there, and there is a presentation, and then they start asking questions, and voicing 
the grievances they have, the difficulties and the pressures they have and then, 
suggestions come. This one tells you he has some experience, and this is the solution. 
And then they, like magic, during the breaks, you see them all together, sitting 
together, discussing,  planning”  (Linda – INGO interview). 
 
 Institutional brokers not only create new ties between CSOs in the field and INGOs, but 
through this process they also strengthen their ties with these CSOs, therefore creating a new 
channel of possible knowledge transfer. Hatem, who was a British-Libyan working for a Danish 
INGO   referred   to   these   brokering   CSOs   as   “good   CSOs”.   He   also   shared   similar   thoughts   to  
those shared by Linda: 
 
“We  need  to  raise  the  capacity  of   these  good  CSOs  that  worked  and  have  access  to  
these areas, to work with the grassroots. This helps in two ways – it bridges the gap 
and   it’s   like,   it   makes   you   reach   to   the   grassroots,   who   cannot   write   maybe,   who  
cannot get to the government, who cannot communicate with the donors. Although 
they have great ideas maybe, but we cannot reach them, they cannot reach you, so, 
these are the ways that I am thinking about to get the organizations themselves to go 
and talk to them, and bring the ideas, and bring them together, and fill the momentum 
to  learn”.  – (Hatem – INGO)  
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This network bridging was vital as it provided grassroots CSOs who were doing great 
work, in areas that were in great need of CSOs, to survive. The INGOs were located in the major 
cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, and a few in Misrata. These cities tend to be more progressive in 
terms  of  women’s  rights  and  empowerment,  and  there  was  access  to  funding,   if  not  through  the  
INGOs, then through large businesses.  
However, the organizations in the more rural areas were being sustained by volunteers, 
many were using their own money to fund their projects. Members of one of these organizations 
that I interviewed from Yefren, a small mountain region of Libya, shared how they felt alienated 
and marginalized by all the activity that was happening in Tripoli. They felt they were being 
forgotten. One nurse, Naila, told me how she started off delivering food to the fighters and after 
the war she started an organization focused on children with special needs. She became very 
emotional when she mentioned how she sold her car to pay for things like registration of her 
organization and some small projects her organization developed in Yefren. She wanted to be 
involved  in  civil  society  but  she  shared  how  she  couldn't  afford  it  anymore.  “They  (INGOs)  want  
a proposal, I   can’t  write   a   proposal   in  English.  What   am   I   suppose   to   do?”  A  year   later   I  met  
Naila again at a CSO workshop. She was working with a branch of VLW in the mountain 
regions.  I  asked  her  about  her  organization:  “I’m  not  doing  that,  but  I’m  working  with  VLW and 
learning  a  lot.  Maybe  I’ll  go  back  and  do  that  soon.  That’s  my  dream”. 
 
6.3. Outcomes of Network Cultivation 
Networks create bridging ties between a focal organization and contacts in economic, 
professional and social circles that otherwise would not be accessible (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). 
Institutional brokers bring to the emerging field a small network that they leverage to build the 
field. However as resources become depleted, these networks are further cultivated. The outcome 
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of this cultivation results in both network level and organizational level outcomes. At the 
network level, the network strategy observed introduces more nodes (individual actors or 
organizations), thus increasing its size. It also strengthens the ties (relationships or interactions) 
between the nodes, allowing for more collaboration. At an organizational level, benefits include 
increased legitimacy via the ties, and access to funding, knowledge, and the introduction of new 
institutional entrepreneurs.  
 
6.3.1. Network Level Outcomes 
The two processes discussed above  - network enhancing and networking bridging, lead 
to two network related effects, expansion of the network (a size dimension) by creating ties 
outside the field, and enhancing the network quality, by building and enhancing new ties within 
the field (a strength dimension). 
Creating Ties Outside the Field – Expanding the Network (Size). Individuals and 
organizations outside of the emerging field play significant roles during the initial phases of 
institutional innovation, as they are typically located in fields with strong institutional elements, 
abundant resources, and legitimacy. Institutional brokers leverage their position to build ties with 
these actors. From a resource dependency perspective, in environments characterized by 
institutional voids, these connections help acquire critical resources and reduce uncertainty 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 Consistent with entrepreneurship research, when building a new venture, entrepreneurs 
use a stock of social capital from friends, family members, and other relationships or ties that 
may have come about through work, previous businesses, etc. (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003; Grandi 
& Grimaldi, 2003). These contacts bring much support for entrepreneurs, however entrepreneurs 
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eventually require resource that cannot be satisfied by their existing network contacts (Hite & 
Hesterly, 2001; Larson & Starr, 1983). To access these much needed resources, entrepreneurs 
expand their network to include additional contacts from outside the field (Batjargal, 2003; Lee 
& Tsang, 2001). This typically leads to a cascade effect where network connections, lead to more 
network connections and so on.  
 For example, VLW initially was connected to a few INGOs that had entered Libya. These 
connections led to a substantial amount of funding that allowed VLW to create successful events, 
such   as   the   conference,   a  women’s   sewing   center,  Purple  Hijab  Day,   and   the  Zawia  Women’s  
Center and NGO Hub for Education and Empowerment. These projects led to a great deal of 
media attention that led the founder, Alaa Murabit, to become the go-to person for anything 
related  to  women’s  rights.  Her  speaking  engagements  in  the  past three years include, a number of 
TedX talks, the Oslo Freedom Forum, the Oprah Winfrey Foundation, and the United Nations. 
At each of these events, Ms. Murabit continues to expand her network, bringing in continuous 
support for her organization. 
Creating Ties Within the Field  - network strength. Granovetter (1985) notes that 
organizations are embedded in a wide variety of networks that both constrain their actions and 
provide them with opportunities to achieve their goals. These networks can create opportunities 
for cooperation through developing trust, commitments between network parties, and providing 
for opportunities for organizations to achieve their goals (Larson, 1992). The ties forming within 
the field between individuals and organizations would lead the way to collaborations that set the 
stage for the final phase observed in the radical institutional innovation process in Libya.  
Collaborations are many times a way to develop new solutions to complex problems and 
bring about changes to institutional fields (Lawrence, et al., 2002). As ties between organizations 
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get stronger, so does an awareness of involvement for a common purpose. A common purpose 
brings organizations together so that they may mobilize their collective resources and diffuse any 
developing institutional elements beyond their immediate field. Collaboration is discussed in 
greater deal in Chapter 7. 
 
6.3.2. Organizational Level Outcomes 
Networks provide individuals and organizations with access to knowledge, resources, 
markets, and technologies (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). In emerging fields situated in institutional 
voids, there are minimal networks for entrepreneurs to leverage. Whereas institutional 
entrepreneurs interested in institutional change work to construct normative associations in 
already existing networks and organizational fields (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; 
Lounsbury et al., 2003; Podolny, 2001), institutional brokers are concerned with building 
strategic partnerships and connections with actors, organizations, and institutions in adjacent and 
nonadjacent fields. This network cultivating process leads to the accumulation of social capital, 
“the   aggregate  of   the   actual   or   potential   resources  which   are   linked   to   possession   of   a   durable  
network of more or less institutionalized   relationships   of   mutual   acquaintance   or   recognition”  
(Bourdieu, 1985: 248).  In the entrepreneurship literature, social capital has been found to 
directly impact performance by providing entrepreneurs access to information, financial capital, 
emotional, legitimacy, and competitive capabilities (Florin, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2003; McEvily 
& Zaheer, 1999; Stam & Elfring, 2008). I focus on three outcomes of the development of social 
capital through network expansion and enhancement; legitimacy through affiliation, competitive 
capabilities, and new institutional entrepreneurs. Finally, an additional outcome of this process is 
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a network effect selection, where organizations that do not participate in these networks building 
strategies are selected out of the field. 
Legitimacy through Affiliation. A large stream of network research looks at the role of 
network ties as informational cues about actors sharing the tie. Podolny (1993) argues that high 
status is derived from affiliations with other high-status actors. Affiliations with prominent 
institutions and actors can yield beneficial consequences for organizations and actors in the field 
by enhancing their status and thus perceiving them as more legitimate. Ideas can also become 
legitimate, popular and even taken for granted as a result of having been adopted by certain 
actors in the field (Tolber & Zucker, 1983; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1977). Neo-institutional 
theory emphasizes the importance of gaining legitimacy through ties to gatekeepers or higher 
status players in the organizational field (Baum & Oliver, 1996). Baum and Oliver (1992) show 
that by establishing ties to prominent organizations within their community, day care centers can 
enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of potential consumers. Similarly, Stuart, Hoang, and 
Hybels (1999) show that biotechnology firms affiliated with venture capital firms are more likely 
to be acquired. Organizations use these ties to build legitimacy.  
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For example, the Canadian Libyan Council posted the following on their Facebook page:  
Figure 10: Facebook post from the CLC – Meeting Names 
 
In Figure 11 the Canadian Libyan Council is seeking input for their meeting, however instead of 
just stating what are the important issues to be addressed with government officials and NGOs, 
they emphasize the names of the reputable and powerful organizations and individuals they are 
meeting. The exclamation mark at the end of the sentence further emphasizes the importance of 
those attending the meeting. 
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Figure 10: Facebook Post from the CLC – Parliamentary Mention 
 
In Figure 10, the mentioning of the organization in a government debate on the mission is 
shared with all their followers. The Canadian Libyan Council emailed a similar announcement to 
their mailing list and included it in their 2011 Annual Report. These examples illustrate the role 
of legitimacy through affiliation as an outcome of the development of network expansion and 
enhancement.  
Competitive Capabilities. Although one of the most direct outcomes of networks for both 
institutional brokers and other actors in the field is material resources, such as funding, networks 
also provide the network actors, those participating in the network, other sources of competitive 
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advantage. Formation of networks enables ideas and institutional building blocks to flow. 
Networks create access to knowledge for the network actors (Adler & Kwon, 2002; 
Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). The ties that organizations and actors 
have with other firms allow the members of the network to be exposed to various types of 
valuable knowledge. Thus the larger and stronger network can help facilitate learning via the 
transfer of knowledge (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005).  
Networks also represent an informational advantage (Gulati, 1999). Organizations benefit 
from having a network of knowledgeable contacts that can provide reliable sources of 
information and enhance their capabilities. Inkpen and Tsang (2005) argue that ties within a 
network can lead to network learning and can create a locus for new innovations. Lawyers for 
Justice in Libya (LFJL) is an organization comprised of international lawyers living in the 
diaspora  and  in  Libya.  Their  ‘About  Me’  section  on  their  website  states15: 
Figure 12: About Me Section of LFJL Website 
 
Collectively,  LFJL’s  members  have  expertise  in  international  human  rights  law,  the  law  of  armed  conflict,  
international arbitration, transitional justice, corporate law, finance law, and oil and gas law.  
The team of six members works in five cities, speaks six languages, and is qualified in seven jurisdictions. It 
includes graduates from the University of Oxford, the Sorbonne, the London School of Economics, University of 
California, Berkeley, Cairo University, and Stanford University.  All members hold post-graduate degrees in 
law. LFJL also maintains a growing network of talented Libyan lawyers, currently in excess of 60 lawyers, working 
on the ground across all regions in Libya. 
 
LFJL became an important partner for many CSOs given their expertise. Although they 
were a small group, they had the experience and knowledge to assist many of the organizations 
with maneuvering around the legal landscape in Libya. They were also key players in all 
regulatory-based discussions such as constitution building, bylaws, and civil society laws.                                                         
15 Lawyers  for  Justice  in  Libya  ‘About  Me’  Page:  http://www.libyanjustice.org/about-us/who-we-are 
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  New Institutional Entrepreneurs. Another outcome of network cultivation is new 
institutional entrepreneurs. Research has explored why individuals participate in collective action. 
The social movement literature points to existing grievances or pro-movement values and 
attitudes. However, these attributes may be present without collective action occurring (Tilly, 
Tilly, & Tilly, 1975; Tilly, 1979). Critical is whether those holding grievances become organized 
and mobilized (Tilly, 1978) and to do so, researchers have argued that it is contact with an agent 
of recruitment, or a network tie, that distinguishes those who participate in collective action and 
those who choose not to participate (McAdam, 1986; Tindall, 2002). Network cultivation creates 
more contact with individuals in adjacent fields in Libya that are recruited as institutional 
entrepreneurs to build the field. These individuals end up connecting with strong nodes of the 
network with resources and power and are therefore positively influenced to join the cause. 
Network Selection Effect. A final outcome of network cultivation is network selection 
effect.  Given the resource scarcity in the field, the organizations being established in Libya were 
forced to give up some autonomy and develop formal types of collaborations with the INGOs to 
gain better access to critical resources. Some of these organizations found this worthwhile, while 
others gave up quickly. Those organizations that were not able to anchor themselves in the 
network had a hard time surviving past the first year post-revolution.  
“Over   2000   civil   society   organizations   were   registered   within   the   first   year   of   the  
revolution, now, there may be 100, 200 max that are still here. They ran out of 
money,   the  volunteers  went  back   to  their  work,   they  got   tired.  Some   just  aren’t  cut  
out for this work, they were caught in the moment, others, just didn't know who to go 
to”  (Pierre  – UNDP).  
 
 
 Throughout my research I followed all the Libyan CSO organizations on Facebook and 
Twitter that I could find. During the first year, most of the CSOs I was following were posting 
weekly, if not daily. This started to decrease with time. By the time my data collection phase was 
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completed, only 17 of the 43 organizations were still active on Facebook, and of the 17, only 8 
were posting more than once a week. These 8 were organizations I had initially labeled as 
institutional broker based organizations. Thus, those organizations that fail to be successful at 
network cultivation may be selected  
 
6. 4. Conclusion 
 Network cultivation creates larger and stronger networks for institutional brokers to 
disseminate their work. To build on the networks they may already have, brokers participate in 
network enhancing activities and bridging with other institutional brokers. This dynamic also 
creates individual and organizational level outcomes. By affiliating themselves with powerful 
actors brokers create legitimacy by affiliation. This leads to competitive capabilities for the 
brokers. Finally, as the network expands it touches new individuals and organizations that are not 
participating in institutional innovation. Those individuals and organizations that do not become 
associated with the network tend to be selected out. 
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CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS - COLLABORATIVE TRANSMISSION 
 
How do micro-level interactions gain sufficient collective agreement to spur change? In 
institutional voids, do actors build institutions based on individual agency or do they mobilize 
collectively? The institutional entrepreneurship, and recent institutional work, has focused our 
attention on individual action (Battilana et al., 2009; Hwang & Powell, 2005; Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Maguire, Hardy & Maguire, 2008). Whereas a few key entrepreneurs can 
spearhead change in relatively simple fields where actors are highly coordinated and institutional 
innovation is relatively incremental (Dorado, 2005), radical institutional innovation involves 
sometimes highly diverse interest, perspectives, and stakeholders. In line with what social 
movement scholars have stressed (Schneiberg & Lawrence, 2008), this type of innovation 
requires collective action by a wide group of actors on the basis of mutual interests (Emery & 
Trist, 1965; Marwell & Oliver, 1993).  
During my first two visits to Libya, I noted how most organizations were working on 
their own. Even when it came to projects or causes that were very similar, and in a context where 
resources were incredibly scarce, there was little collaboration, or even communication, between 
the various organizations and stakeholders. When I probed respondents about collaboration 
during these visits, responses included: 
“No,  not  a   lot  of  collaborations.     We  talk   to  each  other  but   little   joint  efforts.  But  
sometimes  I  know  some  will  approach  us  for  stuff  and  we’ll  steer  them  in  the  right  
direction.  But  that’s  about  it”  (Ahmed – CSO interview). 
 
When asked whether her organization collaborated with other organizations during my 
first  visit,  Anisa  from  a  women’s  CSO  shared: 
“We  don’t  like  collaborations.  Can  I  say  that?  We  don’t  mind  collaborating  if  the  
other organization is willing to do the work they promised to do. But that’s  hard  to  
find  in  Libya”. 
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During my final visit to Libya, I spoke with Anisa again, I knew she was working with a number of other 
organizations on the constitution recommendations. This time she shared:  
“We  started  to  collaborate  more  because  I  think  for us it was very much seeing which 
other organizations will last, which organizations can we work with, and which ones 
are  doing  things  which  represent,  or  are  doing  things  we  are  OK  with”. 
This led me to explore how did collaboration begin in Libya. In Libya, I found that 
collaboration was preceded by a Not Invented Here Syndrome that propelled the need for 
collaboration. 
 
7.1 Not Invented Here Syndrome  
Not invented here (NIH) syndrome is a mindset that favours internally-developed 
products over those developed outside the organization (Katz & Allen, 1982, Kanter, 1983; 
Chesbrough, 2006). The concept stems from the open innovation literature. Organizations 
participating in open innovation strategies bring in innovative ideas from outside the 
organizations. Those inside the organization may reject externally generated knowledge. The 
introduction of externally generated technologies can be significantly hindered by internal 
resistance if the group receiving the technology feels that their identity is being challenged by the 
external knowledge or the associated group (Katz & Allen, 1982). 
I found that the positional advantage of brokers also created functional disadvantages and 
an NIH effect was observed. Institutional brokers started to lose their popularity as animosity 
started  to  develop   toward  “New  Libyans”,   those  who  were  thought  to  have   ‘newly   found   their  
nationalism’,  and  “double  SIM  card  Libyans”,  similar  to  a  phone  that  takes  SIM  cards  from  more  
than one mobile carrier.  
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These feelings developed for a number of reasons, including the new surge of Libyan 
expatriates who had come back to Libya hoping to secure jobs after the war. Many of these 
individuals  were  educated  in  reputable  universities  abroad,  and  spoke  fluent  English.  These  “new  
Libyans”  were  seen  as  stealing  jobs  from  Libyans  who  had  not  had  the  same  experience.  Marwan,  
an electrical engineer who was working in a clothing retailer voiced another sentiment that I 
heard  from  a  number  of  people  while  I  was  in  Libya;;  “they  didn’t  suffer  like  us.  And  now  when  
things   are   good,   they  want   to   come   back   here   and   run   the   show”.  This  was especially voiced 
towards Ministers and the elected Prime Minister who had been living outside of Libya during 
the revolution. Comments on Facebook with these grievances were ample. On a popular 
Facebook page, Marbo3a, the following comment was directed towards what was considered 
double Sim card Ministers: 
“He  (Prime  Minister  El  Keeb)  failed.  He  failed  because  he  knows  nothing  about  us.  
He  hasn’t  been  Libyan  for  decades”. 
 
At a small conference on violence against women, things became very heated, when one 
of the speakers, a Libyan-American, introduced herself in Arabic, and then said she would 
continue her presentation in English as she is more comfortable with English when it came to 
academic discussions. The venue had professional translators and had equipped the audience 
with headsets to listen to any translations. When she was finished, a woman from a grassroots 
CSO  took  the  microphone  to  ask  a  question.  Instead  she  angrily  pointed  out:  “This   is  a  Libyan  
conference, if you cannot address the audience in  Arabic,  then  you  do  not  belong  here”.  Most  of  
the participants applauded her remark. 
Many  of   the   organizations   I   refer   to   as   institutional   brokers   fit   the   “new  Libya”   and/or  
“double  SIM”  definition  and  were  therefore   facing  barriers  when   it   came   to  the  public. During 
my second visit I asked my sister-in-law to introduce me to some of her friends. I wanted to 
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understand how those not involved in any CSOs, but were still aware of the work being done, 
whether through other friends, or social media, viewed the dynamics. One woman, Ibtihal, 
shared with me her opinion on the situation; 
 
“I  think  they  (the  ‘50’)  are  getting  the  rest  of  the  people  in  civil  society  to  do  the  
donkey work for them. They get the publicity, and media coverage, and you 
know, the trips abroad, and handshakes with the ambassadors, and so on, and the 
real  work  is  done  by  the  locals,  you  know,  the  society  on  the  ground”   (Ibtihal – 
Public Interview). 
 
The grievance she shared was one shared by many in the general public. However, 
organizations within the field were eager to learn from institutional brokers and leverage their 
resources in order to survive within the slowly shrinking field. 
Research in knowledge transfer has shown similar findings. Tung and Lazarova (2006) 
looked at the skill transfer of nationals who had returned home after spending some time 
working or studying abroad. They found that the failure to connect with colleagues in their home 
country   prevents   returnees’   from   transferring   skills   in   their   home   country.   Recently,   Wang  
(2014) looked at how skilled return migrants acting as cross-border brokers, transfer knowledge 
about organizational practices from abroad to their home countries. Home-country 
embeddedness and host-country embeddedness, or the extent to which returnees were integrated 
in the workplace and other professional activities while at home or abroad, gave returnees 
different advantages as cross-border brokers. High home country embeddedness meant that the 
returnee had more familiarity with local practices and values and therefore helps them effectively 
recognize opportunities for knowledge transfer. It also instills greater trust in the relationships 
between returnees and their home country coworkers. Chen (2007) however argues that most 
returnees are weak brokers as they are not deeply embedded in either the foreign or home 
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networks or they are deeply embedded in one at the expense of the other. Many of the 
institutional brokers I talked to were aware of the resentment towards them. Some shrugged it off, 
but others started to use their networks to build collaborations with other institutional brokers 
and grassroots organizations. This led to collaborative transmission, which I will now discuss. 
 
7.2. Collaborative Transmission 
“It  was  awesome.  Did  you  see  it?  We  all  worked  together.  It  wasn’t   just  one  of  
us.  No  one  can  point  and  say  it’s  a  bunch  of  girls  for  this  cause.  No,  this  is  real.  
You  have   an   issue  with   us,   you’re   going   to   have to   fight   all   of   us   (laughing)” 
(Abi – CSO Interview). 
 
The ability of institutional entrepreneurs to bring about change also depends on their 
ability to mobilize constituents (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, Rao & Giorgi, 2006). 
Institutional brokers mobilize by exploiting their position via the legitimacy they have created in 
the previous two phases and building collaborations with key allies. Their knowledge of the 
practices, working culture, and discourses of the fields they are embedded in allows them to 
convince other parties to join in accomplishing their vision (Rao & Giorgi, 2006). Radical 
institutional innovation requires support, and therefore actors must mobilize allies (Fligstein, 
1997; Greenwood et al., 2002) and cultivate alliances and cooperation (Fligstein, 2001; 
Lawrence, Phillip, & Hardy, 2002) through collaboration. Collaboration is the cooperative, 
interorganizational relationship that is negotiated in an ongoing communicative process and that 
relies on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms of control (Lawrence et al., 2002). The 
collaborations within the emerging field help build a sustainable coalition and interactions that 
create common understandings and practices that form the institutions that define the field 
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(Lawrence et al., 2002). Additionally, collaborations can lead to the mobilization of political and 
regulatory support resulting in protection of the field.  
Similarly, the innovation literature has shown that collaboration enhances organizational 
learning (Hamel, 1991; Dodgson, 1993), allows for new entrants into a field (Powell et al., 1996), 
and improve creativity, innovation and performance (Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Phillips, Lawrence, 
& Hardy, 2000). Thus, collaboration is a means of transmitting institutional elements beyond the 
broker  organization  and   it’s  network,  while  also creating an environment conducive for further 
innovative ideas. 
The civil society dimensions put forward by Anheier (2013) provide a useful backdrop 
for understanding the mechanism of collaborative transmission. The three dimensions 
representing the components of civil society; structure, space, and values, are characteristics of a 
field. Institutional brokers collaborated with other organizations, including other broker 
organizations and grassroots organizations to create new structures in the emerging field. The 
structures created were more powerful with greater resources and clout and were therefore able 
to have more influence to create new space. Finally, the space provided a context for the 
discussion, negotiation, and development of values related to the norms embodying the space. 
Figure 13 illustrates the collaborative transmission dynamic using an illustrative example with 
Libya’s  media groups, an important group of organizations in civil society according to a number 
of civil society scholars (Anhier, 2013; Hann & Dunn, 1996; Siever, 2010). 
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FIGURE 13: Collaborative Transmission Dynamic 
 
 
Media groups in Libya were running into a number of problems by the end of the 
revolution. They lacked professional training for the most part, had little funding, and were 
operating in an unwelcoming environment given the historical context of media in Libya as it 
was all state controlled prior to the revolution. Therefore it was difficult for media stations to 
approach the public for information. This was partly due to the volatile situation in Libya even 
post-revolution. People still feared for their lives given the ever-growing presence of militia and 
newly formed radical political groups. However, much of the fear stemmed from the oppression 
instilled by the Gadaffi regime when it came to freedom of politics. There was a number of 
situations when I was not allowed to record my interviews for this study. Amina, was one of the 
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interviewees who refused to be recorded. When I asked her why, she responded that a Gadaffi 
official once interrogated her and it was recorded and she had a fear of being recorded ever since. 
Media stations at various events I attended were also constantly being refused requests to 
interview subjects. 
To exasperate this situation, many of the media stations post revolution were not funded. 
A few had strong financial backing from countries like Qatar, but local bred stations were based 
in small make shift studios, and run by people who had a passion for journalism, photography, or 
had nothing else to do. This of course made it very difficult for these groups to report to the 
public in a timely and professional manner. The public was quickly losing trust for these 
organizations that had once been their only source of information during the fighting. 
This led to the creation of the Libya Media Institute (LMI). A coalition of media groups 
that could share best practices, resources, and bring some structure to the media sector. This 
collaboration created a new non-profit organization that brought together already existing media 
organizations.  
This new structure was used for lobbying efforts to build a Committee for Supporting and 
Encouraging the Press. Gaining support from international organizations, such as MedMedia, a 
European Union funded program, the LMI has more power to push politicians to create laws that 
will help provide support for these media groups. Through a Media Coordination Strategy, the 
LMI is also expanding its space. Recognition that business partners are important to bring in 
resources has pushed media stations to transition from completely non-profit or state dependent 
models to hybrid forms where wealthy business-men in Libya can provide the needed funding 
for training and equipment. This is an example of a transformation of space related to media 
organizations where business-civil society relationships have developed. 
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These collaborations and the spaces they create are important in building values and 
norms in Libya’s   civil   society   pertaining   to   media. The coordinated effort of members of a 
collective creates common ground to develop shared meanings and practices (van Wij, Stam, 
Elfring, Zietsma, & den Hond, 2013). The LMI created a small working group to participate in 
the constitution drafting process. This was to ensure that freedom of expression and operation of 
the media was included as the constitution was being built.  
“We   all   came   in   with   different   things   we   wanted   to   see   written   in   the  
constitution that had to do with us (media groups). It was interesting to see 
what  other  groups  had   to   say.  Some  wanted   funding,  but  of  course  that’s  not  
constitution stuff…  what  we  all  agreed  on  was   freedom  to  do  our  job.  To  tell  
the  news”  (Atef, AlWatan Media Group). 
 
This collective value, as shared by Atef, develops through discussion, tensions, debates, 
and is framed by the legal, social and economic space the collaborations are set in. This leads to 
a set of values that represent the groups in the field. A similar process was seen with women 
rights based organizations. 
 
7.3. Conclusion 
Radical institutional innovation involves diverse groups, perspectives, and stakeholders, 
even though they may all be working towards the same cause. Actors must come together on the 
basis of mutual interests for institutionalization to occur.  
In this final dynamic, the result of a not invented here mindset propelled institutional 
brokers to collaborate with actors outside of the network to mobilize support for the innovation. 
This meant working with like-minded organizations to generate new structures. These structures 
created new relationships and frameworks that govern the space these organizations are in. 
Through this space, shared meanings and practices are slowly developed and can begin to be 
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institutionalized. These values can also feedback into the structures that already exist, further 
embedding them in the organizations. 
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CHAPTER 8: RADICAL INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION - A 
MULTILEVEL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Institutional innovation aims to introduce formal institutions, such as rules, laws, and 
organizations, as well as informal or tacit institutions such as individual habits, norms, and 
practices. Institutional brokers are well positioned to carry out this process through their 
connections and experiences in established fields. The three dynamics discussed were observed 
as distinct processes however my experiences from the field point to an iterative and interactive 
process where the three dynamics are connected and feed into each other but also provided 
outcomes that looped back. Figure 14 integrates the three dynamics.  
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FIGURE 14: Multilevel Framework of Radical Institutional Innovation 
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8.1. Overview of the Model 
The model illustrates a multi-level analysis of the phases, as what was seen in Libya was 
truly a ground-up approach to radical institutional innovation. The radical institutional 
innovation process happens at different levels of analysis, yet the various micro-processes lead to 
field-level innovation, which in affect feed into other micro-level processes. I now explicate the 
relations between the dynamics.  
In the creative translation phase new ideas and practices start to originate in the field. 
Here the field is at its most nascent level. Organizations are just starting to emerge and there is 
little or no regulatory framework that is present to direct these organizations. Processes, 
procedures, and practices are non-existent, and no one organization dominates the field as they 
are all new. Those outside the field, and some within the field, do not understand its purpose or 
what logics surround it. At the start of the process, institutional brokers creatively translate 
institutional elements from fields they are familiar with into the emerging civil society field in 
Libya. New ideas and practices start to form in the field. This is done through a process of 
bricolage (shaded boxes) that leverages already existing elements they have access to by 
recombining, transposing, and recasting them to fit with the new field. The bricolage process 
connotes the resourcefulness of the institutional brokers, and their ability to improvise as they 
co-shaped the field. These three mechanisms of bricolage are part of a transformation process 
that takes place as resource constrained institutional brokers draw from the resources leveraged 
from other institutional fields they belong to. Through a process of creative negotiation, new 
solutions for the field are also created. This process creates institutional building blocks and 
organizations, that as a collective, start to bring some structure to the field. The bricolage process 
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also helps create legitimacy by assimilation as elements of the transformation are recognized 
given they are made from recognizable elements of life in Libya. 
In the second phase of the process institutional brokers develop and grow the network 
they work in through a process of network cultivation that involves network enhancing activities 
and network bridging. Institutional brokers took part in a strategic and conscious effort to both 
increase the size of their networks and the quality of the network. By creating events that bring 
positive attention to the small existing network, institutional brokers were able to provoke the 
attention of important stakeholders so that they could become part of their network. They also 
build relationships with those already in their network, thus strengthening the ties between them. 
Network cultivation was found to lead to outcomes at two different levels. At the network level, 
the network size and strength are enhanced. At the individual and organizational level, network 
cultivation creates legitimacy by affiliation, competitive capabilities for the brokers, and new 
institutional entrepreneurs. There is also a network selection effect, where individuals and 
organizations that do not become associated with the networks that are developing tend to be 
selected out. 
Finally, as a result of a not invented here mindset where other actors in the field start to 
question the legitimacy of institutional brokers, institutional brokers collaborate with actors 
outside of the network to mobilize support for the innovation. Although institutional brokers are 
able to introduce organizational and institutional building blocks through transformation and 
network building, for innovation to happen at the institutional level, a broad spectrum of actors 
and stakeholders across the field need to get on board. Ties are made in the network cultivation 
dynamics, however little collaboration has occurred and any results of collaboration have yet to 
reach beyond the boundaries of that specific relationship. By co-structuring the field with those 
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that are deeply embedded in the environment, institutional elements gain the support needed so 
that they can be institutionalized. This part of the process relies on distributed agency where the 
emergence of a new field cannot be attributed to any one individual actor. Although institutional 
brokers initiate and lead the process, the development of the field involves efforts of a 
multiplicity of actors. This is done through the creation of new structures, spaces and values 
through collaborations with like-minded organizations. 
These dynamics are related and can at times be sequential and iterative, as the outcomes 
of the dynamics can feed into other dynamics and also feedback into the process at earlier phases.  
Referring back to the civil society diamond discussed in Chapter 2, elements of civil 
society can now be seen in Libya, where they did not exist before. Table 7 presents the outcomes 
of institutional innovation in Libya at the time data collection seized using Anheier’s   (2013) 
four-dimension framework. This conceptualization of civil society according to four dimensions 
is useful, not just for civil society, but institutional fields in general. 
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TABLE 7: Civil Society Diamond for Libya 
Dimension Elements Elements 
Pertaining to Libya 
 
Illustrative Example  
 
Structure 
 
Breadth and depth of 
citizen participation; 
diversity within civil 
society; level of 
organisation; inter-
relations; resources. 
 
 
Philanthropic 
organizations, 
nonprofit and 
voluntary 
organizations,  
 
 
Less than ten registered CSOs prior 
to the revolution to over 2000 as of 
January 2012.  
Space Political context; 
basic freedoms and 
rights; socioeconomic 
context; socio-
cultural context; legal 
environment; state-
civil society relations; 
private sector-civil 
society relations. 
 
Ministry of Civil 
Society and Cultural 
Affairs, Civil 
Society Law 
Civil Society Law developed by a 
network of CSOs, lawyers, 
Ministry of Civil Society, and the 
United Nations. The legislation 
contains 22 articles governing the 
protection of CSOs, their 
boundaries, and regulations. 
 
Values Democracy; 
transparency; 
tolerance; non-
violence; gender 
equity; poverty 
eradication; 
environmental 
sustainability. 
 
Women 
empowerment 
Civil society culture 
Pictures of women candidates on 
billboards and signs during the first 
elections were blackened out. By 
the time parliamentary elections 
took place there were women 
candidates and their pictures on 
large billboards and Facebook 
profiles with less opposition. 
 
Impact Influencing public 
policy; holding state 
and private 
corporations 
accountable; 
responding to social 
interests; 
empowering citizens; 
meeting societal 
needs. 
Influencing election 
policy on the 
representation of 
women on ballots  
Inclusion of women in 
parliamentary vote (17%) 
The structural dimension represents the actors, organizations, and resources that make up 
civil society. Although at the end of data collection there was little in terms of funding and 
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resources, the number of organizations and individuals active in civil society is unprecedented. 
The second dimension, space, pertains to the political, socio-economic, cultural and legal context 
of civil society. Here we see the establishment of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and Civil 
Society, which did not exist prior to the revolution, and the development of a number of legal 
frameworks, including a Civil Society Law that governs the CSOs in Libya. The values 
dimension refers to the values civil society represents and advocates. Here we see progress in 
terms of women rights and inclusion in the political landscape. The inauguration of women to 
parliament is a step, although small, towards tolerance of women candidates was observed within 
the data collection timeframe. Finally, the impact dimension looks at the contributions of civil 
society. One of the most tangible direct influences of the work of civil society in Libya is the 
women led movement to change the electoral law that would make the women names on the 
election ballots more visible. This strategy led to a 17% women demographic in parliament. This 
number is higher than some European Union countries. 
8.2. Conclusion 
 This chapter introduced the overall multilevel framework of radical institutional 
innovation. My data pointed to three separate dynamics emerging from Libya, however these 
dynamics were also connected in a process that was linear at times, but also iterative and 
interactive. Outcomes from one dynamic many times fed into the next. At times, some of the 
micro-dynamics such as recombination and transposing were also seen in other dynamics.  
 The outcomes of radical institutional innovation led to the development of new structures 
that did not exist before. In Libya, this included new organizations, coalitions, and government 
bodies. We also saw the creation of a space for these structures to operate in. This space is 
governed by newly formed legal frameworks, and a sense of civil society culture. Radical 
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institutional innovation also introduces new values in the field. In Libya, women rights and the 
freedom of the press are just a few examples of norms and beliefs that are starting to emerge that 
embody the values of civil society.  Finally, we starting to see the impact of the presence of civil 
society in Libya less than two years post revolution. CSOs worked hard to not only build the 
field, but acted to create tangible outcomes of their work that had great impact nation wide.  
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CHAPTER 9:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION   
 
9.1 Discussion 
This study sought to shed light on the process of radical institutional innovation and the 
actors involved in the process. To do this, I investigate the creation of civil society in Libya 
during and post the revolution of 2011. I illustrate the void in civil society in Libya prior to the 
revolution, and through an ethnographic approach in data collection, show how a new field was 
created from this void. Institutional innovation is a context dependent social process and thus the 
ethnographic approach is fitting as it emphasizes the experiential, with an approach to knowledge 
that is both contextual and interpersonal. The resulting framework stresses a multilevel 
perspective as the framework involves actors and capabilities at different levels of analysis, and 
relationships that span the different levels. 
I found that in contexts of institutional voids, like that seen in Libya, a special kind of 
institutional entrepreneur is involved in radical institutional innovation. These entrepreneurs 
have a unique characteristic about them that was an outcome of two dimensions of their 
positions; a spatial dimension and a cognitive dimension. These actors are positioned in the 
emerging field, but are also embedded in adjacent and non-adjacent fields that had established 
civil societies. I label these actors institutional brokers, as they connect otherwise unconnected 
institutional fields.  Institutional brokers are critical actors in the emerging field. They are able to 
build on their networks and use their resources from established fields to help create a new field. 
These individuals do not suffer from a liability of foreignness like the international organizations 
present in Libya, as they are familiar with the context and share similar backgrounds with other 
actors in the field. They also do not suffer from a liability of institutional newness, as did the 
grassroots organizations in Libya, as they had experience working in similar fields. Institutional 
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brokers became critical actors in the emergence of civil society in Libya and were the focus of 
this dissertation.  
The process institutional brokers partake in can be divided into three dynamics which I 
illustrate in Figure 14.  The framework developed illustrates the mechanisms by which these 
institutional brokers bring about innovation and how their social position mediates their relation 
to the environment in which they are embedded, and drives their access to the resources and 
capabilities that support innovation. 
 
 
9.2. Contributions to Theory and Practice 
This research aims to contribute to our theoretical and practical understanding of how 
radical institutional innovation emerges. It also sheds light on a type of actor that is critical for 
the process coined institutional brokers, and how they successfully innovate and build an 
institutional field through creative translation, network cultivation, and collaborative 
transmission.  
This study offers a number of contributions to the existing literature on innovation and 
institutional theory, and has implications for theory, policy and practice. 
9.2.1. Contributions to Innovation Research 
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature on innovation. First, this 
research looks at innovation at the institutional level versus the individual and organizational 
level that is common in this stream of research. We know a great deal about individual creativity 
and what leads to various types of individual level and organizational level innovation, however, 
macro-level societal innovation has been sidelined in the innovation research. Perhaps this is 
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because innovation researchers have left this to those interested in institutional theory. However, 
the constructs, insights, and processes that have been developed over the decades of work in 
innovation research have implications for understanding institutional level innovation and 
therefore it is imperative this this level of innovation is not ignored.  
Exploring radical innovation at this level of analysis also lends to new insights that may 
bring some additional understanding to innovation at more micro level of analysis. For example, 
radical innovation of processes, organizational forms, business models, products and services 
understandably require resource-building aspects.  
However, this research shows that generating novel ideas can be facilitated and lead to 
more creativity when the canvas has yet to be painted. Research looking at de novo entrants have 
shown similar findings (McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll, & Khessina, 2003; Kaplan & Tripsas, 
2008; Powell & Sandholtz, 2012). Individuals and organizations that enter a field, industry, or 
organization without the confining baggage of established ways of thinking may help spur 
radical ideas. Research has looked at how resources can be transferred through new connections.  
This research points to the broader environment, the norms, beliefs, and logics situated in the 
environment these individuals and organizations are embedded in that can create barriers to 
creativity.  
This leads to a second contribution of this research to the innovation literature and also 
strategy literature in general. The findings of this study put the focus on brokerage as an 
innovation strategy but instead of focusing on where these brokers are positioned, it explores 
what they do to make innovation happen. Thus, my findings supplement the rather static portrait 
of the role of knowledge brokers with a more in-depth understanding of the innovation process 
individuals and organizations participate in as they create radical institutional innovation. Also, 
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the knowledge brokerage research embedded in the innovation and strategy literature points to 
the importance of brokers as they provide access via bridges to new knowledge. However, this 
study sheds light on how brokers also infuse a sense of legitimacy in innovations that is required 
for uptake. This dissertation also provides support for a more strategic view of brokerage and 
brokering (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Obstfeld, 2005) versus a passive nature of brokerage 
previously described in the literature (Burt, 1992, 2002; Fernandez & Gould, 1994). 
Third, entrepreneurs, institutional or venture creating, have typically been the actors 
behind bricolage. However, in this context bricolage happens because of brokers. This unique 
relationship brings additional insight into our understanding of bricolage. These institutional 
brokers do more than link organizations and individuals; they also transform ideas as they are 
ideally positioned to receive new and previously uncombined innovation building elements. 
However, this transformation happens through a process of bricolage. And it is successful 
because of bricolage. Prior research has illustrated how bricolage is an important mechanism 
under resource constrained environments and that bricoleurs gain their resources from some sort 
of stock of resources or repertoire. However, a fundamental question yet to be explored is where 
do these stocks of resources from a repertoire come from? The findings of this dissertation point 
to where bricoleurs are positioned as a possible answer. 
Additionally, this study takes place in the social sector, a sector typically ignored in 
innovation research. It is especially relevant to the growing area of research in social innovation 
as this type of innovation requires transformation at multiple levels and a radical systemic shift 
in deeply held values and beliefs (Westley et al., 2011). In other words, social change requires 
institutional innovation. Bridging institutional work, innovation, and institutional 
entrepreneurship can provide insight to this area of innovation. An institutional lens may provide 
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a way to explore the structures and processes that affect how people view a social problem and 
social innovations. Institutional innovation is particularly relevant as it highlights a purposive 
and strategic effort by individuals to radically innovate. 
Finally, quantitative research is the dominant methodology in innovation research. The 
qualitative nature of this research provides greater insight into the process dynamics of 
innovation while being highly sensitive to the context and sequence of events. Innovation 
involves actors and the broader environment they are situated in. Although quantitative studies 
provide great insight on the vast array of relevant constructs in the innovation process, it is hard 
to capture the complex relationships, tensions, and interrelationships between actors and 
environments using quantitative measures. 
 
9.2.2. Contributions to Institutional Theory 
 This study also extends current views in institutional theory, more specifically in the area 
of institutional entrepreneurship and institutional field emergence.  
First, the findings of this study offer insights on the positional advantages and 
disadvantages of institutional entrepreneurs. Institutional theory scholars offer competing 
arguments as to how the positions of actors affect their motivation and abilities to create, disrupt 
and even maintain institutions (Rao et al., 2003; Battilana et al., 2006; Pacheco, et al., 2011).  
On the one hand, actors at the periphery of a field are not bound by any existing logics 
preventing innovation to happen. However, innovation also requires resources and legitimacy, 
which peripheral actors may lack. This was seen in this study with the INGOs who had a liability 
of foreignness. On the other hand, institutional entrepreneurs embedded in adjacent fields to the 
one emerging may have trouble initiating radical innovation due to a lack of capabilities and 
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understanding of what the new field entails. This was seen with the grassroots organization that 
had a liability of institutional newness. Therefore, neither the peripheral nor dominant actors can 
be the instigators of innovation. In Libya, institutional brokers overcome this paradox, as they 
understand and have access to the resources in the landscape of the institutional elements 
surrounding the field they are trying to create, but they are also familiar with relevant 
institutional fields that they can use as templates to create new ones. Consequently, this 
dissertation argues that institutional brokers are a critical type of institutional entrepreneur in 
radical institutional innovation. 
Second, this dissertation is based in a context of an extreme institutional void. Although 
recent studies in the management literature have studied various research questions in the context 
of voids (Mair & Marti, 2009; Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Breton Miller, 2009), these studies have 
been situated in environments where weak market institutions exist, rather than the absence of 
institutional fields all together. Because of this, the findings of this study pointed to a multi-level 
framework of institution building where actors participate in dynamics at various levels of the 
void to create the field. Here it is not about maneuvering around a specific void in a field, this 
study explores how institutional brokers do their work across multiple voids. Third, research on 
institution emergence has tended to focus on one or two levels of analysis. Theories of 
organizations need to encompass the social processes that take place at the different levels of the 
organizational environment and to be able to connect the multiple sets of activities that take 
place (Goodman, 2000). Research examining innovation at the institutional level has typically 
been seen as a macro process with change being initiated at the field-level (Smets et al., 2012). 
There is a neglect of bottom-up change with repeated appeals for scholars to give greater 
attention to the micro-processes of institutionalization (Smets et al., 2012). These studies have 
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also typically looked at the slow emergence of micro-fields with little attention given to the 
wide-ranging and broad impacting transitions (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000; Peng, 
2003). Neglecting radical innovation in  organizations  and  institutions  may  keep  the  field  “on  the  
sidelines in  debates  about   issues   in  which   it  potentially  has  much  to  contribute”  (Pfeffer,  1997:  
24). The level of analysis in this dissertation was the field level, however it was the actions of 
individuals and organizations that created institutional building blocks to help create the field 
and ultimately create outcomes at the national level, a level of analysis rarely looked at in 
institutional research. 
Finally, from a methodological standpoint, process research in both institutional theory 
and field emergence tend to be retrospective. In this dissertation I follow the process as it unfolds, 
thus starting at time zero of the fields development. This brings insights that otherwise may have 
been missed.  
 
 
 
9.2.4. Contributions to Practice 
We have become much better at technological innovation than at institutional innovation.  
Given the speed of change in the world, institutional innovation is becoming more and more 
important. Woodhill (2010) uses the software versus hardware analogy to illustrate this point. He 
argues that for society to prosper, adaptation and innovation needs to happen at both the 
technological  and   institutional   level.  Improving  the   ‘software’  side  of  how  societies   function   is  
what  he  refers  to  as  institutional  innovation.  The  ‘hardware’  side   is the technological innovation 
that has been the focus in the past. For example, the failure to effectively deal with hurricane 
Katrina was not because of a lack of machinery, military, transport, or communication equipment, 
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it was the software, the institutional arrangements that were the problem. There are times when 
institutions must be constructed or reconstructed rapidly and dramatically, as failure is not an 
option. The 2008 financial crisis is another excellent example of when radical institutional 
innovation is needed. Building our understanding of the process and what is involved can help 
society steer the wheel more quickly and possibly foresee problems and instigate innovation 
before they fail. 
While this thesis focuses on institutional innovation in the context of civil institutions, the 
findings have implications for institutional innovation strategy in other sectors, contexts, and 
industries. By understanding the different processes and actors involved in the different 
typologies of institutional innovation, researchers may be able to better understand the ways 
organizations adapt to these changes as adaption to change is a key determinant of competitive 
advantage  and  organizational  survival  (D’Aveni,  1994;;  Richardson,  1996).   
From an organizational perspective, institutional brokerage is a strategy for organizations 
to gain a competitive advantage. Managers push their organizations to innovate faster, but their 
focus is largely on technology and product innovation. The problem is that product life cycles 
continue to shorten, meaning that value is only created in the short-term. But redefining the 
institutions we are in can overcome this. This   ‘fish-eye’   perspective   that   institutional   brokers  
have allows them to be observers and participants of more than one institution at a time, thus 
allowing for the potential of more successful recombination and the legitimization of innovations. 
For example, we see the health care industry starting to embrace this as more and more doctors 
are getting management training and going back to school for MBAs. These MBA-doctors 
saddle both institutional fields, therefore having a fish eye view of the fields and therefore able to 
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bring in their expertise in management into healthcare while also being seen as legitimate actors 
in the health field. This strategy can help overcome resistance to change. 
It also has implications for the not invented here syndrome. My findings suggest that 
there is a need for localization when building collaborations. Innovations must be translated, but 
more importantly, this research shows that translation requires some sort of transformation by 
local actors. 
Given the context of this study, the findings also have implications for nation building. 
Too often the international community intervenes to assist countries that have gone through 
radical upheaval and political turmoil. Many times this is unsuccessful. This study points to the 
potential role the diaspora can play in nation building as members of a country’s diaspora can be 
considered institutional brokers. For INGOs, this study highlights the critical role of identifying 
institutional brokers and the importance of promoting network cultivation and collaborative 
diffusion. Fostering democracy and/or civil society in countries where it has no local roots is 
difficult. Connecting and legitimizing these institutions through brokers may have more long-
term impact and sustainability if done through agents that are familiar with the environment void 
of these institutions.  
 
 
9.3. Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 As with all research, there are limitations that provide directions for future research. First, 
this study is based on a single, qualitative case in a specific context.. In examining the radical 
institutional   innovation   in   Libya’s   civil   society,   this   research   focuses   on   a   specific   sector,  
country, and an extremely radical situation. Therefore, although patterns unearthed may be 
relevant to other contexts of radical institutional innovation, there may be limitations on the 
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generalizability of the research It also focuses on field emergence at the infant stage, right when 
the field was beginning to be created. Fields develop, change, and take form with time. Upon 
completion of my data collection, the process of institutional innovation was still happening.  
Also, subjectivity in qualitative research can be a limitation in certain contexts. Being 
originally from Libya with strong ties to the culture, people, and the events of the revolution, my 
interpretation of the data and relationship with the subjects involved may have affected the way 
the data is interpreted. This being said, understanding of the culture, language and the events that 
took place was also beneficial for this research.  
There are a number of directions future research can take. First, a comparative study that 
looks at another radical institutional innovation context outside the civil society sector would 
help build generalizability. Although extreme cases such as the one observed in Libya may not 
be very common, less extreme examples of radical institutional innovation can be investigated. 
For example the introduction of patenting systems in countries where it did not exist before 
would be an example of radical institutional innovation as it would require the creation of a 
completely new institutional field of patenting agencies, firms, specialists, and the introduction 
of new norms when it comes to innovation practices. Another possible example is the 
introduction of Facebook and other social media platforms which have created a radically new 
field of social media focused organizations, a new way of thinking for organizations, and even 
legal reform in terms of privacy. Another form of a comparative study might use an incremental 
institutional innovation context as a comparison. This would be ideal for the study of any 
differences in the two types of innovations in terms of actors and dynamics. Examples of 
incremental institutional innovation are abundant, but perhaps a more recent one is the 
introduction and popularity of sharing based economy platforms such as Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb. 
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As these platforms become more and more popular, institutions such as insurance, and norms 
around legitimate jobs and safety will have to innovate to address new problems due to these 
new business models. 
 A second important direction for future research would be extending this study with more 
longitudinal data. This could provide insight into how the process continues and whether there 
are new dynamics that emerge later on during the process. It would be interesting to see whether 
the process starts to take on the stages of institutional change (Greenwood et al., 2002) where 
some institutions become deinstitutionalized (Oliver, 1992) and others do not. Additionally, what 
happens as institutional brokers stop brokering? Many times these individuals act as temporary 
builders of the field. How can other actors sustain innovation once the brokers are no longer 
present? 
 Finally, another potential areas for interesting research is on who are bricoleurs. In this 
study the institutional brokers were able to use bricolage as a way to creatively translate 
institutional elements outside of the field into the field they were trying to build. It was this 
position that helped them bricolage. What other characteristics are required for successful 
bricolage? Studies addressing this question would be beneficial to institutional theory, innovation 
and the entrepreneurship literature. 
 
9.4. Conclusion 
This dissertation was motivated by a phenomenon. A phenomenon I saw. One I felt. A 
phenomenon that changed my life and continues to do so. Studying this phenomenon has 
revealed the critical role of institutional brokers in radically transforming a society. It has 
explored how these actors do this in an environment where institutional building blocks are not 
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present. By cobbling together pieces of a different life so that they can breath life into an 
environment void of civil society, institutional brokers brought hope to a country. 
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APPENDIX A - Civil Society Organization Interview Guide 
 
1. I’d  like  to  start  by  asking  you  to  tell  me  about  yourself. 
a. Probe: previous and other current occupations 
2. How did you become involved with (name of organization)? 
a. Probe for why they got involved and when 
3. Were you involved with anything similar before the revolution?  
a. Why or why not? 
4. What is the purpose or main mission of (name of organization)? 
5. How effective do you think (name of organization) has been in achieving this mission so 
far? 
a. Probe for obstacles and challenges and enablers 
b. Probe for accomplishments 
6. Describe your experiences in the past year in regards to your organization and the work 
you do. 
a. Probe: day to day work – challenges – enablers 
b. Probe: obstacles and how they overcame them 
7. Who would you say are the main partners in your organization? 
a. How did you create these partners? 
b. Why these partners specifically? 
8. What or who are the main obstacles? 
a. Probe: how they overcame them if they have, if not why. 
9. I now have some general questions about civil society. What is civil society in your 
opinion? 
10. How is civil society different now than before the revolution? 
11. Did you ever see yourself doing what you are doing now? 
a. Probe: What were the biggest pushes to get involved? 
12. I would like to now focus on the recent elections. How was your organization involved in 
the elections or the events leading to the election? For example, the formation of the 
election bylaws or public awareness. 
a. Probe: How as this done? 
b. Probe: With whom? 
13. What are the most pressing obstacles to come? 
14. Do you work with any of the INGOs? 
a. Who, how, thoughts on this. 
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APPENDIX B - INGO Interview Guide 
 
1. I’d  like  to  start  by  asking  you  to  tell  me  about  yourself. 
a. Probe: previous and other current occupations 
b. Nationalities 
2. How did you become involved with (name of organization/ministry)? 
a. Probe for why they got involved and when 
3. What is the purpose or main mission or goal for (name of organization) in Libya? 
4. How effective do you think (name of organization) has been in achieving this so far? 
a. Probe for obstacles and challenges and enablers 
b. Probe for accomplishments 
5. Describe your experiences in the past year in regards to your organization and the work 
you do. 
a. Probe: day to day work – challenges – enablers 
b. Experience compared to other countries they have been to 
6. I now have some general questions about civil society. What is civil society in your 
opinion? 
7. How is civil society different now than before the revolution? 
a. Probe: What were the biggest pushes to get involved? 
8. What are the biggest accomplishments of civil society so far in Libya? 
9. Who is leading this effort? 
a. Who are the successful organizations in your opinion? What makes them 
successful? 
10. Civil society a year ago versus now and what do you think is going to happen by next 
year? 
11. I have heard a couple of comments and I wanted to get your opinion on these statements: 
a. Civil society is made up of 50 individuals right now – same people 
b. Only those organizations led by English speaking individuals are getting funded 
12. What are the roles of organizations within civil society? 
13. What are the biggest challenges facing these organizations? 
14. Does your organization help organizations deal with these challenges?  
15. What are the most pressing obstacles to come? 
 
 
Probing: - networks – transferring skills – gap between your organization and the organization 
you work with.  
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APPENDIX C - Government Interview Guide 
 
1. I’d  like  to  start by asking you to tell me about yourself. 
a. Probe: previous and other current occupations 
b. Nationalities 
2. How did you become involved with (name of organization/ministry)? 
a. Probe for why they got involved and when 
3. What is the purpose or main mission of (name of organization)? 
4. How effective do you think (name of ministry) has been in achieving this mission so far? 
a. Probe for obstacles and challenges and enablers 
b. Probe for accomplishments 
5. Describe your experiences in the past year in regards to your ministry and the work you 
do. 
a. Probe: day to day work – challenges – enablers 
6. I now have some general questions about civil society. What is civil society in your 
opinion? 
7. How is civil society different now than before the revolution? 
8. Did you ever see yourself doing what you are doing now? 
a. Probe: What were the biggest pushes to get involved? 
9. What are the biggest accomplishments of civil society so far in Libya? 
10. Who is leading this effort? 
11. What are the roles of organizations within civil society? 
12. What are the biggest challenges facing these organizations? 
13. Does your organization help organizations deal with these challenges? If so how, if not, 
why not? 
14. What are the most pressing obstacles to come?  
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APPENDIX D - Citizen Interview Guide 
 
 
1. I’d  like  to  start  by  asking you to tell me about yourself. 
a. Probe: previous and other current occupations 
2. Are you involved in any civil society initiatives? 
3. I now have some general questions about civil society. What is civil society in your 
opinion? 
4. How is civil society different now than before the revolution? 
5. What are the biggest accomplishments of civil society so far in Libya? 
6. Who is leading this effort? 
a. Who are the successful organizations in your opinion? What makes them 
successful? 
7. Civil society a year ago versus now and what do you think is going to happen by next 
year? 
8. I have heard a couple of comments and I wanted to get your opinion on these statements: 
a. Civil society is made up of 50 individuals right now – same people 
b. Only those organizations led by English speaking individuals are getting funded 
9. What are the roles of organizations within civil society? 
10. What are the biggest challenges facing these organizations? 
11. What do you think these organizations do? 
12. What are the most pressing obstacles to come? 
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APPENDIX E - Informed Consent Form 
 
Study Name:  
Radical Institutional Innovation: Institutional Work, Dynamic Capabilities and the Building of 
Libya’s  Civil  Society 
 
Researcher:  
Nada Basir, B.Sc., M.Sc 
PhD Candidate Strategic Management & Policy 
Schulich School of Business, York University 
E-mail: nbasir08@schulich.yorku.ca 
 
I want to thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. I would like to talk to you today 
about your experiences and involvement in _______________________________. This is part 
of my PhD Dissertation research which looks at innovation at an institutional level and the 
individuals, organizations and processes involved. 
 
The interview should take less than an hour. I will be taping the session and taking some notes as 
I do not wish to miss any of your comments.  I would also appreciate any documents, such as 
emails, press releases, and video recordings of key events that would be beneficial to this 
research.  
 
I think you may benefit from participation in this research as sometimes when we reflect back on 
previous experiences or collect our thoughts on a topic, we can learn or understand events in a 
new way. You will also be a part of research that will hopefully pave the way to more research in 
this area and policy papers that may directly help the Libyan population. 
 
Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may choose to stop participating 
at any time. Your decision not to volunteer will not influence the relationship you may have with 
the researcher or the nature of your relationship with York University either now, or in the future. 
 
You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, if you so decide. Your 
decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not affect your 
relationship with the researchers, York University, or any other group associated with this 
project. In the event you withdraw from the study, all associated data collected will be 
immediately destroyed wherever possible. 
 
This research is confidential and no individuals or organizations will be identified without their 
written consent. Any information that could reveal your identity or that of your organization will 
be excluded from the written dissertation and any future papers or research reports that are 
written based on this research. Confidentially will be provided to the fullest extent possible by 
law and data will be securely stored for approximately ten years. After ten years all data will be 
destroyed. If the data is still required after ten years, you will be contacted for your consent. My 
contact information is provided above. If you have any questions about the substance of this 
research or this form, please feel free to contact me. 
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This research has been reviewed and approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-
Committee,   York   University’s   Ethics   Review Board and conforms to the standards of the 
Canadian Tri-Council Research Ethics guidelines. If you have any questions bout this process, or 
about your rights as a participant in the study, you may contact the Senior Manager and Policy 
Advisor for the Office of Research Ethics, 5th Floor, York Research Tower, York University. 
 
 
I, ________________________________________, consent to participate in this research  
conducted by Nada Basir. I have understood the nature of this project and wish to participate. I 
am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form. My signature below indicates my 
consent. 
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